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Abstract
This study is concerned with the impact that political institutions can have of
welfare reforms. It compares recent pension reforms adopted in three countries -
the UK, France and Switzerland - characterised by very different constitutional
arrangements. In each country, governments shared similar concerns for the
medium and long term financing of state pensions, and were equally committed to
achieve savings through a partial rethinking of pension policy. However, the
three governments were operating in substantially different institutional
environments, and developed different strategies in order to achieve a coinnion
goal.
In the UK, thanks to a constitutional structure which concentrates power in the
hands of the government, the latter was able to impose changes in face of
widespread public opposition. In contrast, in Switzerland, the high level of power
fragmentation generated by its political institutions, forced the majority to combine
saving measures with elements of expansion. Finally France, which as far as
constitutional arrangements comes somewhere between the two, managed to
adopt a (negotiated) reform when, because of contingent political factors, power
concentration was low, but failed when it was higher.
The study concludes by arguing that political institutions are an important factor
which affects the selection of a given strategy in pension reform. However, their
impact is mediated by a series of other contingencies that can influence the level of
power concentration. Of particular relevance are electoral results, which can
strengthen or weaken the bargaining power of a government, and the position in
the electoral cycle at the time of reform.
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Introduction
I started working on this project in the early 1990s, a short time after I had moved
from Switzerland to Britain. At that time I was finding out what had happened in
this country during the 1980s. The memory of Thatcher was still firmly
entrenched in discussions and in collective thinking, and the social consequences
of Thatcherism were increasingly being recognised. I instinctively compared what
I was seeing in Britain with what I had been used to in Switzerland. Many things
surprised me, but perhaps the one that most struck me was the. fact that the
various Thatcher governments, which were never supported by the majority of the
electorate, were able to implement radical and unilateral reforms regardless of
substantial criticism comiiig ATIOM large sections of society. I was amazed by the
degree of control the Conservative governments had on policy-making, and by the
extent to which they could afford to ignore what so many other people wanted.
Coming from a country which is viewed as the exemplar of consensus
democracy, my surprise was undertsandable. In Switzerland, political decisions
are generally the result of compromises that are indirectly supported by some
80% of the electorate. As political scientists have pointed out, this is not due to a
particular listening attitude of Swiss policy-makers. Rather, it is the Swiss
constitutional structure which makes provision for power-sharing and offers veto
points to unsatisfied minorities, such as referendums. The result is that
governments have tended to incorporate potential dissent, in order to reduce the
risk of being unable to get legislation accepted. For this reason, the legislative
process is among the most lengthy in Europe. For instance, work on the 1995
pension reform (the one analysed in this study) started 16 years earlier, in 1979.
A second consequence of 'consensual' policy-making, is the fact that truly
innovative policies are very unlikely. Typically, viable compromises can be
achieved only on incremental change, which affects only marginally the current
situation.
In the early 1990s, however, Switzerland was going through its worse economic
downturn since 1945, and increasingly, the neo-liberal ideas that inspired the
Thatcher reforms of the 1980s were gaining ground among Swiss elites.
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Employers, the powerful banks and the political right-wing were increasingly
arguing in favour of a more radical approach in economic and social policy, based
on lower social expenditure, a more flexible labour market, lower taxes, and so
forth. The conditions were ripe for a shift in public policy like the one
experienced by Britain in the 1980s.
In this context, I became convinced that Swiss formal institutions were likely to
constitute a formidable obstacle to the neo-liberal ambitions of economic and
political elites. The sort of reforms they were suggesting were certainly not likely
to attract support from a substantial majority of the electorate. Perhaps, a
`Thatcherite revolution' was simply impossible in the Swiss institutional context.
To try to answer this question was the initial stimulus for this study, which, more
in general, is concerned with the issue of whether welfare retrenchment is affected
by constitutional structures. I chose to concentrate on the particular area of
pensions because public pensions are one of the programmes that are most
strongly supported by the public and as a result the institutional obstacle to
retrenchment is likely to be more visible. For it is not institutions per se that
impede retrenchment. They can provide an opportunity to influence policy, but
there needs to be a social group prepared to take up this opportunity, otherwise
the potential impact of institutions on policy remains unexploited. In this respect,
the focus on institutions should not be accompanied by neglect for social forces.
Since the UK and Switzerland are two rather extreme versions of majoritarian and
consensus democracy respectively, I decided to include in the analysis a third
country, France, which can be seen as being half-way between the two. France
was also a particularly interesting case because of the topicality of the pension
issue there: despite a rapidly growing deficit in the pension scheme budget,
governments of different political orientations had long been unable to win the
unions' resistance to a reduction in pension entitlements.
As I am about to complete this project, the pension issue remains crucial in most
European countries. It has gained additional prominence also because of the
commitment of many EU countries to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).
Because access to the EMU depends on a number of economic criteria, including
the level of government budget deficit, these EU countries are under pressure to
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save public funds. Pensions, which is generally the single largest item in social
expenditure, are obviously a privileged target for cuts.
In France, after various attempts at cutting back public pensions, the right-wing
government has been voted out of office, as it promised austerity measures in
order to qualify for the EMU. In Switzerland work has already started on a new
pension reform, which should guarantee the financial viability of the basic
scheme. In Britain, the most pressing issue is not cost. Instead, the problems
generated by a largely unregulated private pension sector have become
increasingly evident. Now the debate is on how to regulate it better.
Hopefully, the findings of this study will help to explain why given paths to
pension reform are adopted in some countries but not in others. It is argued that
the political limits to welfare retrenchment are country specific and that they
depend on the institutional opportunities for influencing policy provided by
formal institutions to the relevant groups. In general, when institutions favour
power concentration, legislation reflects the government's priorities to a larger
extent. In contrast, when a political system is characterised by power
fragmentation, governments have to make concessions or to accept the inclusion
in new legislation of non-retrenchment elements in order to secure the approval or
at least the acquiescence of the relevant interest groups, most often the labour
movement.
These mechanisms of power concentration/fragmentation are likely to become
more important in the future, as the main political cleavage in social policy seems
to be shifting from the left-right axis to an opposition between governments and
trade unions, to a large extent regardless of the political orientation of the
government. This has long been the case in France where the Socialist
governments of the 1980s clashed with the unions on a number of welfare issues.
As new left-of-centre governments have been voted into power in Europe, this
shift in the dominant cleavage in the politics of social policy is likely to become
more evident. In Italy, it is becoming clear that the centre left government is
committed to a possibly radical reform of the welfare state, and the main struggle
will be between them and the unions. Economic conditions allow very narrow
room for manoeuvre, and as a result the left, even when in power, has little choice
but to adopt retrenchment policies in the area of welfare.
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If it is true that the main cleavage in social policy reform will not be the left-right
one but the opposition between governments and organised labour, then the
institutional explanation of policy outcomes might acquire some additional
relevance and replace the 'politics matter' thesis as one of the key approaches to
policy analysis. In fact, the degree of influence trade unions 1-mve on policy
depends to a large extent on the access they are allowed to policy-making.
This study looks at how formal institutions, and in particular constitutional
structures have affected the course of pension reform in three countries, selected
because of their different patterns of power concentration/fragmentation. It begins
by looking at the socio-economic pressures on pension schemes, in particular
ageing (chapter 1). These socio-economic pressures are then translated into
debates, policy-making and ultimately in policy-outcomes. The link between
socio-economic pressures and policy outcomes is obviously mediated by a series
of political, institutional and cultural factors, which have inspired the theoretical
works on the determinants of social policy. Some of these are reviewed in chapter
2, and on this basis, a set of hypotheses in relation to how the different countries
are likely to deal with the pension problem is put forward. Before looking at the
course of policy in the three countries, chapter 3 looks at some methodological
issues.
Chapters 4 to 6 are attempts at reconstructing the political processes that led to the
adoption of pension reforms in the three countries. As far as possible, I have tried
to follow a similar structure in the presentation of the case-studies. First, I look at
the institutional and political context in which reforms have been adopted; second
I provide a description of the country's pension system. The third part
concentrates on the pension policy-making process, and finally, I try to provide a
link between what has been observed and the theoretical framework presented in
chapter 2. Finally, chapter 7 highlights the key elements that emerge from the




DIMENSIONS OF THE PENSION PROBLEM:
INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS
The long term sustainability of current pension arrangements is one of the major
issues which advanced societies will have to deal with over the next few decades.
The projected increase of the size of the older population, combined with a
reduction in the number of workers, constitutes a significant challenge to the
viability of existing pension systems, which, according to many, need to be
substantially reformed. While these general views are widely accepted, there is little
agreement as to what the actual size of the pension problem is now and will be in
the future. Those who have analysed the phenomenon have reached conclusions
which range from apocalyptic scenarios in which, if nothing is done, the elderly
will appropriate increasing large shares of national income with massive detrimental
consequences on the welfare of younger generations (Thurow 1996), to less
pessimistic ones, where the occurrence of an increase in pension expenditure is
accepted as possible, but it is felt that this will not constitute a major economic
problem (Johnson and Falkingham 1992).
Arguably, gloomy predictions of a 'demographic time bomb' deserve little
credibility. However, it seems clear that when the baby-boomers born after World
War If are going to reach retirement age, pension expenditure is going to increase
quite dramatically over a relatively short period of time. Moreover, some recent
developments have put additional pressure on pension schemes. First, recent
economic changes have resulted in increased international competition and in an
upswing in unemployment figures in most European countries. The result is a
reduction in tax and contribution revenues, which has affected the financial viability
of pensions schemes as well as of other government programmes. Second,
countries willing to participate to the European Monetary Union need to respect a
number of economic criteria. In particular, government budget deficits higher than
3% of GDP are not considered as acceptable. As a result, countries committed to
join and to remain in the European single currency (such as France, Germany or
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Italy) have taken steps to reduce public expenditure. Pensions, as the largest single
item in most government budgets, constitute an obvious target for saving measures.
Finally, unlike a few years ago, the current dominant approach to economic policy
favours balanced government budgets. Again, this is likely to encourage policy
makers to turn to pensions. These elements combined with the threat of a
substantial change in the demographic structure of the population, constitute a
powerful pressure on governments to take action.
This chapter discusses some of the elements that contribute to define the pension
problem. Above all, it aims to establish what are the conditions in which the
pension problem emerges and in which debates on the future of pensions take
place, or in other words, the factual background against which political actors
operate. In this respect, it constitutes the basis on which to build an analysis of the
politics of pension reform. First it provides an overview of provision for retirement
in industrial countries. It looks at the differences between pension systems and at
their origins. Starting points can be important for the course of reform, as they
channel debates in some given directions. Second, it focuses on the socio-economic
pressures that are likely to affect pension policy over the next few years. The
discussion covers demographic and expenditure projections as well as the living
standards of the retired population.
The chapter concludes by making the case for an analysis of the politics of pension
reform. Pension systems are highly sensitive distributional mechanisms. They
transfer huge sums of money across generations, time, occupational groups,
income groups, genders and so forth. In this respect, pension systems are political
creatures. Their distributional equilibrium reflects the power relationship between
the different political actors who designed them. The result is that once a settlement
is reached, departures from that arrangement are likely to be extremely delicate
exercises. In particular, when it is a matter of achieving savings, it is almost
impossible to reform a pension scheme and to maintain the same distributional
equilibria. Some groups are bound to lose out. That is why, pension policy in
general, and especially the recent pension reforms, have been characterised by an
impressive level of political controversy.
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1.1. THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL: AN OVERVIEW OF PENSION
SYSTEMS 1
As in other areas of social policy, there are substantial cross-country variations in
pension systems, even if the analysis is restricted to a fairly homogeneous geo-
political area, like western Europe. Palme, for instance, looking at pension systems
in 18 OECD countries, points out that 'countries are similar in the very simple sense
that they all have legislated old-age pension programs.' (1990: 147). Beyond that, it
becomes more difficult to find consistency between different pension systems.
Several attempts to make sense of variations have been made, some of which are
reviewed below. In particular, it has been tried to identify ideal-types of pension
provision, which can be found in a more or less pure form in a number of
countries. To a large extent, this exercise overlaps with the more general effort
aimed at classifying welfare states, as pensions typically constitute the largest social
programme and are often seen as the backbone of a welfare state.
The classification of welfare states in recent years has tended to revolve around
three types, or regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) or four depending on whether or
not one considers southern European welfare states to constitute a distinctive
category. This approach focuses mainly on the outcomes of social programmes, in
terms of decommodification2 and social stratification. A socialist or social
democratic regime is found in Nordic countries. Their welfare arrangements
(including pensions) cover the whole population, perform a fair amount of vertical
redistribution, and access to benefits is less dependent on labour-market
participation than it is the case in other countries. A second model, referred to as
corporatist or conservative, is found in continental European countries. The key
social programmes cover the working population only, and grant earnings-related
benefits which guarantee the maintenance of status differentials in times of
inactivity. Those who do not participate in the labour market have to rely on often
stigmatising social assistance schemes. Finally, a liberal regime is found in English-
speaking countries. Its most distinctive character is the preference for programmes
'Throughout this study the notion of 'pension system' is used to designate the totality of transfers to
the older population which are either compulsory, provided by the state or encouraged by legislation
(e.g. through tax concessions). This excludes other sources of income for the elderly such as earnings,
private savings, social assistance and intra-family transfers. A pension scheme, by contrast, is
understood here as a single arrangement which has the aim of providing income to older people. In
virtually all industrial countries pension systems consist of various pension schemes.
2Decommodification is defined as 'the degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially
acceptable standard of living independently of market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990: 37)
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targeted on the poorest sections of the population. It reinforces social divisions
because the affluent have no stake in these programmes. In addition, since benefits
are often very low, it does not constitute an alternative to individual provision. The
existence of a fourth regime of Southern European welfare states has been
postulated (Leibfried 1992 . _Ferrera 1996b). Its key features are a highly
fragmented income maintenance system with a strong emphasis on old age
pensions, the persistence of clientelism, and a stronger reliance on the family as an
alternative to labour market-participation.
In contrast to Esping-Andersen's preference for outcomes, studies dealing only
with old age pensions have typically concentrated on the institutional design of the
various systems and on their evolution in a historical perspective. Reference is often
made to two initial models of pension provision which were introduced at the end
of the 19th century in Germany, Denmark and New Zealand. In 1889, Germany
instituted a pension scheme for industrial workers. The scheme was meant to
guarantee retirees a level of income related to their earnings while in work.
Denmark (1891) and New Zealand (1898), in contrast, introduced a means-tested
pension scheme targeted on the poor (Myles and Quadagno 1996; Overbye 1996b).
These two models of pension policy had two very different underlying objectives.
In the German case, the scheme introduced by Bismarck was part of a political
project aimed at containing the rise of the labour movement. The adoption of a
pension scheme, as well as of other social programmes introduced more or less
simultaneously, were meant to buy the allegiance of the rapidly emerging working
class. As a matter of fact, Bismarckian social legislation was accompanied by laws
which banned the political organisation of workers (Alber 1986: 5; Baldwin 1990:
59-65). Understandably, the schemes were confined to industrial workers as other
groups did not constitute a threat to social stability and Bismarck had no immediate
interest in improving their condition. The Danish scheme, in contrast, did not have
such an overt political aim. Its introduction constituted mainly a modernisation of
the existing system of Poor Laws (Baldwin 1990: 65-76). Its objective was to
alleviate poverty across the whole population. Given their different goals, the two
original approaches to pension policy used different means as well. The German
scheme was financed by contributions equally shared by employers and employees
(with a state subsidy), it granted earnings-related benefits and entitlement to a
pension was based on contribution records. Its overall result was status
maintenance. In Denmark, by contrast, the 1891 pension scheme was tax-financed,
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means-tested and granted flat-rate benefits. As such, it continued in an ameliorated
form the tradition of poor relief enshrined in the previous system of Poor Laws.
In subsequent years, other countries followed the example set by Germany and
Denmark. In general, the German lead was followed in continental Europe. In
France this came as a result of the re-annexation of Alsace and Lorraine after World
War I. As these two regions had been part of Germany before the war, they already
had a compulsory system of social insurance. This was extended to the rest of the
country in 1930 (Saint Jours 1982: 95). In Italy a compulsory pension scheme
covering industrial employees only, was introduced in 1919 (Artoni and Zanardi
1996: 1). Switzerland was a latecomer as a compulsory pension scheme at the
federal level was introduced only in 1948 (see chapter 5). In contrast, the Danish
(and New Zealand) model was followed in other Nordic countries (Salminen
1993), though with some variation, and in other English-speaking countries (such
as the UK in 1908), with the notable exception of the US, which in 1936
introduced an earnings-related scheme closer to the Bismarckian tradition (Overbye
1996b). Figure 1.1 shows the initial choices in the area of pension provision in a
number of countries.
Table 1.1. Origin of pension policy in selected countries (first compulsory or
comprehensive nation-wide scheme)
















* for industrial employees only
Source: adapted from Overbye 1996b
These two initial models of pension provision can also be seen as ideal-types in the
analysis of past and current developments in pension policy. In fact the distinction
between the two is often used in order to classify pension schemes and systems. In
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the literature, different terminology is found in relation to these two models,
however, perhaps somewhat anachronistically 3 , the two traditions can be
conveniently labelled with reference to Bismarck and Beveridge, two key figures in
the development of modem welfare states who had very different motives for their
actions. The Beveridge plan, in fact, set out to achieve 'freedom from want' and as
such it was consistent with the objectives of the Danish and New Zealand social
reformers. As seen above, Bismarck was worried more with social stability in the
context of rapid industrialisation and rise of the labour movement.
Like all classifications, the one presented here is a crude simplification of the real
world. In fact, other authors have suggested more complex ways of categorising
pension schemes. Some (Ferrera 1993a; Overbye 1996a) further distinguish
between (Bismarckian) insurance programmes which cover the whole population
of a country (Switzerland, US) and those in which different groups are covered by
different arrangements (Germany, France, Italy). Niemela and Salminen (1995)
have put forward a four type classification, which uses the basis of entitlement in
order to discriminate between pension schemes (instead of the objective). The result
is a categorisaion where pension schemes are grouped according to whether
entitlement depends on citizenship, social condition (need), employment or private
contract. The approach is not much dissimilar from the one reviewed above, the
main difference being the distinction between means-tested and universal schemes
and the introduction of private schemes.
While most countries initiated pension policy by adopting one or the other model
discussed above, the overall trend in subsequent years, but in particular after World
War II, has been towards a convergence in pension provision (Chassard and
Quentin 1992; Overbye 1996b). In general, the first step taken in either of the two
'worlds' was to expand provision so as to cover larger shares of the population. In
Bismarckian countries, this was done by progressively including other
occupationally-defined groups into the existing social insurance system. In 1911
Germany introduced a new scheme for white collar employees; and in 1957 one for
farmers. In France, the regime general, which was meant to cater for the whole
3 In fact, as the above discussion shows, the schemes that are commonly referred to as `Beveridgean'
were introduced well before the publication of the Beveridge report of 1942. In addition, the predominant
use of the word 'Beveridgean' in comparative social policy refer to tax-financed schemes, which is in
contrast with Beveridge's preference for contribution financing (Silburn 1995: 92-93). This peculiar
understanding of the term `Beveridgean' in comparative social policy probably developed because of the
focus on the overall objective of Beveridgean social policy, poverty prevention, rather than on the
instruments he suggested to use.
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population, was set up in 1946 (see chapter 6). In Italy additional compulsory
schemes for farmers, non-industrial employees, and the self-employed were set up
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, with the notable exception of
Germany4, countries which initially followed the Bismarckian lead, such as France,
Italy, Switzerland and the US introduced income-tested pensions, either within the
insurance system or as additional schemes to provide for those who did not have a
sufficient contribution record to afford them an adequate pension.
A similar trend towards enlargement in pension coverage can be observed in
countries that started with means-tested pensions, which were expanded into
universal schemes. This was done in most countries after World War II and took
the form of a citizenship pension in Scandinavian countries (Sahninen 1993) and in
the UK, of a contributory pension, which however, because it grants flat-rate
benefits that are just above the social assistance level, remains closer to the
Beveridgean ideal-type than to the Bismarckian one. Because universal flat-rate
benefits were rather low, especially for those on relatively high incomes, the post-
war period saw a rise in occupational provision in these countries. In some
countries, like Sweden and the UK, supplementary earnings-related coverage was
made compulsory for employees.
In most countries, the result of convergence has been a two-tiered pension system,
where the first tier aims at guaranteeing a subsistence level to the whole population;
the second tier, instead, allows retirees to maintain a living standard close to the one
they had while working (Chassard and Quentin 1992; Overbye 1996a). The notion
of convergence seems accurate to describe developments in the functions fulfilled
by pension systems. The guarantee of a minimum income combined with a partial
replacement of earnings is a common feature to almost all pension systems. There
are exceptions, though. Germany, beside a minimum pension, which however
requires 25 years of contributions, does not have an income-tested pension.
Conversely, Denmark does not have a compulsory earnings-related element in its
pension system.
Convergence, thus, has occurred mainly with regard to the functions of pension
policy (poverty prevention and income maintenance). In contrast, when analysis
4The German basic pension scheme does have an internal minimum (Rente nach Mindesteincommen) but
since it requires 25 contribution years, it does not constitute a guarantee of a pension regardless of
contribution record. It entitles recipients to 75% of average earnings. Older people who do not fulfil the
25 years contribution requirement if in need have to rely on social assistance.
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shifts from the functions to the details of the various components of pension
systems, the variation that can be observed across industrialised countries is still
impressive. Important differences exist with regard to benefit formulas, source of
financing (taxation or contributions), financing method (funded or pay-as-you-go)
and in the roles played b- private and occupational provision. In general, the initial
choice in term of the Bismarck or the Beveridge model still affects the current shape
of a pension system.
The institutional design of a pension system can be relevant to the current debate on
pension reform in two different ways. First, it is possible that different systems are
affected in different ways by current socio-economic change. Second, countries
might respond differently to the pension problem depending on the key features of
their pension system. There are reasons to believe that when it comes to reform
pension schemes, depending on the overall design of a system, some options may
be more politically attractive than others (Myles and Quadagno: 1996; Pierson
1996b). These two hypotheses are dealt with in the next section and in the next
chapter respectively.
1.2. THE ECONOMIC DEBATE: AGEING, PENSION FINANCING
AND PENSIONERS' WELFARE
Debates on the present and on the future of pension policy usually make reference to
three different socio-economic developments which are likely to affect the viability
of pension schemes. First, demographic ageing, the increase in the proportion of
older people in the total population, constitutes an ever present background to any
discussion on pension policy and pension reform. According to currently available
projections, in industrial countries, particularly in Europe, the population age
structure is expected to change dramatically over the next 50 years as a result of a
decline in birth rates, an increase in life expectancy and a reduction in the scale of
migration, with possible consequences on the financial viability of pension
schemes. Second, pension schemes' receipts and outlays depend on a number of
developments in the sphere of production. In particular, increases in productivity
and increases in labour market participation rates can have a substantial impact on
the financing side of pension schemes, and possibly offset the negative effects of
demographic change. These developments, which are almost impossible to predict,
are nonetheless crucial in any discussion on the viability of pension schemes. Third,
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particularly in English-speaking countries, there is growing concern with regard to
notions of generational equity. It is assumed that the older population today
constitutes a relatively affluent group in society. As population ageing will increase
this group's financial requirements, it is considered fair that the elderly contribute to
_ solve this problem, possibly by accepting reductions in pension expenditure and in
their living standards (Longman 1987; Thurow 1996; for a critical discussion, see
Quadagno 1989 and Walker 1994).
These economic variables constitute the overall background against which debates
on the future of pensions and policy changes take place. They are the starting point
of virtually any discussion on pension policy. Possibly because they are
characterised by a significant degree of uncertainty, they can also be instruments in
the hands of political actors aiming at redefining existing distributional equilibria in
the area of old age pensions. In this respect it is important, prior to any discussion
on the politics of pension reform, to establish what the reality of these variables is.
On the basis of studies carried out by international agencies and of a comparison of
different national situations, this section will try to provide a picture of the socio-
economic component in the pension debate.
Demographic change
There is a relatively widespread agreement among analysts on the fact that the
proportion of older people in western societies is going to increase over the next 50
years. This is the result of recent trends in fertility rates, which have been declining
since the 1960s and in life expectancy, which has been increasing since World War
11. As figure 1.2 shows, population projections produced by international agencies
tend to confirm this view. However, they also highlight the existence of substantial










Figure 1.1. Population age structure projections in selected countries
(source: OECD 1995; for Switzerland, recalculation of data from World Bank 1994;
same assumptions are used)
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Figure 1 , based on World Bank demographic projections (1994), makes this point
very clearly. While all countries will experience an increase in the proportion of
older people, the variation in the relative size of the working population is expected
to be more severe in Italy, Germany and Switzerland. In these countries, the
absolute size of the working population is expected to decline as well as its relative
size after 2005. In the UK the transition seems to be less dramatic. In particular, the
size of the working age population is going to remain roughly constant.
These projections have to be looked at carefully, as they are based on a number of
assumptions on which there is in fact little certitude. The age structure of a
population is affected by three key variables: mortality, migration, fertility, and by
the current age structure. Typically, trends in fertility are measured by the fertility
rate, which is defined as the number of children per women in the reproductive ages
(15-45). Trends in mortality can be measured either with a death rate (death per
1000 population), or, more commonly, by life expectancy. In a society with no net
migration changes the age structure of a population depend only on fertility and
mortality.
Demographic projections are particularly sensitive to assumptions made with regard
to future fertility rates, as this determines the size of the new generations that feed
into the age pyramid and over time affect the size of the different age groups.
Fertility rates, however, are also particularly difficult to predict (Johnson and
Falkingham 1992: 21; OECD 1988b: 16). The overall trend in fertility rates in
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western countries has been one of decline for the past century. However, after
World War II there has been an upswing in fertility, followed by a decline since the
1960s. There are a number of factors behind these developments. Economic
expectations are usually considered to be the main determinant of people's decisions
with regard to having children (Ermisch 1983). Nevertheless, it seems clear that
other factors have played an important role in recent developments in fertility, and
are likely to do so in the future. The availability of contraception, the increased
participation of women in the labour market, the character and scale of family
policies are all factors that have probably influenced recent trends in fertility.
World Bank's and OECD's population projections are based on the assumption that
fertility rates will remain constant until 2005 and that they will then gradually
increase and converge on 2.1 in 2030. Similar assumptions are made by other
agencies as well. However, recent developments, particularly in the Nordic
countries, suggest that fertility rates may be more volatile than expected. For
instance, in the case of Sweden, fertility increased from 1.6 in 1983 to 2.1 in 1990,
but dropped to 1.6 in 1996 (Calot and Sardon 1996). The upswing has been
explained with reference to Sweden's work-friendly family polices, such as free
child care and generous maternity leave, as a result of which Swedish women do
not experience a trade-off between work and motherhood like many of their
Continental European counterparts (Esping-Andersen 1996b: 78). On the other
hand, the recession of the 1990s, and the fact that the generosity of the Swedish
welfare state is increasingly being questioned, are possibly the reasons behind the
recent decline in fertility (Calot and Sardon 1996).
Changes in life expectancy, unless they are very unstable, have a lower impact on
the age structure of a population, as they affect only the upper end of the pyramid
(Johnson and Falkingham 1992: 21). In addition, trends in mortality rates and in
life expectancy seem relatively easy to predict. In general, mortality rates have
declined gradually in the past and they can be expected to continue along the same
line (OECD I988b: 16). The World Bank's population projections assume an
increase in life expectancy at birth of about 5 years between 1995 and 2035. With
regard to the problem of pension financing, however, what matters is not life
expectancy at birth, but at the age of retirement. As Sturm points out, the two can be
quite different. Looking at EU-12 countries, he notes that 'less than one half of the
increase in life expectancy of males (and one quarter of females) has been due to the
increase in life expectancy at the age of 60' (1992: 24).
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Migration can also have a substantial impact on the age structure. Nevertheless, in
so far as the economic impact of population ageing is concerned, migration is not
likely to play an important role. In Europe, in fact, high levels of immigration
occurred at times of labour shortage, which is not the case at rr_esent. Labour
shortage is likely to occur only if there is a dramatic upswing in economic activity,
which would by itself considerably reduce the difficulties involved in coping with
population ageing.
In sum, there seems to be a relatively high degree of uncertainty with regard to
population age structure projections. In general, because the fertility rate is the most
relevant factor and yet the most difficult to predict, projections are reliable only if
they look at the generations who have already been born. For instance, the ratio
between the above retirement age population and the working age population is not
going to be affected by changes in fertility for the next 15 to 20 years, i.e. until
when today's newborn are going to enter the labour market. Current projections of
the population above 15-20 years of age, thus, should be considered as relatively
reliable until around 2015. Beyond this time-horizon it is extremely difficult to
produce useful projections. However, in most countries, the period between 2000
and 2015 will almost certainly see an increase in the relative size of the retired
population. This development is likely to have an impact on the financial viability of
pension systems.
Projecting pension expenditure
Age structure projections provide only one element for the assessment of the future
viability of retirement systems. In fact, a number of other factors are going to affect
receipts and outlays of pension schemes, the most important of which are increases
in productivity, changes in labour force participation rates and national pension
legislation. The projections given in figure 1.3 take into account these factors.
Variations reflect to a large extent the differences in the expected pattern of
demographic ageing as seen in figure 1.2. This means that expenditure projections
depend to a large extent on the assumptions made for demographic projections.
However, the degree of variation here is even more striking than in the simple
demographic projections. While Germany and Italy are expected to reach
expenditure levels of around 18 % of GDP in 2035, France and Switzerland are
forcasted to spend around 14% of GDP after 2035. In contrast, in the UK, public
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pension expenditure is expected to remain at around the current level of 5% of GDP
for the whole period concerned.
Figure 1.2. Pension payments and contributions as a percent of GDP in selected
countries
(source: OECD 1995; for Switzerland, recalculation of data from World Bank
1994)
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Like age structure forecasts, projections of pension expenditure and financing
should be looked at carefully. First, as seen above, there is little certainty on the
validity of the demographic projections on which they are based beyond the year
2015. Second, in order to produce expenditure projections it is necessary to make
additional assumptions on indicators which are extremely difficult to predict such as
the labour force participation rate (LFPR), increases in productivity, and the extent
to which such increases will be reflected in pension scheme revenues and outlays.
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The OECD projections reported in figure 2 are based on the assumption that the
LFPR is going to remain constant after the year 2000. However, there are some
reasons to believe that this is not going to be the case. First, there are considerable
variations in LFPRs in Europe. To a large extent this is due to differences in
women's involvement in th,_.—l abour market, and current trends seem to suggest the
participation rate of women is going to increase in the future, especially in countries
where it is comparatively low (Schmahl 1990: 167). Second, the demographic
transition is expected, in some countries at least, to imply a significant reduction in
the size of the working age population. If this trend is not accompanied by a
corresponding reduction in labour demand, it is likely that LFPRs are going to
increase and to absorb part of the currently unemployed population. As the baby-
boomers are going to retire after 2005, they will free up more jobs for younger
generations, so that the unemployment rate might decline (George and Taylor-
Gooby 1996).
LFPRs are a crucial element in any debate on the future of pensions. In fact,
according to some commentators, the financing of pensions in the future is more an
employment problem rather than a demographic one. As a recent EU report put it:
If job availability [...] could be expanded over the next 30 years to
reduce unemployment [...] and to accommodate a continuing increase
in the participation of women in the work force, as well as perhaps a
reversal of the trend towards early retirement, this would more than
offset the effect on the dependency ratio of the ageing of the population
and make it easier to effect the income transfer required. If on the other
hand [...] job availability remains low, then any significant transfer will
present serious problems, irrespective of how pensions scheme are
funded in the meantime (European Commission 1995: 13).
A second important assumption refers to increases in productivity and to the extent
to which these increases are reflected in benefits and on contribution/taxation
revenues. The OECD projections reported above assume an increase in productivity
of 1.5% per annum. How much of this increase is going to be reflected on pension
benefits and contribution/taxation revenues, depends on national pension and tax
legislation. In countries such as the UK, where increases in wages have almost no
impact on benefits (with the exception of SERPS; the basic pension is flat-rate and
upgraded according to prices), increases in productivity have a substantial positive
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impact on the country's ability to finance pensions. In contrast, in countries like
France or Italy, where benefits are earnings-related, part of the increase in
productivity will result in an increase in benefits. In addition, if pension schemes
are financed only through employment-related contributions (France), it is also
important to know whether the increase in productivity is reflected on wages, as it
does not otherwise contribute to the financing of pensions. With regard to France, a
study has shown that between 1970 and 1993 the growth rate of wages was close to
that of GDP. However, between 1970 and 1976 wages rose faster than GDP,
between 1976 and 1981 they increased roughly at the same rate, but after 1981
salaries have risen significantly slower than GDP, on average by 1 percentage point
per year (De Foucault 1994: 8).
The projections in figure 1.2. assume that in all countries current legislation is
applied consistently throughout the projected period. However, it can also be
argued that as increases in productivity will result in rising wages, current workers
might be prepared to give up a larger share of their salary for financing pensions.
As noted in an earlier OECD report 'the shift in the demographic structure is
manageable even assuming a quite moderate rise in real income, but then requires a
major redistribution of resources between generations' (OECD 1988a: 41).
This last observation highlights the presence of two distinct dimensions in the
debate on the future viability of pension schemes. The first dimension is macro-
economic and refers to the ability of the economy as a whole to sustain a larger
section of its population in retirement. In relation to this dimension, a crucial aspect
is the productivity of those who are in work. If it is high enough, the
intergenerational transfer does not constitute a serious problem. On the other hand,
there is a micro-economic problem, which relates to how each individual is going to
participate in this transfer. If, as it is the case in most public schemes, current
expenditure is financed by contributions and/or taxes levied on current earnings,
then the reduction in numbers of the active population relative to those in retirement
will result in an increase in the amount that each of them is expected to contribute to
the system. As a result, the future viability of pension systems will depend also on
the willingness of the working population to share part of its income with retirees.
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Pay-as-you-go versus funded schemes
These two dimensions of the pension problem are related to two different
financing methods for pension expenditure. Typically, pension schemes are
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis or are funded (or a mix between the two). In the
first case, current expenditure on pensions is financed by contributions and taxes
levied on current earnings. In the second case, funded schemes, the contributions
paid by the current generation are invested and will be used to finance their
pensions once they retire. From the macro-economic point of view, there is no
difference between these two financing methods. As Johnson and Falkingham put
it:
If the ratio of pensioners to workers rises, but if the relative incomes
of workers and pensioners remain constant, then this necessarily
implies that the claim on current output exercised by pensioners will
increase. In an unfunded public pension system this claim is exercised
through the tax system, but in a founded private pension system it is
exercised through the return to capital owned by the pension fund. The
alternative funding systems have no differential impact on the overall
national income, the only difference lies in the degree of social and
political legitimacy attached to the alternative mechanisms for
appropriating some of the output of current workers (Johnson and
Falkingham 1992: 148; see also for the same view Gilliand 1988).
In fact this is true only if the funds accumulated by funded schemes are invested
within the country where the pensioners live. If this is not the case, then foreign
workers are going to contribute to financing the living expenses of retired
population. This fact might acquire some relevance if the investment is made in
Third World countries, which have a more favourable age structure. In this case,
the shift in the generational balance might be countered by getting younger
workers in Third World countries to support western ageing populations.
While in a closed economy the macro-economic impact of ageing is not affected
by the funding method of pensions, from a micro-economic point of view, the
difference can be quite substantial. The revenue side of a pay-as-you-go system,
especially if financed by employment-related contributions, is more sensitive to
variations in aggregate wages than to changes in GDP. As seen above, increases
in GDP are not always reflected on wages, which means that increases in national
income might be of little use to the financing of pensions. A deterioration in the
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dependency rate, means that a higher proportion of workers' earnings will have to
be used to finance current expenditure on pensions. In contrast, in a funded
scheme, older people become capital owners, and live on the profits produced by
the capital they own, plus the revenue produced by selling it to the working
generations who will retire later on, and so forth. In this way two components of
GDP, wages and profits, are contributing to the financing of pensions.
On the other hand, funded scheme have the disadvantage of being more sensitive to
inflation. In the UK, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the erosion of savings for
retirement was a major concern for policy-makers. In addition, pension funds are
also sensitive to fluctuations on capital markets. It has been pointed out that an
excessive reliance on funding combined with population ageing might actually
contribute to these fluctuations. 'As the baby-boomers save heavily in middle age in
all countries, an excess in savings on capital world markets would tend to drive
down the rate of return and stimulate asset price inflation. However, when the large
baby-boom cohorts retire, pension funds in all countries will want to realise their
assets, which will tend to drive down asset prices (Johnson and Falkingham: 1992:
148). The result might be that defined benefit scheme might be unable to meet their
obligations whereas defined contribution ones will end up paying lower than
expected pensions5 (ibid.; Ermisch 1990: 47).
The discussion on the relative merits of different financing methods seems to be
affected by the same overall uncertainty which characterises the more general debate
on the future of pension provision. In a recent report, the OECD suggests a mix
between funded and pay-as-you-go financing, where the latter should be used to
guarantee a minimum level of income security while additional provision should be
funded (OECD 1994: 14-16). In some countries (France, Germany, Italy),
however, this model would imply a major shift in the financing method, which
raises the issue of 'double funding', i.e. the fact that the current generation is asked
to provide for current retirees through a pay-as-you-go system and to save for its
own old age. This, as will be discussed below, constitutes a major political
problem.
5In defined benefit schemes, the amount of the pension is expressed as a percentage of a salary (final or
the average of a given number of years). This level is guaranteed regardless of the performance of the
invested capital. In contrast, in defined contribution schemes, there is no guaranteed level for pension
benefits, which depend entirely on the amount paid in contributions and the interest earned on that
amount.
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Pensioners' living standards and the debate on generational equity
If the effectiveness of old age policy is measured by the extent to which the living
standards of older people have improved over the years, state intervention in the
area of pensions has been a success story in most countries. It is widely accepted
that during the post-war period pensioners as a whole have progressively moved
from being a relatively deprived group in society to relative affluence. This is a
result of the overall movement of expansion in pension provision that has taken
place over the last 50 years in western European countries. Public schemes have
become more generous and coverage has been extended. In OECD countries
between 1960 and 1985 expenditure on old age pensions as a proportion of GDP
increased by 146%, mainly as a result of changes in eligibility and in the level of
benefits (OECD 1988a: 26). In addition, almost in all western European countries,
there has been an important expansion of occupational pensions, and more recently
of private plans, as a result of which the overall inter-generational transfer has
increased over the years.
The relatively favourable economic situation enjoyed by many older people,
combined with the concern associated with the expected increase in the proportion
of elderly people in industrial societies, has sparked a debate on the issue of fairness
and equity in inter-generational transfers. OECD studies show that because of
differences in cohort size, some generations end up being net contributors to the
state system while others are net beneficiaries. The debate is not confined to
pensions, as there other areas in which expenditure is related to age (such as health
care and social care) and because the debt policy of a government is also relevant to
generational accounting. A recent OECD report summed up the results of a
comparative study as follows: 'The calculation reveals generational imbalances in
favour of living generations. If policies do not change generations that are born after
the base year 1993 are likely to have a significantly greater tax burden than present
generations' (OECD 1995: 38).
These considerations have entered political debates, mainly in English-speaking
countries and particularly in the United States. It has been argued that older people
are enjoying an affluent retirement at the expenses of current working generations,
and particularly of the young who are having to put up with squeezes in education
budgets to finance public pensions and other social programmes (Thurow 1996).
The policy implication of this analysis is that radical steps to contain and possibly
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reduce pension expenditure must be taken to redress the unfairness brought about
by the substantial growth in pension provision over the past decades. From an
economic point of view, the affluent status of older people, allows room for
manoeuvre to politicians to achieve substantial savings.
The available evidence on the generosity of pension schemes and living standards
of older people does support the overall claim that older people are better off than
they were in the past, and that they can be considered as a relatively affluent group
in society. These overall trends, however, conceal country variations, and, within
countries, differences between income groups. Country variations are quite
substantial as far as replacement rates of public pension schemes are concerned
(table 1.1.).
Table 1.1. Replacement rates of public pension schemes as a proportion of net
average salary, EU-12 countries and Switzerland, for a single person with a full
contribution record, in 1993
% of average earnings 66% 100% 200%
%
Belgium 59 47 36
Denmark 51 34 17
Germany 53 53 39
Spain 90 90 90
Greece 112 98 87
France 78 69 59
Ireland 44 29 15
Italy 78 78 82
Luxembourg 76 67 54
Netherlands 50 33 17
Portugal 77 77 77
United Kingdom 42 33 23
Switzerland 47 36 20
Source: Securite Sociale 5/1993: 22
As table 1.1. shows, there are quite important national differences in the level of
replacement rates. Three groups of countries can be identified in relation to the
replacement rates of public pension schemes. First, the highest rates are found in
southern European countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain), where the level of
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the pension is close to the actual salary. A second group includes France, Germany,
Belgium and Luxembourg. There replacement rates are still high, but pensions
replace only about half of the salary. Third, the lowest rates are found in countries
which have a flat-rate system, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark the UK and in
Switzerland, where there is a lower and an upper limit on the benefit (, -->ce chapter
5).
The extent of this variation, however, should not be exaggerated. For instance, the
low level of wages in Southern European countries means that high replacement
rates do not necessarily mean high pensions. In addition, countries which have low
replacement rates tend to have a widespread system of occupational pensions which
are not included in the table. Namely, in the Netherlands, in the UK and in
Switzerland, a second tier-pension is compulsory for most employees, which
means that for the majority of retired people in these countries income in retirement
is higher than what is suggested by replacement rates. If one takes these factors intn
account, then the differences in pension provision between European countries are
perhaps not as important as it appears form the analysis based simply on
replacement rates.
Replacement rates give a measure of the size of the public component of pension
provision. However, in the debate on fairness of generational transfers, what is
also seen as crucial is the living standards enjoyed by today's pensioners. Table 1.2
looks at older people incomes in relation to those of the working population in
different countries. A second dimension is added in table 1.2, i.e. the variation in
older people's incomes within a country. Interestingly, replacement rates and
pensioner's living standards do not seem be related at all.
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Table 1.2. Ratio of average income of quintile groups of older people to overall
average income of the total population, selected countries, mid-1980.
Country Lowest Second - Third Fourth Highest Total
UK 0.49 0.61 0.72 0.89 1.51 0.84
France 0.50 0.67 0.83 1.08 1.97 1.01
Germany 0.47 0.69 0.85 1.06 1.81 0.98
Italy 0.42 0.62 0.81 1.06 1.67 0.92
USA 0.33 0.56 0.80 1.13 2.05 0.97
Sweden 0.54 0.68 0.78 0.92 1.31 0.85
Source: Whiteford and Kennedy 1995: 35, using LIS data, no comparable data
available for Switzerland
Three main elements emerge from table 1.2. First, the variation in replacement rates
which has been observed in table 1.1 is not reflected in terms of older people's
incomes, presumably for the reasons mentioned above. Second, the average income
of older people is very close to that of the working population. Nevertheless, this
observation should be qualified in the sense that there are substantial differences
between different income groups. This suggests that it is not appropriate to refer to
'the elderly' as an homogeneous group when discussing issues of inter-generational
equity. (Johnson and Falkingham 1992: 58). Third, the existence of substantial
inequalities among the elderly as a group suggests that those at the bottom end of
the income distribution have to live on low incomes, often below the poverty line.
The evidence provided by the EU Observatory on older people in Europe in the late
1980s suggests that this is the case. As Walker pointed out:
'Despite generally rising living standards and the achievement of high
net replacement ratios in some member states the national reports reveal
a continuing poverty problem among a minority of older people, with
the size of the minority varying considerably between countries' (1993:
16)
Using national definitions of poverty (typically people living on or below the social
assistance level), Walker identifies three groups of countries. The first group
includes countries which have poverty rates below 10%: Denmark, Luxembourg,
Ireland and Germany. Second, France, the Netherlands the UK and Belgium have
medium poverty rates which range between 10 and 30%. Finally a third group
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includes the southern European welfare states for which it is difficult to find reliable
information, though it seems that poverty rates are most likely to be relatively high
(Walker 1993: 16-18). With regard to Switzerland, a study by Mitchell (1991)
based on LIS data, suggests that this country is likely to belong to the second
group. Using a poverty definition of 50% average equivalent disposable income,
she found that in 1980, 18.6% of single older people and 11.9% of couples had
incomes below the poverty line.
Living standards of elderly people seem to be to a large extent related to gender.
This, in part, reflects income inequality which can be found in the labour market
and longer life expectancy. In addition, however, the assumptions on which most
pension schemes are based usually imply continuous careers, which are more rarely
found among women than among men. Moreover, in countries where occupational
and private pension are widespread, women are less often covered by these
additional arrangements. In Britain, for instance, only a quarter of those who have
taken out a personal pension are women (Rake 1996: 10). In Switzerland
occupational pensions cover virtually the totality of male employees but only around
80% of females. Occupational pensions are compulsory only above a certain
earnings level, which because of lower wages and stronger reliance of part-time
work, is more rarely exceeded by women.
A study by Rake (1996) covering France, Germany and the UK has found that
there are substantial differences in disposable income according to gender. In all
three countries male headed one-person households and two-persons households
fare better than female headed one-person households, though in France this occurs
to a lesser extent than in Germany or in the UK. In addition, in all three countries,
elderly women rely more on state pensions and in particular on means-tested
provision than their male counterparts. In contrast, male pensioners and couples
receive a bigger proportion of their income from occupational pensions or
investment.
The evidence reviewed here concerning the living standards of older people
suggests that it is misleading to treat the elderly as a homogeneous group in
discussions regarding income distribution, as the differences within that group are
more important than the difference between the active population and older people.
This has important consequences for the debate on inter-generational equity. As
Johnson and Falkingham put it 'Any discussion of intergenerational conflict for
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welfare resources establishes a false dichotomy as economic inequality within age
groups is greater than between age groups' (1992: 59). As a result, normative
approaches to the pension problem suggesting that the current situation demands a
shift in the distributional equilibria towards the young, do not seem convincing.
Like demographic and expenditure projections, data on pensioners' living standards
can be an instrument in the hands of political actors who aim to modify the existing
arrangements.
1.3. FROM ECONOMIC TO POLITICS
Above all, this brief review of current key issues in pension policy shows an
impressive degree of complexity in the subject-matter. First, because of the high
level of uncertainty that characterises medium and long-term projections of pension
expenditure, it is extremely difficult to assess the size of the pension problem in the
future. Second, since the retired population is far from constituting a homogeneous
social group, generalisations with regard to resource distribution between age
groups are not acceptable. For these reasons, it is difficult to appreciate what the
objective features of the pension problem are. Economic constraints certainly exist,
but cannot be measured satisfactorily.
Despite uncertainty and complexity, the existence of a pension problem is widely
accepted,both by Western governments, generally regardless of political
persuasion, and by the public at large. As a recent study on elite opinion on current
social policy issues in seven EU member-states has highlighted, ageing is seen as a
major challenge to social security systems by a majority of policy-makers (George
et al. 1995). There are a number of reasons that can account for this discrepancy
between the uncertainty of science and the confidence of policy-makers. First, and
perhaps most importantly, the difficulties involved in pension financing have been
exacerbated by economic change. Low economic growth and unemployment affect
pension schemes' receipts. In addition, in a number of countries, governments have
responded to rising numbers of jobless by allowing older workers to pre-retire (this
is especially the case of France). The combined effect of these two trends, has been
a swift worsening in pension schemes' budgets, which has put pressures on
governments to act. In this respect, pension reforms can be seen more as a reaction
to a contingent economic situation rather than the anticipation of expected changes
in the population's demographic structure.
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Second, governments willing to alter the existing distributive equilibria, might find
an ally in the pension problem. Actors who support a reduction in the role of the
state in the economy can strengthen their claims by arguing that current public
pension arrangement will not be sustainable in the future because of demographic
change, and as a result reduce the size of the intergenerational public transfer. As
discussed in chapter 4, according to a number of commentators the UK's 1986
pension reform was not justified by demographic and financial pressures. Rather, it
was an element of a wider project of shifting responsibilities from the state to the
market.
Over the last few years, a majority of Western European countries have taken steps
to reform their public pension schemes. Generally, these changes consisted of
reductions in the generosity and/or the scope of public pensions, with the view of
reducing current and future expenditure. The measures adopted vary quite
substantially among countries. For instance, they range from the introduction of
incentives for individuals to provide privately for their retirement, to increases in
pensionable age or changes to the indexation mechanisms of existing pensions. On
occasions, more complex measures have been taken, which affect the pension
formula in various ways, generally with the effect of reducing the average level of
benefits. What pension reforms have in common, however, is their potential for
generating political controversy. A fully consensual pension reform is something
extremely unusual. In contrast, there are examples of reform-minded governments
forced to step back on the pension issue because of massive popular protest. This is
what happened in France with the attempted pension reform for public sector
employees of 1995, which generated an impressive wave of strikes and forced the
government to withdraw its plans (see Chapter 6).
Pension reforms, thus are highly sensitive political exercises. Because their goal is
generally to achieve savings, they upset established distributional equilibria, and are
thus likely to generate controversy. If savings are going to be achieved, there is
bound to be losers in a pension reform. These, unless they are compensated in
some other way, are likely to oppose reform, and depending on their effective
power might succeed in preventing the adoption of new pension legislation. The
uncertainty and complexity involved in the pension issue only adds to its potential
for political controversy. If the validity of expenditure projections such as those
presented in this chapter were unanimously accepted, it would certainly be easier
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for a reform-minded government to generate consensus on a pension reform. That
is why pension reforms are often preceded by what a French civil servant
interviewed for this project called 'the pedagogics of the deficit', i.e. a long-lasting
effort by the government to convince the public that there is a problem with the
financing of pensions.
The way governments go about reforming their pension schemes varies quite
substantially between countries and sometimes within the same country at various
times. There are examples of pension reforms which have been approved by the
trade unions, such as the one of 1995 in Italy, and others that were strenously
fought by the labour movement, such as the British 1986 Social Security Act. The
reasons behind such varying degree of responses to changes in pension legislation
are one of the key concern of this study. They emphasise the interest of an analysis
of the politics of pension reform.
The next chapter will look precisely, on the theoretical level, at the question of why
do pension reforms take given shapes in given contexts. In order to do that, it first
provides a review of the literature on the determinants of social policy. On this




UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF
PENSION REFORM
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To a very large extent, theorising old age pensions is an exercise which overlaps
with the more general work on welfare state theory. A number of reasons can
explain that. First, in modern welfare states, pensions are generally the single
largest item in terms of expenditure. Second, in many countries pensions were the
first social programme introduced and have set the example for other schemes.
As a resul.t pension schemes often embody the key principles that can be found
throughout the welfare system of a country. As a matter of fact, many of the most
influential theoretical works on the welfare state (Wilensky 1975; Baldwin 1990;
Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1993a; Pierson 1994) include pensions in their
analysis, while this is not always the case with other programmes. For this
reason, the following discussion often refers to welfare in general, but unless
otherwise specified, what is said is applicable to the area of old age pensions as
well.
The literature on welfare state theory, by and large, has been concerned with
explaining the development and the expansion of social programmes in industrial
countries. Generally, studies falling under this category have addressed two basic
questions: why did welfare states develop, and how does one explain country
variations in social policies. These two questions have kept busy students of
social policy for around three decades and now, with the benefit of hindsight,
their work can be summed up under three headings: socio-economic-
explanations, the 'politics matters' school, and the new-institutionalist approach'.
The first part of this chapter looks at these theories (sections 2.1 to 2.3). The main
concern is with the extent to which analyses of the expansion of welfare states are
useful in understanding current change. Since these theories focused primarily on
the determinants of social policy, they are the natural place to start a discussion
1 This categorisation of theories of the welfare state is borrowed from Pierson 1994.
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on current changes in pension policy. At the same time, however, they need to be
reconsidered in the light of recent changes.
The second part of this chapter, looks at theories of current change, with a
particular focus on the new-institutionalist approach. It is assumed that
....
institution' s an affect current social policy-making in two different ways. First,
the structure of existing arrangements is likely to point governments in some
given directions when it comes to formulate pension policy. This hypothesis,
which has been defended by a number of authors (Ferrera 1996a; Myles and
Quadagno 1996; Pierson 1994; 1996b) is discussed in section 2.4 and found
relevant. Second, constitutional structures and traditional patterns of policy-
making are likely to affect the direction of reform. This second claim has not
been explored in relation to current social policy change, and constitutes the
original contribution of this study to the debate on the restructuring of the welfare
state. It is first discussed on the basis of the relevant literature (section 2.5) and
then a theoretical model is suggested (section 2.6).
2.1. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EXPLANATION
The initial efforts to theorise the determinants of social policy go back to the
1960s. Among the first conceptual frameworks developed, was 'the logic of
industrialisation approach', put forward by authors such as Cutright (1965) and
Wilensky (1975). They viewed the welfare state as a by-product of economic
development. In a functionalist perspective, social policy is seen as a response
to the needs generated by industrialisation. According to Wilensky:
'economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are
the root cause of the general emergence of the welfare state ...
categories as 'socialist' versus 'capitalist' economies, 'totalitarian'
versus 'individualistic' ideologies, or even 'democratic' versus
'totalitarian' political systems ... are almost useless in explaining the
origins and the general development of the welfare state' (Wilensky
1975: xiii)
This thesis was supported by statistical analyses covering large numbers of
countries (sometimes over 60) which proved the existence of a significant
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correlation between economic development, measured by GDP, and the level of
social expenditure of a country. The 'logic of industrialisation' approach was an
accurate first approximation of the causes of welfare development. However, as
more comparative information of welfare provision was made available, it
became clear that country variations went well beyond what could be explained
by differences in the level of economic development. Particularly, the
comparison of Sweden and the US, two countries with comparable levels of
economic development, emphasised the weakness of the logic of industrialisation
approach. In addition, the measurement of the 'welfare effort' of a country, based
solely on expenditure, was also criticised, since it did not take into account
important notions such as conditions for entitlements, degree of redistribution, or
coverage (Esping-Andersen 1990).
If applied to the current situation, the 'logic of industrialisation' approach
suggests the existence of a link between the seriousness of the economic and
demographic crises of a country, and the extent to which programmes are
retrenched. This, however, does not seem to be the case. As Pierson put it, in
relation to pensions 'what is striking ... is the lack of correlation cross-nationally
between the economic burdens associated with present and future pension costs
and the national assessments of sustainability' (Pierson 1996b: 25). This view is
confirmed by the present study. Of the three countries studied, France is the one
where pension financing problems are greatest, and yet it did not adopt a reform
until 1993. Britain and Switzerland, in contrast, introduced restrictive pension
legislation in response to much lower socio-economic pressures. In Britain in
particular, a number of commentators felt the 1986 Social Security Act could not
be justified on economic and demographic grounds alone (see chapter 4).
Welfare crisis theories
Socio-economic explanations of current change, however, cannot be seen as
confined to a reversal of Wilensky's 'logic of industrialisation approach'. Since
the mid-1970s, various interpretations falling into this category have been put
forward. In the 1970s and early 1980s, two idelogically driven interpretations of
the welfare state's financial problems became rather popular. They were
suggested by neo-Marxists and New Right theorists. What they had in common,
was the fact that both approaches saw an inherent contradiction between liberal
democracy and capitalism. First neo-Marxists saw an inevitable trade-off
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between two functions of the capitalist state: accumulation and legitimation. On
the one hand, it was argued, the state must ensure that capital can operate
successfully, by being in the condition to achieve substantial profits and generate
investment (accumulation). On the other hand, it must also construct and
_ maintain democratic consensus on the existing social order. It does so, precisely
by redistributing part of the wealth created by the private economy through social
policies (legitimation). Its failure to do that would result in mass popular
discontent and social unrest. To finance a welfare state big enough to guarantee
an acceptable degree of social consensus, the state has to raise substantial funds,
which in turn impairs capital's ability to carry out accumulation. (O'Connor 1973;
Gough 1979; Offe 1984).
The welfare state was seen a transient arrangement, which made possible the
persistence of the capitalist mode of production for a longer period than it would
have been possible without it. The welfare state, however, did not succeed in its
attempt to eliminate this fundamental contradiction of capitalist democracy. The
logical consequence of this, is that the only way out from the current crisis is the
adoption of a Socialist political and economic order.
As Mishra pointed out (1984: 75), New Right theorists analysed the crisis of the
welfare state in terms which were surprisingly similar to those used by neo-
Marxists. New Right accounts of the welfare state crisis are generally based on a
particular understanding of party competition in democratic systems. Parties
compete in a political marketplace and shape their programmes in order to
maximise their share of the electorate. As a result, they are encouraged to comply
with the requests of various interests groups, which typically involves additional
expenditure for governments. Since voters lack a budget constraint, this
mechanism has lead modern societies to a situation in which governments are
spending much more than what they can raise through taxation without
suffocating the economy. The alternative facing governments is either to roll
back the state, and therefore reduce social expenditure, or the persistence and
presumably the worsening of the economic crisis, which will ultimately lead to
generalised chaos or even to the installation of an authoritarian regime (Brittan
1975; King 1975).
These dramatic views on the crisis of the welfare state, which were probably
connected to the pessimism generated by the economic crisis of the 1970s, have
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been attacked in subsequent years by many authors, on theoretical and on
empirical grounds. Theoretically, a number of authors have challenged the view
that there is an inevitable trade-off between state-provided welfare and economic
competitiveness and that the two variables are linked by a more complex
relationship (Gough 1996). Empirically, it has been pointed out that the
somewhat apocalyptic predictions of the 1970s and early 1980s have simply not
materialised (Alber 1988; Klein 1993; Mishra 1993; Pierson 1994). As Mishra
put it:
'It now appears that the developments of Western society and the
future of the welfare state envisioned in these grand scenarios are
quite out of line with the somewhat prosaic reality of the persistence
of social programmes and expenditures in all western countries'
(1993: 24).
It is true that the last two decades have been characterised by an overall
persistence of welfare arrangements. Nevertheless, the socio-economic pressures
that were identified as responsible for the crisis of the welfare state are to a large
extent still there and remain unresolved which might suggest that, in fact, the big
changes in social policy lie ahead. This is the point made by other strands of the
socio-economic interpretation of the welfare problem.
Post-industrialism and welfare
More recently, a number of authors have put forward an interpretation of current
change which links the welfare problem to socio-economic transformations (Lash
and Urry 1987; Offe 1987, 1992; Piore and Sabel 1984; Rodhes 1996; Strange
1993). Though they emphasise different aspects, these writers all agree on the
fact that a number of changes, which became evident after the mid-1970s, have
given rise to a new pattern of production structures which has been referred to
with different terms such as post-industrialism, post-fordism, or disorganized
capitalism. Their common assumption, is that the pattern of social and economic
structures which dominated Western societies during the long boom, the 'golden
age' of welfare states, has undergone a set of transformations, which have lead to
new and qualitatively different patterns. Existing welfare arrangements, based on
the socio-economic structures typical of the previous phase of capitalist
development, are no longer adequate.
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This interpretation is not only found among academics. Governments as well as
international agencies often rely on this understanding of current change.
According to an OECD report:
'Circumstances change, and public policies must adapt to the new
environment. Policies that were effective in the post-war era are less
responsive to the needs of the 1990s. The new context of slow
growth, persistent labour market difficulties, ageing population,
increasing female labour force participation, a growing rate of marital
dissolution and lone parent families, urban decay, ... are leading to a
re-examination of the role of social policy' (OECD 1994: 10).
The argument has multiple facets which refer to different levels of analysis. First,
on the level of production, it is argued that until about the early 1970s, Western
societies reflected a model of organised capitalism. The key features were a
highly structured productive system, characterised by the fact that manufacturing
industry was the main economic sector; the existence of powerful collective
organisations in the labour market; the high level of state intervention in the
economy; the fact that firms were nationally based, in terms of ownership,
production and market . Since the 1970s however, '[...] this era of organised
capitalism [...] has, in certain societies, come to an end, and there is a set of
tremendously significant transformations which have recently been literally
disorganising contemporary capitalist societies' (Lash and Urry 1987: 12). The
new socio-economic environment is characterised by the internationalisation of
the economy and the emergence of global companies, independent from
individual countries; the transfer of production to emerging capitalist countries in
the developing world; the expansion of the number of white collar workers,
which results in the development of an educationally based stratification system
which fosters individual achievement; and the decline of the size of the working-
class (ibid.) .The consequence of this transformation for social policy,is that:
'Welfare states will not continue to appropriate a rising share of
national income [...]. what is now happening in some at least of the
European countries, is the development of a similar two-tiered
arrangement, depending on the balance of characteristically
disorganised capitalist social and political forces" (ibid. 230-231).
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According to the 'disorganized capitalism' thesis, the welfare state was an
arrangement tailored for what was considered organised capitalism. Recent
transformations are making the traditional welfare state less suitable to the new
social and economic environment. As a result, the most likely outcome of this
transformation, is a residual welfare state, with low level state provision for the
bottom end of society and private individual provision for the rest of society. A
similar conclusion is reached by Abrahamson (1991) who, after having
considered recent developments in EU member-states, argues that T..] European
nations are primarily moving toward liberal and corporate welfare arrangements.
There is some emphasis on programs of insertion; but these programs are targeted
towards the most deprived only Li' (Abrahamson 1991: 262).
Second, on the political level, Offe (1987; 1992) argues that there is a
relationship between structural socio-economic change and declining support for
the welfare state. According to him, any welfare state, in order to be viable,
needs to be underpinned by a relatively widespread consensus as to how much
resources are to be made available for redistribution. In his own words: 'Any
welfare state must operate upon the basis of a socially and politically validated
conception of how much is enough under given circumstances' (Offe 1992: 64).
In his view, among the factors that contribute to shape people's opinion on
welfare is the 'potential for self-inclusion (1992: 66) i.e. the individual perception
of being at least potentially, a beneficiary of existing social programmes. Yet,
structural changes in modern societies are reducing the potential for self-
inclusion for relatively large sections of society. According to Offe 'there are
increasing disparities of life-chances among the totality of wage workers' (Offe
1987: 529). Moreover, the strong division between the 'underclass' and the rest
of society undermines the potential for self-inclusion among those who are
involved in waged work. In Offe's own words: 'Suppose that I happen to be a
middle-aged, middle class, male, married, healthy, skilled, home owning private
sector employee. The implication is that being in this kind of position will
increase the moral effort required to see through a thick veil of ignorance
concerning all those social policies that are aimed at unemployed, youth,
foreigners, [...], and so on'. (Offe 1992: 66). In addition, the economic crisis and
the persistence of low rates of economic growth, triggers the development of
individualistic moral norms. 'In this sense, the economic crisis of the welfare
state generates individualistic political attitudes and orientations and thus
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translates [...], into a political crisis of the welfare state' (Offe 1987: 529). As a
result of all these changes, according to Offe, the conditions for a widespread
support for redistributive social policy, which have made possible the
construction of the European welfare states, are not in place any longer. T..] the
welfare state as we know it as a major accomplishment of post-war West
European societies is rapidly loosing its political support [...]'(ibid. 528).
The evidence provided by public opinion surveys, does not lend much support to
this thesis. Taylor-Gooby, reviewing data collected in six industrial countries
(US, Austria, West Germany, Italy, the UK and Australia), found that majorities
in all countries support increased spending on health care and pensions, while
support for unemployment benefits is much lower. (Taylor-Gooby 1989: 41). His
general conclusion is that: 'the attitudes of the citizens of the six nations
correspond more closely to the traditional post-war settlement than they reveal
any enthusiasm for change, although within this framework there are substantial
national variations [...] . Social welfare that provides for mass needs is warmly
endorsed, but provision for minorities, whose interests challenge the work ethic,
receives meagre approval'. (Taylor-Gooby 1989: 49). More recently, Ferrera
(1993b), in an analysis of a Eurobarometer survey covering 12 EU member-
states, also found a relatively wide support for health care and pensions, coupled
with mixed feelings with regard to unemployment benefits and social assistance.
Dissatisfaction was recorded with regard to the perceived high level of taxes and
contributions. Overall, Ferrera concluded that while 'social protection is still
highly valued by a large majority of Europe's citizens, their support is certainly
more nuanced and qualified than in the past'(Ferrera 1993b: 4)
There is little evidence, thus, of a large scale decline in people's willingness to be
involved in redistributive arrangements. Public opinion is certainly segmented,
especially with regard to programmes which are likely to serve minorities, such
as unemployment benefits and social assistance. However, these opinions are not
new (Pierson 1991: 171), and are coupled with an overall support for social
protection. Nevertheless, the results of public attitude surveys must be looked at
carefully. As Taylor-Gooby emphasises 'what people say about their opinions is
a poor guide to their likely actions' (1985: 22), because a number of factors are
likely to influence the collection of this sort of information. For instance lack of
knowledge on the topic, courtesy or desire to appear an altruistic person, may
prompt respondents to give an excessively pro-welfare image of themselves. This
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might contribute to explain why, despite the support for social policies shown in
opinion polls, parties with openly anti-welfare state platforms, have been
repeatedly able to win elections in the UK and abroad.
The impact of globalisation
More recently, socio-economic analyses of current change in the area of social
policy have focused on the impact of globalisation (Euz6by 1992; Stopford and
Strange 1991; Strange 1993; Rohdes 1996). This probably reflects an acceleration
of that phenomenon since the early 1990s, and the fact that countries which
seemed to be relatively immune to the effects of global economic trends, such as
Germany, Sweden or Switzerland, are now affected by the same problems that
troubled the UK and the US in the 1980s.
The international economy during the 1980s and the 1990s has been characterised
by a process of intensification of economic relations on a world-wide scale, and
by the decline of the relative importance of nation-states as territorial economic
units. Trade barriers have been progressively removed, and production is being
moved to low-wage economies. The result is a global economy characterised by
harsh competition, in which nation-states have to struggle to keep up with their
competitors.
In this context, a key development is the fact that multinational corporations
(MNCs) have expanded geographically to such an extent that they cannot be
identified in terms of production, market, and sometimes even in terms of
ownership, with one single country. It is common for MNCs to have production
units in different countries in different continents, and to operate in the world
market. Only ownership, with a few exceptions, remains predominantly nationally
based. Without entering into the details of this highly complex problem, two
important relationships between globalisation and the financial crisis of the
European welfare states need to be considered.
First, the transfer of production to low wage economies, is having an impact on
the level of employment in the industrialised world. Stopford and Strange point
out that, according to their estimates, MNCs directly employ 21million people in
Third World countries, and they argue that through the multiplier effect, MNCs
are de facto responsible for twice as many jobs in the developing world (Stopford
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and Strange 1991: 16). Obviously, such a huge transfer of production is having
an important impact on the employment structure of industrialised countries, as
well as on the receipts of social insurance schemes, since unemployed people
typically do not pay social insurance contributions. While this should not
constitute the basis for a nationalistic protectionist argument, one cannot ignore
the impact that the transfer of production to low wage economies is having on the
social and economic structure of industrial countries. In addition, the emergence
of new zones of production in low wage and low social protection economies,
can be responsible for what has been termed 'social dumping'. In practice, social
dumping occurs when producers (sometimes assisted by governments) engage in
a competition by lowering wages and social protection standards, which can
ultimately result in a downward spiral in labour standards (Euzeby 1992).
Second, the increased mobility of capital, allows MNCs to lawfully avoid high
rates of taxation, which reduces the financing capacity of welfare states. Goods
and services are increasingly exchanged between different production units of the
same MNC. These exchanges do not obey to market rules: intra-firm trade is
piloted by MNCs headquarters, by arbitrarily setting the prices of exchanged
goods and services. Big multinationals can adopt a pricing policy which will
make more profitable the units located in low tax economies. As a result, these
companies are now capable of actually transferring profits to countries which
offer better fiscal condition. For instance: `... they can set up their own insurance
company in a small country which does not investigate too accurately how
insurance premiums are calculated. They can also modify prices within the group
and move profits so that they will pay the minimum rate of taxation' (Strange
1993: 249). Strange points out that these practices are not obstructed by
governments, on the contrary, they are sometimes encouraged by them. Yet, she
argues, 'these practices certainly contribute in a substantial manner to the fiscal
problems of every welfare state' (ibid. ).
Towards convergence in social policies?
The socio-economic explanations of current change reviewed so far, assume that
the transformations described are affecting various industrial countries roughly in
the same way. The trends discussed here, such as changes in production,
globalisation, demographic shift, etc., are found in all industrial countries, and as
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a result it is reasonable to expect that their responses will be similar. According
to this view, we are likely see further convergence in social policies.
This claim is certainly accurate in relation to broad trends. As argued elsewhere,
(Bono li_et al. 1996), however, if analysis focuses on the details of changes in
policy, current trends in European welfare states reveal a wider degree of
variation. While the common overall direction of welfare reform is towards cost-
containment and adaptation to the needs of the economy, there are significant
variations in the way this is done. In France a key element in welfare reform is a
shift in financing from employment-related contributions to taxation, in order to
reduce indirect labour-costs. Germany, despite being faced with very similar
problems, does not envisage such a solution. In Britain, the shift in financing is
from general taxation towards private funding (ibid.). Similarly, with regard to
pension reform, measures adopted display a substantial degree of variation,
which does not seem to be related to socio-economic differences (see chapters 4
to 6). How does one explain the fact that Switzerland reformed its pension system
before the occurrence of actual social security budget deficits, while France
intervened only after various years of recurring imbalances? Why did the Swiss
pension reform2, unlike the British and French ones, include elements of both
retrenchment and expansion? To answer these questions, socio-economic
explanations are of little use. Country variations are better understood if political
and institutional factors are brought into the analysis.
2.2. FROM 'POLITICS MATTERS' TO REGIME THEORY
Focusing on the Swedish case, and to a lesser extent on other Nordic countries, a
second strand of welfare theory emerged in the early 1980s. Authors like
Stephens (1979), Korpi (1983), Esping-Andersen (1985; 1990) and Castles
(1982) developed what is known as the 'politics matters' or 'power resource'
model. Its general hypothesis is that the strength of the labour movement and of
left-wing parties are a key determinant of the level of social provision in a
country. According to them, the successful mobilisation of the working class is
the crucial factor in the explanation of different levels and models of social
2The 1995 pension reform in Switzerland combined retrenchment measures, such as an increase in
women's retirement age from 62 to 64, with some expansion elements, such as the introduction of
contribution credits for carers (see chapter 5). In contrast, neither the British nor the French reforms
included elements which could be characterised as expansion of the state scheme.
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protection. Left-wing parties, can, once in government, prompt the adoption of
generous and universalist social policies which best serve working class interests.
As Esping-Andersen puts it, his approach 'flows from social democratic political
economy. It differs from structuralist ... analyses in its emphasis on the social
classes as the main agent of change, and in its argument that the balance of class
power determines distributional outcomes' (1990: 16).
Empirical studies of welfare state development have generally confirmed the
existence of a relationship between the strength of the left and of the labour
movement on the one hand, and various measurements of welfare effort on the
other (not necessarily spending). Esping-Andersen (1990), for instance, found a
significant correlation between left-power mobilisation and the degree of
decommodification achieved by various welfare states. Castles, concentrating on
political parties only, argued that `... partisan control of governments is among
the factors influencing ... public expenditure, with strong parties of the Right
acting as an impediment to expansion and social democratic and other parties,
jointly or separately, serving as a stimulus' (Castles 1982: 85). With regard to
pensions, Myles (1984) found a correlation between the power of the left and
his index of pension quality , which takes into account a wide range of variables.
Despite a relatively strong empirical support, this approach has also attracted
substantial criticism. Baldwin (1990) and Ferrera (1993a) have challenged the
assumption made by the power resource model with regard to the link between
working class and solidaristic social policies. According to them, other social
classes have fought for inclusion in redistributive arrangements at various times
in the history of European welfare states. This is the case of Scandinavian
farmers first and middle classes later and of the French self-employed in the
1950s and 1960s. According to Baldwin, it is not so much the fact of belonging
to the working class that determines the positive attitude of a social group to
welfare. Instead, it is the subjective perception of the groups' risk exposure and
capacity of self-reliance.
With regard to current change, it has been argued that the power resource
approach does not accurately reflect actual developments. As Pierson puts it:
'a power-resource perspective cannot explain patterns of retrenchment
in the United States and Great Britain. [...] Their overall impact has
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been modest [...] . In Both countries, the political and economic
resources of the left have diminished considerably. Rates of
unionization have plummeted; left of center parties have been
weakened. Although power-resource arguments suggest that this shift
should have sharply altered the character of the welfare state, this has
not been the case' (Pierson 1994: 28).
Given the substantial decline in the level of support for the left and the labour
movement, welfare states in the UK and in the US were not dismantled as the
power-resource model would have predicted. In Pierson's view, thus, other forces
have replaced the left and the unions as the political basis of social policies,
particularly the new constituencies created by the welfare state itself such as the
beneficiaries of social programmes (particularly pensioners). This conclusion,
however, is contradicted by the analysis of pension reform in continental
European countries. In fact, the role of the labour movement in defending
existing arrangements there has proved substantial and sometimes crucial. In
some respect, it seems that Pierson' s choice to compare the UK and the US
might have led him to conclusions that are not applicable to a number continental
European countries3.
A second problem with the application of a 'politics matters' approach to the
analysis of current change, lies with the fact that socio-economic changes
reviewed above, particularly globalisation, have sharply reduced the room for
manoeuvre enjoyed by left-wing governments in the areas of social and economic
policy. While the expansion of welfare states took place at a time when
economic and political boundaries roughly coincided, this is not the case any
longer. As seen above, the bargaining power of the business community on social
and economic matters has been strengthen by recent socio-economic
developments. The result is that even when politics favours labour, the
imposition of market-correcting mechanisms remains problematic. This does not
necessarily mean that political parties of different political persuasion now have
similar positions. As a recent study has shown, elite opinion on current changes
in the area of social policy is strongly correlated to the political orientation of the
organisation represented (George et al. 1995; George 1996). However, when in
3 This risk, in fact, is acknowledged by Pierson himself, who admits that `... this selection of cases
bypasses key issues raised by power-resources analysts. In a comparison of, say, the United States
and Sweden, the strength of left parties and labor movements might well have emerged as more
important' (1994: 29).
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government, left-wing parties are, more often than in the past, forced to adopt
policies that are more responsive to economic than to social requirements.
It seems thus that the link between left-wing power and policy outcomes has not
— disappeared altogether. Instead, its significance has possibly been reduced by the
emergence of new, more powerful, factors. Globalisation, for instance, limits the
room for manoeuvre available to governments in pursuing their social and
economic objectives. In addition, the new constituencies created by the welfare
state have reduced the centrality of the labour movement as the key supporter and
defender of social policies.
Regime theory
A more complex version of the 'power resource model' has been put forward by
Esping-Andersen in his more recent work (1990; 1996a). This approach identifies
three regimes of welfare provision within industrial countries which refer to
three different ideological traditions, liberalism, conservatism (often related to
Catholicism), and social democracy. Countries such as Britain and the US, with a
strong influence of liberal ideology, a relatively weak labour movement and
without a strong Catholic tradition, have developed welfare states which are
characterised by low levels of provision, targeted on the most disadvantaged.
Continental European countries, most evidently France and Germany, strongly
influenced by conservative traditions such as paternalism and social Catholicism,
have based their welfare states on contributory social insurance, which keeps
under control the uncertainty brought about by capitalism but at the same time
guarantees the preservation of socio-economic status-differentials, and follows
meritocratic principles. Finally, the social-democratic model, which is found in
Nordic countries (most typically in Sweden) is the result of the strength of the
labour movement and of left-wing parties. As the defenders of wage earners'
interests, these political forces have managed to impose the introduction of social
policies that reduce the dependence of employees on their participation in the
labour market. The privileged means of social intervention in this case are
generous and universal programmes, a developed social services sector and a
commitment to full employment (Esping-Andersen 1990).
On the basis of this typology, Esping-Andersen formulates a number of
hypotheses with regard to how different countries are likely to deal with current
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socio-economic challenges to the welfare state. Countries belonging to the liberal
regime are likely to respond by de-regulating the labour market, by containing
social expenditure and reducing welfare entitlements. This approach does have a
positive impact on employment (Blank 1994) but it engenders developments
such as job insecurity, rising numbers of working poor and ultimately a
substantial increase in inequality. The conservative-corporatist response to
current challenges has been to reduce the size of the labour-force by adopting
pre-retirement schemes (particularly in France), by not encouraging women to
enter the labour-market (Germany) and more in general by maintaining relatively
generous entitlements to social benefits for workers. The result of this approach
is the constitution of what has been termed a 'ring-fenced' labour market, which
exacerbates the division between insiders and outsiders. The main indicator of
this trend is the high unemployment rate in continental European countries, and
particularly high levels of youth and long term unemployment. Thirdly, countries
belonging to the social-democratic regime (particularly Sweden), have responded
by increasing public employment (particularly in the social services sector) and
by adopting a range of active labour market policies. This approach managed to
keep the unemployment rate at relatively low levels until the early 1990s. More
recently, however, to some extent because of rising budget deficit and
unemployment, the social-democratic approach has been reversed, and cutbacks
in provision have been adopted (Esping-Andersen 1996a).
The main interest of Esping-Andersen's work is arguably the fact that it brings
together political, institutional and cultural factors within a single framework of
analysis. In this respect it certainly constitutes a substantial break-through which
is confirmed by the influence regime theory is having on academic debates on
welfare states. The approach, however, has also attracted substantial criticism.
First a number of commentators have argued that Esping-Andersen's
categorisation should be complemented with a fourth regime, the Southern
European model (Leibfried 1992; Ferrera 1996b). The key features of Southern
European welfare states are a strong reliance on the family as a provider of
welfare, the importance of clientelar practices in the attribution of benefits, a
comparatively generous pension system and weakness in the area of
unemployment compensation. From a feminist perspective, regime theory has
been criticised for failing to take into account differences in the treatment of
women that can be observed among modern welfare states (Langan and Ostner
1991: 130).
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A further problem identified in relation to regime theory refers to its weakness
when it comes to account for change in policy (Taylor-Gooby 1996). This
approach highlights the self-reproductive potentiality of welfare regimes, but
neglects the scope for change. Current developments in social policy are likely to
affect the fundamental structure of welfare states, and yet the independent
variables used by regime theory, mainly cultural traditions and left-wing power,
are insufficient in explaining actual change. While some countries have arguably
strengthen the key features of their regime-type (US and UK), others seem to be
moving away from their traditional approach. This is the case of France where in
a number of areas social insurance is gradually being replaced by universal
programmes (Bonoli and Palier 1997a; 1997b).
2.3. BRINGING INSTITUTIONS IN
Since the mid-1980s, a third interpretation of welfare state developments
focusing on the state and more in general on institutions has gained pominemct
(state centred approach or new institutionalism). To a large extent this new
strand of welfare state theory reflected what was happening in other areas of
public policy analysis where the role played by institutions in determining the
shape of public policy was increasingly being recognised. In a seminal article,
March and Olsen (1984) used the term 'New-Institutionalism' 4 to describe a
growing corpus of literature which emphasised the impact of institutions on
public policy. Since then both the term and the approach have acquired a
significant influence in academic debates5.
The central claim made by new-institutionalists is that institutions can be
considered as an independent variable or as important intermediate variables. In
their view socio-economic factors constitute a more or less distant background
whose impact on public policy is significantly mediated by the shape of
4This trend is contrasted with the 'old' institutionalism which dominated political science debates
until the late 1950s. Within this strand, the main emphasis was put on institutions which were studied
from a strictly formal point of view. To some extent, 'old' institutionalism overlapped with the study
of constitutional law (March and Olsen 1984; Stone 1992: 157).
5The most recent reviews of new-institutionalist literature make reference to at least three sub-
strands: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and organisational institutionalism
(Immergut 1996; Hall and Taylor 1996). My discussion refers mainly to the first sub-strand
(historical new-institutionalism).
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institutional structures. The concept of 'institutions' is generally understood in
fairly broad terms. Typically it refers to the 'formal and informal procedures,
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the
polity or political economy' (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). In other words, the
term institutions includes a set of rules and structures which range from the
constitutional order to the unwritten conventions that contribute to shape the
political game. The organisational structure of the various state bodies, and
particularly the rules that define the relationship among the various actors who
take part to policy-making do also play a substantial role in characterising an
institutional environment. In fact, however, new-institutionalist analyses of
public policy tend to concentrate on a relatively small number of elements of the
institutional environment which are treated as independent variables.
A second important element of the new-institutionalist paradigm refers to the
way institutions affect actors' behaviour and ultimately policy outcomes.
According to Hall 'the organization of policy-making affects the degree of
power that any one set of actors has over the policy outcomes[...]. Organisational
position also influences an actor's definition of his own interests, by establishing
his institutional responsibilities and relationship to other actors' (1986: 19). More
precisely, the perception of actors' interests as well as the definition of the most
adequate strategy to reach their objectives depends to a large extent on the
institutional structure, on the position of a given actor within that structure and on
the relationship with other actors as determined by existing sets of rules.
In relation to the analysis of social policy, New-Institutionalists have put forward
three basic claims. First, countries which developed a strong state apparatus
relatively early are associated with big welfare states; second, it is argued that
existing social policies have a substantial impact on future developments; and
third, countries where the constitutional structure allows minorities substantial
access to power, are less likely to develop big welfare states. These three claims
are found in various combinations in the new-institutionalist literature on the
welfare state.
Among the first to look at the impact of institutions on social policy, Heclo
(1974) has emphasised the importance of institutional factors such as state
capabilities, inherited policies and the role played by administrators in initiating
social reforms. In his comparative study of welfare state development in Sweden
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and the UK, he highlighted the impact of old policies on the new developments.
In his own words:
The men who charted the first departures into modern social policy
were not amnesiacs. The substance of their policies was not a simple
by-product dictated by economic, social and political preconditions.
[...] With varying degrees of deliberateness, all were reacting against a
background of inherited techniques, forms and presumptions
collectively known as the poor law' (Heclo 1974:46)
Later, some basic elements of a new-institutionalist theory of welfare state
development were laid down in an important article by Skocpol and Amenta:
Until recently, most work on the determinants of social policy has
emphasised their socioeconomic roots and has treated states as if they
were merely arenas of political conflict or passive administrative tools
to be turned to the purposes of any social group that gains
governmental power. Currently, however, scholars are exploring ways
in which policymaking may be shaped by organizational structures
and capacities of states and by the political effects of previously
enacted policies (Skocpol and Amenta 1986: 147).
In her subsequent work, Skocpol has used a state-centred approach to analyse
social policy developments in the US, a case which is not successfully accounted
for by the logic of industrialisation approach nor by the power resource model.
The comparatively small size of the American welfare state is explained with
reference to the traditional weakness of state institutions. Particularly at the time
of industrialisation, state bureaucracy was underdeveloped and did not have the
capacity to set up and run extensive social programmes as was the case in
Europe. Instead of the state, in the US social policies were instigated by political
parties. This resulted in the introduction of social programmes which were more
or less targeted on specific groups, such as civil war veterans, which were likely
to respond with electoral support (Skocpol 1995).
More recently and in a comparative perspective, Immergut (1992) and Huber et
al. (1993) have put forward the hypothesis that constitutional structures have a
substantial impact on the level of state welfare of a country. More specifically,
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they argue that in countries where interest groups are allowed substantial access
to the policy-making process, and where minorities have the opportunity to
prevent the adoption of legislation thanks to the existence of veto points,
solidaristic welfare reform are more difficult to implement. Irrunergut (1992)
contrasts the different course of health policy in Sweden, France and Switzerland.
In the latter, the lack of a public health insurance scheme or a national health
service is explained with the fact that thanks to the availability of referendums,
interest groups that opposed state intervention in the area of health care (such as
doctors, mutual societies), were able to prevent the adoption of such legislation
(see Chapter 5). The Swedish success in establishing a national health service,
conversely, is explained with reference to the dominance of the executive in
policy-making. A similar conclusion is reached by Huber et al. (1993), who
found a correlation between various indicators of the size of welfare states and
power concentration with the executive branch of government. Their approach is
particularly interesting as it accounts for the comparatively low levels of social
protection found in Switzerland and in the US.
Institutions are likely to have an impact on current change as they did in the
expansion of welfare states. Of the three institutionalist claims mentioned above
the second and the third seem more relevant in the current context. First,
retrenchment occurs at a time when welfare arrangements are well established
and entrenched in people's daily lives. In this respect, the existing arrangements
are likely to have an impact on the future course of policy. Second, retrenchment
is also a potentially controversial exercise, and as a result likely to generate
confrontation between different actors. The way in which these actors will
interact with each other and will be able to affect the shape of legislation is likely
to be related to the institutional environment in which they operate. Particularly,
constitutional structures which shape the political game, as well as standard
procedures of policy-making are likely to influence the scope and shape of
current reform. The next two sections deal with these issues.
2.4. POLICY FEEDBACK AND PENSION REFORM
According to the author of one of the most comprehensive studies of welfare
retrenchment carried out so far, the current phase of welfare state development
cannot be analysed with the same conceptual tools that proved appropriate for
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understanding previous developments. His central contention is that
'retrenchment [... occurs] on a terrain that the welfare state itself has
fundamentally modified' (Pierson 1994: 2), and as a result requires a new
theoretical approach. Welfare programmes have created new constituencies in the
electorate, the beneficiaries of social nrogrammes, who act as a powerful brake
against cutbacks which are likely to worsen their condition. As a result of the
welfare state, a certain level of economic security has become the norm in most
western societies. If governments want to reduce that level, they are likely to
encounter powerful resistance from relatively large sections of public opinion.
Pierson's own theory of retrenchment focuses on institutions, and particularly on
the notion of 'policy feedback', which relates to the fact that existing policies
predetermine debates, coalition formation patterns and strategy selection by
relevant actors. Socio-economic factors are seen as a background. Because of
recent socio-economic changes (such as declining rates of economic growth,
increasing international competition, demographic change) governments are
under considerable pressure to reduce the scope and level of social programmes.
The way these pressure are translated into policy outcomes, however, is
significantly influenced by the institutional design of existing welfare state
programmes. This occurs in two different ways.
First, it is argued that the welfare state has modified the political landscape, by
creating its own constituencies, which include a substantial section of the
electorate (pensioners, families, middle classes, and so forth). The result is that
politically, it is extremely difficult to adopt cutbacks that most likely will prove
unpopular. There is a significant risk of losing electoral support, and
governments, caught between two contrasting pressures, will develop strategies
aimed at minimising the political cost of retrenchment. They are likely to refrain
from adopting radical measures unless they are under major budgetary pressure
(1996a: 157); in order to 'spread the blame' for retrenchment they are likely to
seek consensual or negotiated solutions (1996a: 177); they might try to obfuscate
the true impact of reform (by reducing indexation for instance) ; or also offer
compensation (1994: 19-24).
Second, social programmes have often produced `lock-in' effects, or
mechanisms 'that greatly increase the cost of adopting once-possible alternatives
and inhibit exit from a current policy-path' (Pierson 1994: 42). A key example of
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a lock in effect is the difficulty involved in shifting pension financing from pay-
as-you-go to a funded system, which implies a double payment of contributions
by the generations currently in work, as these would have to finance their own
retirement and the pensions that are currently being paid. In the UK 1986 pension
reform initial plans for scrapping a pay-as-you-go pension scheme (S2-7.1PS) and
replace it with a system of funded private pension were dropped precisely
because of the issue of double payment (see chapter 4).
Myles and Quadagno (1996) have argued that the institutional design of pension
schemes is associated with given approaches to retrenchment. In an ingenious
article they have pointed out that recent pension reforms have tended to follow
two different patterns and that these patterns are related to the type of pension
scheme which is being reformed. In particular, they argue, schemes of
Bismarckian inspiration, i.e. those which offer earnings-related benefits on a
contributory basis, have tended to be changed by strengthening the relation shir
between contributions and benefits. In practice, this means that the benefit
instead of being expressed in terms of a proportion of a reference salary (typically
the last salary or the average of the best X years) it is going to be determined by
the amount of contributions paid during the entire life. In other words, defined-
benefit schemes are transformed in defined-contribution ones, which was the
starting point of pension policy in most Bismarckian countries.
In contrast, schemes belonging to the Beveridgean tradition, which grant flat rate
benefits often on a non-contributory basis, have been cut back by restricting
eligibility. For instance, Australia, Canada, Denmark and New Zealand have all
introduced some form of income or means testing. Again, as in the case of
Bismarckian systems, the direction of reform seems to be towards what used to
exist before. In all the four countries mentioned, universal provision was
introduced as an extension of existing means- or income-tested schemes. Myles
and Quadagno point out that in the four countries above, the shift towards
income-testing was facilitated by the fact that the basic pension there is financed
through general taxation only, which means that unlike in other systems there is
no clear link between what people have paid in and their expected benefits. In
Beveridgean schemes financed through contributions such as Finland, Norway,
Sweden and the UK. In these countries the trend towards more selectivity occurs
through an erosion of the basic pension which is replaced by a greater role of
means-tested pension supplements.
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The trends observed by Myles and Quadagno can be explained in terms of
structural predisposition of pension schemes. The basis for entitlement, the type
of financing and the kind of benefits they provide make some reform strategies
more feasible than others. In a Bismarckian system, the least politically damaging
way to achieve savings is to strengthen the link between contributions and
benefits, while in Beveridgean countries savings are best achieved through
targeting. Like Pierson, thus, Myles and Quadagno understand governments'
strategies in pension reform as the search for least politically damaging solution
within a given institutional context.
A similar conclusion is reached by Ferrera (1996a) in his analysis of patterns of
welfare retrenchment in various European countries. After having identified four
regimes of welfare provision, Scandinavian, Continental, Anglo-Saxon and
South-European, he argues that the use of increased targeting as a retrenchment
option will be most easily implemented in Anglo-Saxon countries (UK and
Ireland). Since these two systems are mainly based on flat-rate provision of a
relatively low level, increased targeting can be achieved through the non-
adaptation of benefits to increases in people's living-standards. In this
institutional context, governments do not need to take a proactive approach to
increase income-testing; if they simply omit to upgrade benefits, people will
increasingly turn to means-tested provision. Politically, this solution is much
more feasible than, say, the replacement of a contributory earnings-related
scheme (such as the French and German pension schemes) with a means-tested
one, which would entail the non-respect of the contributory principle.
The institutional design of pension schemes is a powerful determinant of reform.
The authors discussed here have found different associations between given
institutional features and the course that pension reform is likely to take in
various countries. Despite their emphasis on institutions, all these studies
highlight the importance of politics in the adoption of a pension reform.
Institutional features become relevant only insofar as they make some solutions
more politically feasible than others. As a result, abstract discussions on what are
the best solutions to the pension problem, do not seem appropriate. Instead, the
institutional context peculiar to each country as well a the power relationship
between the relevant actors should be taken into account, as this defines the
realm of what is politically feasible.
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Pension scheme design, however, is not the only institutional variable likely to
affect the politics of pension reform. The potentially conflictual character of
retrenchment in the area of public pensions is likely to emphasise the impact of
the decision-making process on new legislation. The rules and procedures that
govern policy-making in the various countries are likely to further restrict the
realm of what is possible and to affect actors' strategies. This is the subject of the
next section.
2.5. PATTERNS OF POLICY-MAKING
One of the key aspects of pension policy is the fact that it affects a very large
section of the population. Current retirees, of course, are among those who have
the biggest stake in the retirement system of a country. In addition, the working
population, often through the payment of employment related-contributions, has
built up a number of strong expectations with regard to their retirement. Hence,
retrenchment in the area of pensions is likely to upset a substantial section of the
electorate, with obvious repercussions on the popularity of the government in
power. The link between pension policy and electoral risks is perhaps most
obvious in the case of the US, where powerful organisations of retirees, such as
the AARP (American Association of Retired Persons) issue voting
recomandations to their members on the basis of candidates' position in relation
to old age policies (Pierson 1996b). In Europe, pension politics has not generated
single-issue movements to a similar extent. However, the potential unpopularity
of cutbacks constitutes an important asset in the hands of interest groups
opposing pension reforms. Generally, when trade unions set up protest
movements against reductions in pension entitlements, their ability to gather
popular support is quite impressive. Even in countries like France, which have
low rates of unionisation (around 10%), the labour movement has been able to
generate massive protest movements in defence of current pension entitlements,
with the result of forcing the government to abandon its plans (see chapter 6).
Obviously, governments are well aware of the potential for controversy
embodied in a pension reform. As a result they are likely to adopt strategies that
minimise the risk of generating mass protest, unless they feel confident enough
that they will manage to impose reform packages even in the face of widespread
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opposition. To put it simply, two political strategies are available to governments
wishing to reduce pension expenditure. They can either impose the reform
package they regard as the most appropriate for dealing with the current situation,
or, alternatively, they can negotiate the content of pension reform with external
interests in order to obtain their approval or at least their acquiascence.
These two strategies have different implications. From the point of view of
governments committed to a reduction in pension expenditure, the
confrontational approach has the advantage of excluding a watering down of
savings measures, as these do not need to be negotiated. On the other hand,
however, this strategy has the drawback of being more uncertain, since external
unsatisfied groups might succeed in preventing the adoption of a controversial
piece of legislation. This is not only the case in Switzerland, where the
referendum system allows interest groups to challenge legislation at the polls, but
also in countries like France or Italy, where the trade unions have rereatedly
proved their ability to set up and sustain massive protest movement, often forcing
governments to back down. The consensual approach, in contrast, is likely to
strengthen support for a pension reform, to make mass protest less likely, and as
a result to increase its political feasibility. In this case, however, reform-minded
governments are forced to accept a compromise in the extent of retrenchment
which they will not necessarily find adequate to deal with the current problems as
they perceive them6.
In the end, from the point of view of a government aiming to tackle the pension
problem, both strategies have advantages and drawbacks. Decisions on how to go
about reforming a pension scheme, will depend on perceptions of convenience
and on calculation, but also on the established tradition in policy-making of the
relevant country, and perhaps more crucially, on the room for manoeuvre allowed
to governments by constitutional structures and decision making procedures.
Arguably, the strategy selected will have an impact on the scope and on the shape
of a pension reform, as well as on its likelihood to survive possible popular
protest. Before formulating more precise hypothesis, however, one needs to look
6A similar view is taken by Pierson, who argues that concentration of power, associated with a
confrontational approach, does not necessarily entail increased likelihood of success in retrenchment
policies. He points out that while power concentration allows governments to impose controversial
policies, it also concentrates accountability, thus making electoral punishment by voters more likely.
He concludes by arguing that there is not a strong case for believing that power concentration favours
retrenchment (Pierson 1994: 34).
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more closely at the question of consensus versus confrontation in policy-making.
In fact, a substantial corpus of literature has been produced on this issue, which
sheds light on the conditions that favour the adoption of one or the other
approach to policy as well as their respective impacts on legislation. Some
influential works are discussed b-elow.
Majoritarian and consensus democracy
The issue of aggregating conflicting preferences is central to Lijphart study on
majoritarian and consensus government . His leading question is the following:
'Who will do the governing and whose interests should the government
be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent
preferences ? One answer is: the majority of the people. [...] The
alternative answer to the dilemma is: as many people as possible. This
is the essence of the consensus model' (Lijphart 1984: 4).
In order to answer the question of how divergent preferences are aggregated into
policy, Lijphart develops a typology of 'patterns of government' ranging from
`majoritarian government', typified by Britain, to 'consensus government',
typified by Switzerland, with 19 other democracies falling somewhere between
the two extreme cases. A number of dimensions are used in order to discriminate
between the two models.
The majoritarian model (referred to also as the 'Westminster model') is
characterised by a strong dominance of the cabinet on parliament; by bare-
majority and single-party cabinets; asymmetric bicameralism; two party system;
one dimensional party-system (the left-right axis is the dominant cleavage in
politics); a first-past-the-post electoral system; unitary and centralised
government; unwritten constitution; and absence of referendums (ibid. 6-9).
These features of the Westminster model all contribute to enhance the power of
the majority vis-a vis the rest of the population. The British electoral system, for
instance, allows a party with a relative majority in the electorate to have an
absolute majority in parliament; it also encourages bipartism, which in turn
makes coalitions unnecessary and thus contributes to majoritarian government
(see chapter 3). The absence of non-socio-economic cleavages (with the
59
exception of Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism, which do not have a country-
wide dimension), also encourages bipartism. Finally, the lack of a written
constitution and the fact that constitutional matters can be modified by a simple
majority in parliament, are also likely to enhance the power of the ruling
majority.
The consensus model, in contrast, is characterised by features which tend to limit
the power of the majority and to include minorities in decision-making. The key
features of consensus democracy, as identified by Lijphart, include: oversized
coalition governments, i.e. the government includes more parties than what is
needed to rule; strong separation between legislative and executive powers i.e.
parliament has more independence vis-a-vis the government (and vice-versa) than
it is the case in the Westminster model; balanced bicameralism and minority
representation; multiparty system; multi-dimensional party system (presence of
religious, language and centre-periphery cleavages); proportional representation;
federalism; written constitution and minority veto (ibid. 23-31). According to
Lijphart, the frequent use of referenda in Switzerland is not a feature of
consensus democracy but rather 'a foreign element in either of the two model,
which are models of representative democracy' (ibid. 31). This assumption is
disputable, since in Switzerland the possibility of calling a referendum on any
law is a powerful tool in the hands of unsatisfied minorities, as it gives them an
additional opportunity to intervene in the policy-process. It is true, however, as
Lijphart points out, that referenda can also be used by governments to generate
majorities in the public and to silence unsatisfied minorities, and thus be an
instrument of majoritarian policy-making (ibid.), as was the case, for instance,
with De Gaulle's referendum on the independence of Algeria. Nevertheless, since
referenda in Switzerland are not called by the government but they are either
compulsory or called by unsatisfied groups, it seems more appropriate to include
the use of referenda in Switzerland as a feature of consensus government
(Kobach 1993). The consensus model can be seen as the mirror image of the
British political system, at least as far as the nine dimensions considered by
Lijphart are concerned. Both the institutions and the segmentation of society
along a number of cleavages tend to limit the authority of the majority and by the
same token they allow minorities to play a bigger role in policy-making.
There are two main factors, in Lijphart's view, that contribute to explain the
emergence of majoritarian or consensus patterns of government in a given
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country. First, the degree of societal homogeneity. Segmented societies, in order
to make cohabitation of different minorities practical, tend to include them in
decision-making to a significant extent, and thereby develop a consensus pattern
of government. In contrast, in homogeneous societies, there is a lesser risk of
unsatisfied minorities wishing to leave the polity (regional nationalism in the UK
is a feature which does not correspond to the majoritarian ideal-type). The second
factor identified is the existence of cultural links with the UK. On a number of
dimensions English-speaking countries, with the notable exception of the US,
come closer to the Westminster model than other nations (ibid. 220).
The interest of Lijphart's work in relation to the analysis of welfare retrenchment
lies in its ability to distinguish between different models of managing
disagreement and conflict, which are typical features of current social policy
reform. In this respect, it highlights a number of potentially fruitful directions for
understanding why governments adopt either consensual or confrontational
approaches when they have to deal with pension reform. There are however some
problems with his approach. First, the different dimensions which are used to
discriminate between Lijphart's models of democracy include both dependent and
independent variables. The number of parties, for instance, depends heavily on
the electoral system, since typically, a first-past-the-post electoral system is
associated with bipartism while proportional representation produces multi-party
systems7 . These two dimensions belong to two different levels of causal analysis
and should thus be treated differently.
Second, Lijphart's model does not take into account factors falling outside the
realm of parliamentary politics. Most notably, the role of organised interests in
policy-making is neglected. While the formal procedures he analyses are
certainly relevant to the policy process, the influence of organised interests on
politics cannot be ignored. This is especially the case in corporatist countries like
Switzerland or Germany, where interest groups are regularly consulted by the
government and given official tasks (such as drafting regulations) which in other
countries are carried out by civil servants. This weakness of his initial work has
been recognised by Lijphart himself in subsequent writings, who has argued that
the two notions, 'corporatism' and 'consensus democracy', are nevertheless
strongly related (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991: 245).
7 As Duverger put it, this statement is one of the few which in political science 'approximates a true
sociological law' (Duverger 1963).
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Corporatist policy-making
The role of interest-groups and their inclusion in or exclusion from policy-
making is the central fcs of a different, but related, strand of public policy
theory which refers to the concept of corporatism 8. Corporatism is understood as
a system of interest intermediation in which groups supporting different (and
often conflicting interests) are included in policy-making. According to
Lembruch corporatism 'involves ... a plurality of organisations usually
representing antagonistic interests [which] ... manage their conflicts and co-
ordinate their action with that of government expressly in regard to the ...•
systemic requirements of the economy' (1984: 62). The inclusion of interest-
groups into policy-making is usually institutionalised, typically through
'obligatory consultation of interest organisations over government bills' and
through 'their representation on advisory and administrative committees (ibid.
68). These mechanisms play an important role in strong corporatist countries
such as Austria, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland.
Typically, corporatist practices are associated with strong and well integrated
labour movements and employers' associations. According to Schmitter (1982:
264) among the preconditions for corporatist concertation to take place are a
system of interest organisation based on centralisation and monopoly of
representation. These features are important because they affect interest groups'
threat potential (such as the ability to call and sustain strike activities) and as a
result constitute a powerful pressure on governments to adopt negotiated
solutions in the relevant areas of public policy. Trade union monopoly of
representation and vertical integration are also important when it comes to defend
with the rank-and-file an agreement reached in tripartite negotiations. In the
absence of strong integration, there is no guarantee that individual unions, or
union members, will conform to decision taken by the national leadership. The
failure of income policies in Britain in the 1970s was to a large extent due to the
TUC's inability to control wage settlements negotiated by individual unions
(Hall 1986: 277).
8 For a general discussion on the concept of corporatism, see among many other Schmitter and
Lembruch 1979; Lembruch and Schmitter 1982; Lembruch 1984; Regini 1984. In relation to social
policy, see Mishra 1990 and Kemeny 1995.
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The existence of a corporatist tradition in a country is likely to affect the kind of
political approach governments will adopt in a pension reform in two main ways.
First, the conditions that have been identified as favourable to the establishment
of corporatist practices are likely to put pressure on governments to seek external
support for planned legislation. In countries with strong and well integrated
labour movements, governments will be more inclined to adopt a consensual
approach to welfare retrenchment, since there, the trade unions can credibly
threaten to prevent the adoption of controversial legislation, through mass protest
or by making use of the opportunities provided by formal institutions. Second,
countries with a strong corporatist tradition have developed standard procedures
in policy-making which include the concertation of policy with external interests.
Organised interests, in turn, having being used to negotiate between themselves
and with the government, are less likely to adopt an uncompromising stance.
Corporatist countries, in fact are often characterised by what Katzenstein (1985a:
12-13) has termed 'the ideology of social partnership', a notion referring to
labour movements and employer associations which are sensitive to the needs of
the national economy rather than concentrated on simply defending the interests
of their members. The existence of a tradition in public policy-making that
values compromise and consensus can be seen as an element favouring a
negotiated solution to a pension reform.
As a matter of fact, countries with a strong corporatist tradition have sought to
reach consensus on retrenchment measures in the area of pensions. For instance,
the German 1992 pension reform was supported by the main political parties
(both by the ruling coalition and by the Social Democratic opposition), and was
to a large extent influenced by the proposals made jointly by the trade unions and
employer organisations (Schmahl 1993: 42). Similarly, the Swedish 1994 pension
reform was carefully agreed between the Social democratic government and the
social partners (Pierson 1996a: 172; Stephens 1996: 46). As discussed in chapter
5, the 1995 Swiss pension reform was also negotiated with the social partners,
though, despite a number of attempts, a compromise could not be reached on all
of its elements.
For the reasons mentioned above, it is not surprising that countries with well
established corporatist practices tend to deal with the pension issue in a more
consensual way. What is more striking, however, is the fact that countries which
lack a corporatist tradition have also developed a consensual approach to pension
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reform. This was the case, for instance, with the 1995 Italian pension reform,
which reflected to a large extent the proposals made by the trade unions (Artoni
and Zanardi 1996). As discussed in chapter 6, the French 1993 reform, though it
was not officially approved by a large section of the labour movement, included
elements that were clearly geared at gaining its acquiescence. In both countries,
governments were admittedly afraid of the possible conflictual reaction of the
trade unions, so that they opted for a negotiated solution. In this respect, it seems
that the strong attachment of the population to existing pension arrangements,
which makes union-led mobilisation easier, compensates for the weakness and
poor integration of labour movements in non-corporatist countries. In both
countries, attempts to deal with pensions in a confrontational way failed as a
result of impressive trade union-lead protest movements. In 1994, the Italian
government had to drop plans for a pension reform after a general strike had been
called (Artoni and Zanardi 1996), while in France the attempt to impose pension
cuts on public sector employees in 1995 generated a major protest movement
and forced the government to withdraw its plans. Standard indicators of trade
union density, thus, do not seem to reflect accurately the extent to which labour
movements are able to challenge the adoption of legislation. The case of France,
in particular, shows that even numerically weak trade unions are able to set up
and sustain massive protest movements, which can ultimately succeed in
preventing the adoption of controversial reforms.
2.6. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The interpretations discussed in this chapter provide some useful insights in
understanding current social policy change. First, socio-economic factors are
having a substantial impact, although, as pointed out earlier, they do not explain
national variations in policy responses. Second, political factors, and particularly
the power of the left and of the labour movement, are likely to continue playing a
role in the current redefinition of the welfare state, albeit possibly to a lesser
extent than during its expansion. Third, institutional design of social
programmes seems particularly crucial in the present context as policy feedbacks
affect the direction taken by reform. Finally, the rules that govern policy-
making, which determine who has access to it and the degree of influence
granted to external interests, are also likely to affect the shape of reform.
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The relationship between policy-making patterns and policy outcomes, which is
the central focus of this study, is analysed in two separate stages. First, the study
deals with the issue of how governments go about reforming their pension system
in terms of policy-making process. As seen above, they can choose between two
strategies based either on the inclusion or the exclusion of external intermts. In
relation to this issue, the study aims at understanding what are the factors that
favour the adoption of one or the other of these two approaches to pension
reform. Second, it examines the implications of the type of policy-making
chosen on pension reform. In particular, it is assumed that the number and kind of
actors involved will have an influence on the type and on the scope of measures
adopted. In this section, a number of hypotheses related to these two questions
are discussed.
Power concentration and policy-making patterns
On the basis of the above discussion on models of democracy and on
corporatism, it seems that a key element likely to affect governments approaches
to pension reform is the balance of power between them and external interests,
particularly the labour movement. The balance of power between these two
actors (or sets of actors) depends on three main factors: the extent to which the
constitutional structure concentrates power with the government, the level of
integration and representativeness enjoyed by the trade unions, and a number of
political contingent factors such as electoral results.
First, in relation to constitutional structures, Lijphart's work on consensus and
majoritarian democracy gives us some insight into what individual institutional
features are likely to be associated with strong power concentration with the
executive. In this respect, one would expect countries falling into the majoritarian
category to be more likely to adopt a confrontational approach to pension policy.
Conversely, countries which share many features of the consensus model, are
likely to include external groups in the definition of pension policy. Because of
the potential for controversy embodied in pension policy, governments willing to
retrench in a consensus democracy might find it more rational to agree on a
reform package beforehand rather than to try to impose their own priorities. The
second strategy, in fact, might result in the rejection of reform as a whole. In
relation to the three country sample covered here, theory suggests that the UK is
likely to adopt a confrontational approach while Switzerland is expected to
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negotiate the content of reform with the relevant interests. With regard to France,
which according to Lijphart shares elements of both models, it is more difficult to
suggest a likely course for pension policy merely on the basis of institutions.
Some more elements need to be taken into account in order to do that.
Second, in relation to the existence of corporatist practices, which as seen above
are expected to be related to a consensual approach to pension reform, only
Switzerland has a relatively well integrated labour movement and a strong
tradition of corporatist policy-making. France, in contrast, has one of the lowest
unionisation rates among industrial countries, and the labour movement is further
divided along ideological lines, which is seen as an impediment to the
development of corporatist patterns. Finally, the UK, despite having a stronger
and better integrated labour movement, has failed to develop consistent
corporatist practices. According to most commentators, this is due to the lack of
control of the TUC over individual unions (Hall 1986; Regini 1984). Moreover,
the Conservative governments of the 1980s and early 1990s have shown little
interest in negotiating policy with external groups.
Third, contingent political factors can affect the balance of power between
governments and external interests. The position of a country on the majoritarian-
consensual axis might in fact change as a result of these contingent elements.
Three main factors seem to be particularly relevant: the proximity of an important
election, the size of a parliamentary majority and the configuration of power
within democratic institutions.
First, electoral cycles provide some windows of opportunity in which
governments can take more risk in policy-making. Unpopular measures, such as a
pension reform, are more easily adopted when the next important election is
scheduled for a relatively distant future. Their potentially negative impact on the
government's popularity has some time to fade away. These considerations are
particularly relevant in the case of France, which because of its semi-presidential
system has two non-coordinated electoral cycles: a president is elected every
seven years while parliament is renewed every five. As discussed in chapter 6,
the double electoral cycle narrows down the size of these windows of opportunity
and helps to account for the long time taken by French policy-makers to adopt
saving measures in the area of pensions.
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Second, the size of the parliamentary majority is likely to affect the
government's approach to a pension reform (Pierson 1996: 176). If it can rely on
a substantial 'electoral slack', a government might be more inclined to ignore
external demands. Under such conditions, possible defections in parliament do
not constitute a cause for concern. Electoral slack might have played a role in the
1986 British pension reform, which was imposed by the Conservative
government who could count on a majority of 146 in the House of Commons.
The third contingent factor, power configuration, refers to the orientation of
political control of the different democratic institutions. This factor is relevant in
countries with bicameral parliaments, where the two chambers are elected on a
different basis and where they both can affect the course of policy (symmetric
and incongruent bicameralism). Under such conditions, it is possible to have a
situation in which the two chambers are dominated by different parties. This was
the case in Germany at the time of the 1992 pension reform, when the Bundestag
was dominated by the centre-right ruling coalition, and the Bundesrat was
controlled by the Social-Democrats. According to the German constitution, most
laws must be accepted by both chambers. The result of this peculiar power
configuration is a significant pressure on the government to seek concertation
with the opposition (ICriesi 1994: 334; Schmidt 1996). As seen above, this is
precisely what happened in the 1992 pension reform.
A similar effect of power configuration on policy-making patterns could be
observed in France, when between 1993 and 1995, President and Prime Minister
belonged to two different parties. As in the case of Germany, the coexistence of
two important actors with different political orientations constituted a powerful
pressure to avoid confrontation and to seek wide support for legislation (Bigaut
1995). As argued in chapter 6, this configuration of power constituted an
important incentive for the government to act consensually in the 1993 pension
reform. When, in 1995, this incentive disappeared with the election of a President
belonging to the ruling right-of centre coalition (Jacques Chirac), pension policy
took a much more uncompromising character.
Policy-making patterns and pension reform
The relevance of the above discussion for understanding why a given course of
pension policy is followed in a country, relates to the fact that the pattern of
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policy-making adopted (confrontational or consensual) limits the range of options
available for reform. In general terms, it seems appropriate to expect
governments choosing the confrontational approach to be better able to shape
pension reform according to their ideological and political preferences. In this
case, governments might also be able to anticipate predicted financial problems.
In contrast, governments willing to adopt a negotiated approach, in order to
convince external interests of the need for a pension reform, will need to wait
until pension schemes budgets are unequivocally in trouble.
In addition, groups inclined to oppose retrenchment in the area of pension, most
typically the trade unions, are likely to demand some sort of quid pro quo in
return for their support or acquiescence to a pension reform. A deal can be
achieved in a number of ways, which depend to a large extent on pension scheme
design. As a result, it is difficult to generalise on this point. A progressive labour
movement might accept retrenchment measures if these are compensated through
an improvement of the situation of women, who often fare less well than men in
insurance-based pension schemes (Rake 1996). As discussed in chapter 5, this
was the case in the Swiss 1995 reform. Other possible quid pro quos include
concessions on the management side of social insurance schemes (in the 1993
French reform; see chapter 6); or a commitment by the government not to
intervene in pension policy for a number of years (in the 1995 Italian reform).
Given the important degree of variation of pension arrangements in Europe, it is
difficult to theorise on the details of pension reforms. However, what seems
likely, is that negotiated solutions, unless adopted in a context of generalised
'pension panic', i.e. a situation in which everybody agrees on the necessity to
cutback pension expenditure, will include elements which constitute a
compensation for the groups who are negatively affected by retrenchment
measures.
Interacting determinants
The above discussion of the factors that are likely to affect the course of pension
policy suggests that monocausal explanations are most unlikely. Instead, what
best accounts for major policy reforms, is a combination of factors interacting
with each other. A constitutional structure which concentrates power with the
executive can become irrelevant if no party manages to achieve a majority. By
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the same token, bicameralism or two-headed executives have different impacts on
policy-making depending on who controls the two institutions.
While it is plausible to assume that, in line with the new-institutionalist
hypothesis, constitutional structures have an impact on policy, this impact,
_
however, should not be seen as a constant and fixed feature. In fact, the
importance of institutional variables depends on contingent political factors and
on the balance of power between the different actors. For this reason, predictions
with regard to the likely course of pension reform in given countries are extremely
difficult to make. What one can say, however, is that given combinations of
institutional features and contingent factors are likely to be associated with certain
patterns of pension policy-making. In general, a confrontational approach to
pension reform is more likely in countries presenting a combination of
institutional and contingent factors which favour concentration of power within
the executive.
This general hypothesis, however, needs to be adapted to the different national
contexts, in order to increase the range of variables that are explained and in order
to understand the details of pension policy. In the three case-study chapters, this
hypothesis will be re-formulated in the light of the particular socio-economic,
institutional, and political context that characterises the countries studied. In fact,
the specific measures that make up reform packages can only be accounted for by
a closer analysis of national situations. Before turning to the case-studies,
however, a discussion of the methodology used in this work is needed. This is the





This chapter addresses some issues of method in the social sciences in general, and
in particular with reference to the understanding of social policies. Given the
approach adopted in this study, it concentrates mostly on the comparative method.
It is important to be aware of what are the possibilities and the limits of scientific
research in the social sciences. Too often, in fact, research is carried out on the
basis of implicit assumptions with regard to the explanatory power of theory. Can
we, social scientists, produce statements of general validity, or laws? If we cannot,
what should we aim for? What are the best methods to achieve that? These are
important questions that have kept methodologists busy for decades. Rather than
attempting to answer them (this task could be the subject of a doctorate in its own
right), I will try to provide an informed discussion of some of the main positions
which can be found in the relevant literature.
First, the chapter presents the case for comparative research as being the most
adequate to develop theories which relate to macro-social structures. It then moves
on to look at two different traditions of comparative research, the quantitativist
school and the strand referred to as historical sociology (sections 2 & 3). In the
fourth section, it tries to relate the general debate on comparative social research to
the area of social policy; and, finally, it focuses on the approach adopted in this
study.
3.1. PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE RESEARCH
Strictly speaking, comparison is the essence of all scientific research. The scientific
method, be it in the realm of natural or social science, is always based on a
comparison between different situations, which are characterised by the presence,
or absence, of given causal factors and by the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of a
given event (Lijphart 1971: 683). In the social sciences, however, the term
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comparative is generally used to designate research based on the parallel analysis
of a given issue in different geographical entities, most often nation-states, with
the aim of uncovering causal regularities, or more ambitiously, scientific 'laws'.
The following discussion is based on this definition of comparative research. As a
result, the fact of studying more than one country is not a sufficient condition for a
piece of research to be considered comparative. In this case, one might simply
have a juxtaposition of case studies. To be comparative, analysis must go beyond
the stage of parallel investigation and uncover consistency (or inconsistency
depending on the research design) between causal links in the different countries
studied.
A comparative approach is particularly powerful, and sometimes even inevitable,
when the hypotheses being tested relate to macro-social, -political or -economic
phenomena. In this case, in fact, the other major tool of the social scientist, the
controlled group technique, cannot be applied. More confined events, like the
impact of a given change in policy on the behaviour of a given group, can be
assessed through the comparison between two groups, of which only one has
been affected by that particular policy change. Different behavioural outcomes
will tell us whether or not the policy change in question has had the supposed
impact on the group concerned. For obvious reasons, most often of a practical
nature, the controlled group technique cannot be applied to test the validity of
hypotheses which concern macro-structures. For example, the proportion of GDP
spent on social expenditure, the importance of corporatist networks or the level of
investment in a country are all indicators which cannot be controlled by the social
scientist.
When analysis covers this sort of phenomena, the comparative approach is the
only practical option. Instead of intentionally exposing a group to a given
stimulus, the comparativist will look around to find countries which present the
best possible combination of presence-absence of his or her independent and
dependent variables. The success of this exercise, of course, depends to a large
extent on the availability of countries with the required features. Often the
researcher is forced to compromise. Nevertheless, to look at a causal relationship
between variables in a single country, is not a satisfactory solution either. The
presence or the absence of a given causal relationship observed only once tell us
nothing about the existence of such relationship independently from the context in
which it has been observed. As Kohn put it:
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'cross national research is valuable, even indispensable, for
establishing the generality of findings and the validity of interpretations
derived from single nation studies. In no other way can we be certain
that what we believe to be social-structural regularities are not merely
particularities of some limited set of historical or cultural or political
circumstances' (Kohn 1987: 714)
Yet the identification and the validation of causal relationships can be extremely
important in the area of public policy in general, and in particular of social and
economic policy. Surprisingly, much of the current public debate on the supposed
relationship between social expenditure and economic performance is not always
informed by sound comparative research. Paradoxically, this is one of the areas in
which the contribution of comparative analysis is potentially most relevant. From a
scientific point of view however, (as opposed to a political one), comparative
research which is used to inform policy decisions must be of the highest possible
quality. The complexity involved in the study of raacso-styuctuml. xe,l.Mionships
across different countries, in fact, means that there is plenty of scope for errors.
Measurements can be incorrect, or they can refer to different things in different
countries. Institutions which developed in a country may or may not exist in
another one. Concepts used in a given culture may or may not have an equivalent in
other cultures. In sum, the extent of obstacles to successful comparative research is
substantial, and can produce major misreading. That is why, before embarking in
my own, I thought it useful to provide a discussion of what are the main problems
in comparative research and how these can been dealt with as well as, perhaps
most importantly, what are the possibilities and the limits of comparison in the
social sciences.
The term 'comparative' offers a relatively loose methodological prescription on
how to do research. The facts that more than one country must be involved and that
the objective of research is to identify causal regularities tell us little about how one
should proceed in the analysis. This reflects the existence of important variations in
method between studies that are generally treated as comparative. Broadly speaking
the majority of comparative studies can be grouped into two different categories.
First there are quantitative studies, which compare a number of indicators usually
across a relatively large number of countries. Alternatively, comparative research
can be based on a more detailed analysis of events in different countries. In this
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case, because of the amount of work involved, the number of countries is generally
smaller and they are chosen because of their relevance with regard to the research
hypotheses. These two approaches to comparative research are based on different
normative assumptions with regard to methodology in the social sciences and have
different implications in so far as their general validity is concerned. For this
reason, it is worth spending some time looking at some of the main debates
surrounding them.
Quantitative comparative research
Quantitative comparative studies are based on the assumption that the scientific
method as applied in the natural sciences can be successfully used in the social
sciences. Reference is often made to the work of Karl Popper (1959) and to his
normative theory of science. According to him, sound scientific research must be
based on the elaboration of one or more hypotheses which need subsequently to be
corroborated by testing them against empirical evidence. Hypotheses must be
falsifiable, i.e. before the test takes place, it must be possible to identify a number
of results which would invalid the hypothesis. The validity of hypotheses is, in
principle at least, only temporary. Hypotheses should be considered valid as long
as they are not contradicted by empirical evidence. The corollary of this
understanding is the fact that the more empirical tests a theory has survived, the
stronger it is. Consequently, it is in the interest of the researcher to test his or her
theory against as many cases as possible. Much of the American political science
tradition, until the late 1970s at least belongs to this strand (Cutright 1963; 1965;
Wilensky 1975). Typically, macro-structural hypotheses, like for example that the
level of social expenditure is related to economic development (Wilensky 1975),
were tested across a large number of countries, depending on the availability of the
relevant indicators.
In this perspective, the number of cases analysed is seen as a crucial factor in the
ability to make generalisations (Lijphart 1971). According to Skocpol, it is because
of this methodological belief that some research areas were not covered by
American political scientists before the mid-1970s. Her subject, social revolutions,
had been avoided because of the insufficient number of cases to produce
convincing scientific results (1979: 33). While the number of cases covered is a
crucial element, in general, quantitative comparative analysis pays relatively little
attention to the differences in national contexts and to the dynamic character of the
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phenomena studied. Instead, the main concern is to improve the quality of
measurements (indicators) which is believed to be a key standard by which to
assess the scientific validity of research (Blalock 1975).
The quantitative approach remained the dominant paradigm in comparative social
research until the late 1970s, though not immune from criticism. Among historians,
in fact, there had always been resistance to the assumption that social theories
could aspire to some sort of general validity. Their view is that generalisations are
not possible in the field of social science, since social phenomena occur in
particular and unique historical and cultural contexts. Within sociology, however,
the quantitativist paradigm came increasingly under attack for its lack of
understanding of contextual and cultural specificity. According to cultural
sociologist Bertrand Badie, comparative social science entered a phase of crisis
when the research community became aware, towards the end of the 1970s, of the
difficulties involved in comparing social structures defined by western academics
across a varied range of cultures. For instance, he points out, concepts such as
'nation', 'state', or 'civil society', do not have an equivalent in most non-European
cultures (Badie 1989: 343). As a result of growing awareness of the Eurocentric
perception which had dominated much of earlier research, the corpus of theory
developed by quantitativists in the 1960s and 1970s was significantly weakened.
When people were relating various economic indicators to the level of political
development in different countries (Cutright 1963), were they really comparing like
with like? Or were the equivalents found in non-European 'cultures just
'methodological artifacts' (Kohn 1987: 718). How can the problem be dealt with?
Badie acknowledges that the implication of his view on the non-comparability
between cultures is the risk for analysis to remain descriptive. Hypotheses
developed in a given cultural context, cannot be tested in a different one, since the
concepts used might not have a true equivalent in another culture (Badie 1989:
346).
Historical sociology
The result of the critique of the quantitativist research strategy was a resurgence,
during the 1980s, of historical sociology as a comparative approach. A source of
inspiration for historical sociologists is the work by Alexis de Toqueville (1981;
1983), unknowingly one of the founders of this approach, who between 1835 and
1856 published two books which compared the different paths to political
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modernisation undertaken by France and the United States. The comparisons he
makes are based on many of the techniques which later became prescriptions of
comparative historical sociology. Another study which is often quoted as an
example is the work by Barrington Moore (1966) on the origin of democracy and
dictatorship in a number of countries, chosen according to whether they develeFA
democratic or dictatorial political regimes. His approach is often presented as an
example in comparative methodology (Skocpol 1984; Kriesi 1995).
The revival of historical sociology developed to a large extent around Theda
Skocpol and her school. The key aspects of this approach are a particular emphasis
on the context in which a given phenomenon is taking place and on processes rather
than on measurements. The units of comparison, instead of being economic
indicators are 'selected slices of national historical trajectories' (Skocpol 1979: 36).
According to Skocpol (1984: 1) there are four main features which characterise
historical sociology as a distinctive method, as opposed to traditional history and to
quantitative sociology. First, she argues, 'social structures and processes [are]
understood to be concretely situated in time and space' (ibid.). Second, historical
sociology is supposed to 'address processes over time' (ibid.), or in other words,
to cover a given time span rather than concentrate on a particular moment. This
feature is in contrast to the quantitative-empirical school, which has been criticised
for being anti-historical, in the sense that it generally limits analysis to a particular
point in time, thus failing to capture the dynamics of social phenomena. Third, she
suggests that historical sociology should 'attend to the interplay of meaningful
actions and structural context' (ibid.). This third item seems to relate more to a
particular theoretical understanding of what explains social change i.e. a
combination of actions and structures, rather than a methodological prescription.
Finally, it is claimed that historical sociology should 'highlight the particular and
varying features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change'
(ibid.). In other words this approach follows historians in recognising the
peculiarity and uniqueness of different social and cultural contexts. However,
unlike historians, historical sociologists do not believe that this fact is an
unavoidable obstacle to cross-national comparisons. In fact, by placing much
emphasis on the context in which a given social phenomenon occurs, the risk of
ignoring differences between the units of comparison is substantially reduced.
In historical sociology the selection of the countries to analyse is of foremost
importance. The composition of the most appropriate sample is determined by the
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requirements of the research. For instance, in her work on the origins of social
revolutions, Skocpol (1979) selected three countries which experienced a social
revolution (France, Russia and China) and contrasted them with three other which
did not (Japan, Prussia and England). Simple common sense tells us that factors
which were present prior to revolutions in France, Russia and China, but did not
exist in Prussia, England and Japan, are likely to be the causes of social
revolutions. In the selection of her sample, Skocpol combined two main strategies
in cross-national comparative research: the 'most similar system design' which
consists of selecting countries similar in most respects, and then compare what is
different between them; and the 'most different system design' which entails
selecting very different cases and compare what these countries have in common.
(Przeworski and Teune 1970: 31-39). In the comparison of the three countries
which did experience a revolution, Skocpol looks for similarities; when she
contrasts them with countries which did not, she looks for differences.
Comparative historical sociology, however, has also its disadvantages in relation to
quantitative-empirical analyses. First, since it requires a thorough investjgation of
the different contexts and processes, the number of countries covered is bound to
be lower. For instance, if one compares socio-economic indicators, the size of the
sample, assuming that the indicators are available, does not constitute a practical
problem. In contrast, when comparisons are made between processes which take
place over a given time span, and when the context in which these processes occur
is also analysed, then the number of cases cannot be increased beyond a certain
level. In fact, while quantitative studies often cover up to around 100 countries,
research projects in comparative historical sociology are typically limited to 2 to 5
or 6 cases. As a result, the general validity of findings emerged from the analysis of
such a small number of countries, which moreover, have been carefully selected by
the researcher, can certainly be questioned. Second, the fact that comparisons are
usually carried out among broad themes or wide ranging events, means that it is
extremely difficult or even impossible to include all relevant elements.
It seems thus, that the merits of comparative sociological history should not be
overestimated. In particular, it should be made clear that its ambition cannot
reasonably be to produce statements of general validity, especially when research is
based on a very small number of cases. Instead, the usefulness of this method, lies
in its ability to highlight some mechanisms which are at work in given processes
and in given contexts. Following Boudon (1986) it seems that theories produced
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by historical sociologists can aspire to 'localised determinism 1(cleterminisme par
plaques) a concept which basically refers to the fact that the validity of statements
should be considered as limited to the particular context in which a given
phenomenon has been analysed and a cause-effect relation has been identified. This
limitation certainly applies to the present study
3.2. COMPARING SOCIAL POLICIES
One of the first problems which comparativists working in the broad area of social
policy usually have to deal with is that of finding reliable and comparable statistics.
The economic indicators provided by international agencies such as the OECD,
Eurostat -or the ILO are often difficult to use, since they rarely (if at all) mention
what a given indicator means in different countries. For instance, it is not always
clear what schemes are included in the indicator 'expenditure on pensions'. Does it
include the German employer-sponsored (non compulsory) pension schemes? Does
it include tax rebates for UK private pension plans? In most cases, this sort of
detailed information is not supplied with a table. Indeed, it can be of crucial
importance for the accuracy of a comparison, depending on what sort of
hypotheses one is working on.
This type of problem is made worse by the fact that terms carrying the same name
have different meanings in different countries. It is known that, for instance, the
concept of social expenditure may (UK) or may not (France) include education. In
addition, things get more complicated when it comes to the details. Higgins (1981:
17) points out that the term 'social security', refers to all cash transfers to
individuals in the UK; in the US, the same term is used as a synonym of the Old
Age Sickness and Disability Insurance (OASDI) scheme. In France, securite sociale
can be understood as either an institution or a concept. The securite sociale
institution indicates the social insurance system set up in 1945, which includes
pensions, family benefits and health insurance. The concept, in contrast, refers to
universality, i.e. the idea of a single plan covering the whole population of a
country, since one of the initial aims of the securite sociale was universality. This
objective, however, has not been achieved, and that is why it is sometimes said that
the French social security system is not a real social security system (Chatagner
1993: 118). A sentence which does not make sense if taken out of its context.
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These problems are mainly of a practical nature. Ideally, if one had access to
national statistics, had a thorough knowledge of the languages and cultures
involved in his or her study, this kind of obstacle would not be too serious. There
are however more complex problems involved in cross-national comparative social
policy, which are more of a conceptual nature. For instance, let's assume that the
indicator 'social expenditure', has been built so as to be satisfactorily comparable,
i.e. it includes the same programmes in all countries. A closer look at the schemes
contained reveals that there are profound differences as to how these schemes are
financed; what part of the population is covered, what the entitlement rules are and
the kind of benefits they provide (flat-rate or earnings-related). For example, in
Bismarckian systems the bulk of social expenditure consists of contributory
earnings-related benefits while in some Nordic countries universal tax financed
provision plays the major role. Is expenditure on these programmes 'the same
thing'? Can it be treated, as is the case in some international comparisons as beissg
interchangeable?
The most sensible answer to that question is that it depends on what this indicator is
being used for. If, as it is often the case, it is to reflect in some way the overall
welfare effort of a nation, then there is growing awareness that the social
expenditure indicator is not the most adequate (Esping-Andersen 1990; Cochrane
1993). Esping-Andersen argues that 'not all spending counts equally' (1990: 19).
For instance, he points out, in Austria relatively large sums are used to finance a
scheme for privileged civil servants. When assessing the welfare effort of a nation,
the amount spent on such schemes cannot be treated as equivalent to expenditure
on schemes which cover the whole population. More in general, differences in the
way schemes are financed, in their coverage and eligibility rules and in the sort of
benefit that they grant, can produce a substantial impact on important dimensions
such as redistribution and gender equality. For instance, it is known that welfare
states based on contributory earnings-related schemes of Bismarckian tradition, are
much less vertically redistributive than their Anglo-Scandinavian counterparts.
O'Higgins et al. (1990) have found that the British and even the American welfare
state are more vertically redistributive than the German one, though in the latter
social expenditure is considerably higher both in relative and in absolute terms.
It seems that comparisons of welfare efforts based on the social expenditure as a
proportion of GDP indicator (such as Wilensky 1975), which refer to substantially
different sets of policies and institutions in different countries, are considerably
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weakened if one considers that the same economic indicator sometimes refers to
rather different things in different countries. In this respect, the reasons which
support the adoption of a more detailed contextual analysis in comparative social
policy are the same as the ones reviewed above on a more general level. The
emphasis on the context reduces the ris ir_nf inadvertently not comparing like with
like. In fact, there are some excellent examples of detailed comparative research in
the area of social policy that from a methodological point of view reflect the
guidelines given by historical sociologists.
In his pioneering work on the relationship between industrialisation and social
policy, Rimlinger (1971) uses an approach which reflects the main features of
comparative historical sociology. The sample selected includes countries with a
strong liberal-individualist tradition (US, UK, France) together with countries with
an authoritarian legacy (Germany, Russia) and a totalitarian state (USSR). This is
relevant in relation to Rimlinger' s central hypothesis, i.e. that the impact pi
industrialisation on the development of social policy has been mediated by the role
played by ideas, and in particular by liberalism (ibid. 8-10). The analysis then
concentrates on processes (the development of social policies) and on contexts
(industrialisation, political development, dominant ideologies), and concludes that
'the countries that denied the right to social protection during the period of
industrialisation were the ones with the strongest liberal and individualistic
traditions' (ibid. 336).
Similarly, Heclo's work on the development of old age and unemployment
insurance in Sweden and in Britain (1974), employs comparative historical
sociology as a methodological approach. Heclo explicitly mentions the relevance of
looking at the context in which social policies develop. As he put it:
'Public policies never exist in a vacuum. To begin by immediately
comparing the course of social policy in Britain and Sweden would not
only obscure many of the extremely important conditioning factors for
such policy but also ignore something of which the zealous
comparativist needs constantly to remind himself: countries are not
interchangeable pieces' (ibid. 17).
In his analysis of the context, Heclo focuses on three main areas: the socio-
economic background, political development and the policy inheritance (ibid. 19-
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64). In the following chapters, he looks at the processes, i.e. the development of
social insurance programmes in the two countries. Finally, in his conclusion, the
relationship between context and processes is outlined. In particular, he argues, that
'forced to choose one group among all the separate political factors as most
consistently important [...] , the bureaucracies of Britain and Sweden loom
predominant in the policies studied' (ibid. 301). In his opinion, thus, it is the policy
inheritance which is the main determinant of public policies, mediated by the
individual contribution of administrators, social reformers, or more in general of
figures who took part in the debate on social policies.
Baldwin's work on the origins of social insurance is also an interesting example of
comparative historical sociology applied to social policy. His general hypothesis is
that groups which perceive their position as insecure are more likely to accept to be
included in highly risk-redistributive arrangements in the area of social insurance.
Much of Baldwin's argument is based on an understanding of social insurance
schemes as risk-redistributive only, as opposed to income redistributive. In order to
support the validity of his thesis, Baldwin defines two ideal-types of social
insurance. In the first type, which he refers to as the solidaristic or the
Scandinavian type, risk-redistribution is very important and occurs across large
collectivities (usually the whole population). In contrast, in the second ideal-type of
social insurance, which he calls un-solidaristic or Bismarckian, risk-redistribution
is usually limited to an occupational group, and within that group among people
with similar incomes.
The next stage consists of the identification of a number of criteria (or dimensions)
which can be used to discriminate between the two types. Baldwin uses
universality, earnings-related versus flat-rate benefits and contributions versus
taxation as a financing method. These three indicators are considered to be 'the key
reforms and issues that have defined the degree of solidarity embodied or lacking in
social insurance' (Baldwin 1990: 51). These key elements of welfare provision are
then compared across the sample (Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany and the
UK). In particular, Baldwin concentrates on the interaction between different
groups which has resulted in the adoption of a given form of welfare.
From a methodological point of view, Baldwin compares the processes which have
led to the adoption of either universal or occupationally based provision, and so
forth for the two other dimensions, focusing his attention on the preferences
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expressed by the different groups. The best example is perhaps the contrast between
Scandinavian and continental European farmers at the beginning of this century
(1990: 12). Scandinavian agriculture was mainly based on small size farming, and
as a result farmers were suffering the consequences of mechanisation and improved
methods of transportation, which made competition harsher. Consequently, Nordic
farmers supported universalism so as to be protected against social risks. In
contrast, because continental European agriculture was based more on large firms
and markets were better protected, farmers there did not feel the same sort of
insecurity which convinced their Nordic counterparts to support universalism.
Hence universalism was never seriously adopted as a policy in most of Continental
Europe, and it is only in the 1970s that something approaching universal coverage
(but through different schemes) has been achieved there.
What is important here, is not so much the content of his study, but the method
followed by Baldwin, which consists in the definition of a number of concepts
related to his hypothesis; the identification of a number of dimensions which
distinguish the two concept he has developed; and the analysis of the processes that
have led in one or the other direction. What is compared, thus, is a number of
processes which have occurred in different countries, and which have determined
the current shape of welfare states. The analysis of the context in which these
processes occur, is also important. For instance, in the case of Scandinavian
farmers, it is pointed out that improvements in transport made competition harsher
in the small free-market oriented Nordic countries, thus increasing the economic
insecurity of farmers there.
There are however a number of problems with the approach used by Baldwin,
which are obviously inherent to the historical sociological approach rather than
specific to his work. As argued above, the main limitation in comparative historical
sociology, lies in the small number of cases and in the formidable degree of
freedom granted to the researcher in terms of the choice of events he or she wants to
study. For instance, the development of universal social insurance in Britain is
accounted for with a political explanation: 'because British policy did not share
Bismarck's political aims, there was less reason to limit it [the 1908 pension
scheme] to one particular social group' (ibid. 100), while his general hypothesis
would have required a structural explanation, such as those he offered for Nordic
universalism or continental occupationalism. In addition, Baldwin's hypothesis on
the relation between perceived insecurity and willingness to participate in risk-
81
redistributive arrangements, does not seem to work in today's Britain, where the
middle-classes have been experiencing increasing economic insecurity but do not
seem to be interested in collective risk-redistribution.
It seems, thus, that generalisat i ws based on the observation of a carefully selected
series of events have to be taken extremely cautiously. The complexity involved in
the study of public policy is such, that a causal relationship observed in a very
limited number of cases may be due to some overlooked contingent factors, which
are typical of the countries covered but not of others. The result is that it is
extremely difficult to produce convincing generalisations on the basis of a limited
sample of countries. In my view this limitation must simply be accepted as, an
inherent feature of social research.
3.3. UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF PENSION REFORM
Above all, this study is about the politics of pension reform. Its central aim is to
deal with the question of how governments are going to act in the context of
contrasting socio-economic and public opinion pressures in the area of pension
policy. The leading hypothesis, as spelt out in chapter 2, is that the constitutional
structure and the opportunities it provides to minorities to influence the course of
policy is a key determinant of government's responses to the pension problem.
This hypothesis explains the selection of the sample. As it is conventional wisdom
among political scientists, the UK and Switzerland constitute two extreme examples
of majoritarian and consensual democracy respectively. In the former formal
institutions magnify the power of the majority and allow minorities little access to
policy-making; in the latter, a series of checks and veto points in the law-making
process, provide opportunities for minorities to influence policy. A third country,
France, has been included in order not to limit the analysis to the two extreme
versions of one or the other model of democracy. Most countries in fact are
somewhere in the middle. In fact, the choice to include France was a particularly
lucky one. This country was selected because it had recently (1993) adopted a
pension reform. However, while this study was being carried out, a second,
unsuccessful, attempt at reforming pensions was made in 1995. The combination
of two reforms with opposite fortunes which, incidentally were very similar in their
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content, provided additional empirical material to test hypotheses concerning the
link between institutions and pension policy-making.
In addition, at the time of reform, all three countries were dominated by right-of-
centre parliamentary majorities', which were equally committed to achieving
savings in the area of pensions. This choice allowed to control for the political
variable. In fact, if the sample had included a mix of left- and right-wing
governments, it would have been more difficult to ascertain the impact of
institutions on policy-making. Different outcomes could have been related to the
different ideological orientation of the parties in government.
The comparison of the course of pension policy in the three countries was a two-
stage process. Initially, countries have been dealt - with as individual case-studies.
Following a similar pattern of investigation in the different countries, I have tried to
reconstruct the processes which have led to the adoption of a given set of measures.
Particularly, I have tried to highlight the position of the relevant actors with regard
to the pension issue, and the extent to which each of this positions was reflected in
the final legislation. For each country, I have also tried to provide a picture of the
political, socio-economic and institutional contexts as a preliminary to the analysis.
The second stage consisted in the comparison of the processes observed across the
sample (chapter 7). This was done first in relation to the leading hypothesis which
relates constitutional structures to pension-policy-making, and, second, with regard
to other dimensions which emerged as potentially interesting in the course of the
research. This two-stage structure has been followed also in the presentation of the
results. The following three chapters are case-studies of pension reforms in the
various countries. Finally, chapter 7 provides a discussion of the regularities and of
the differences that have been observed in the different countries.
'As discussed in chapter 5, in Switzerland, there is a parliemantary right-wing majority which has a
common orientation in the areas of social and economic policy. The right-wing parliamentary





PENSION REFORM THROUGH MAJORITY
RULE
By international standards, the British pension reform of the 1986 constitutes one
of the most radical departures from the traditional west-European post-war
approach to pension policy. As a result of this reform, British employees can now
opt out of the state second-tier pension or of their occupational pension and make
individual provision for their retirement through a private and personal pension.
The significance of this change is twofold. On the one hand it constitutes a major
shift from the state to the market in pension provision, with the implication that the
redistributive function and the role of guarantor played by the former are
substantially reduced. On the other hand, the introduction of the opting out clause
means that fewer people are now paying into the state scheme which impairs its
ability to meet existing and future pension commitments and thereby constitutes an
additional incentive for employees to opt out of the state system.
It is useful to recall that the debate and the adoption of the British reform occurred
in a particular ideological and political climate. The mid-1980s where characterised
by the strong dominance of the Conservative party in politics, and by the general
ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas with regard to the respective roles of the state and
the market in modern societies. To some extent, the pension reform was part of a
wider move to reform the British economy and society, which, under the heading
of 'popular capitalism' included measures such as privatisation of state-owned
firms and of public housing, deregulation of financial services, incentives to home-
and share-ownership.
The ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas in the mid 1980s has prompted a number of
commentators to argue that contrary to government's claims, the 1986 pension
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reform was adopted for ideological reasons, rather than to anticipate a pension
crisis due to population ageing (Nesbitt 1995; Walker 1991). For instance,
according to a leading expert in UK pension policy:
'It is not the burden of aging as such that concerns the Thatcher
government, or even the cost of pensions; it is the public burden ... .
Concern about the aging of the population in Britain has been amplified
artificially as economic and demographic imperative in order to
legitimate ideologically driven policies aimed at reducing the state's role
in welfare' (Walker 1991: 31).
Walker's thesis is supported by international comparisons. If one looks at the
financial situation of the British pension system throughout the 1980s, one will find
that it is among the least worrying among industrial countries (OECD 1988a), and
yet the UK was among the first countries to adopt radical retrenchment in the area
of pensions. In addition, as will be seen below, the government's own analysis of
demographic projections is not always clear as to why future pension commitments
will not be sustainable. There is something missing, however, in this ideological
explanation of the 1986 British pension reform. Walker's thesis assumes a linear
link between economic ideas and public policy, but fails to address the issue of
why Conservatives espoused a given set of ideas in relation to pension policy; and,
perhaps more crucially, why were they able to carry them through into actual
legislation.
This chapter discusses these two crucial questions on the basis of the theoretical
framework presented in chapter 2. Particularly, the UK's constitutional structure
and its standard patterns of policy-making are treated as two important independent
variables. It is argued that the majoritarian character of the British democracy made
possible and encouraged the adoption of a particularly radical pension reform,
which is seen as part of a wider reform movement which goes under the rubric of
popular capitalism.
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4.1. THE POLITICS OF MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE
UK
British policy-making is characterised by the relatively unchecked dominance of the
party in government. As seen in chapter 2, this is to a substantial extent due to the-
particular constitutional structure of government in the UK, which emphasises the
influence of the majority party over policy. This process takes place through two
distinct stages. First, at the polls, where thanks to a first-past-the-post electoral
system, the party which obtains a plurality of votes in the electorate is likely to
reach an absolute majority in Parliament (see table 3.1). Second, once the majority
party has formed a government, there is no written constitution to limit the scope of
its actions. Because of the strong tradition of party discipline in British politics,
underpinned by institutions such as the 'whip', Parliament does not constitute an
effective check on the government's actions. The result is a political system which
allows the government a comparatively wide room for manoeuvre in policy-
making. Continental European countries, where electoral systems generally require
political parties to form coalition governments, constitute examples of polities
where the control of the majority on policy is less substantial.
According to political scientists, in the UK the main check on what the government
does is in fact party competition (see, for example, Budge 1996). Dissatisfaction
with government policies may lead to a transfer of votes from the ruling party to the
opposition, resulting in an alternation in government between parties of different
ideological persuasion. Governments seeking re-election, thus, are expected to
adopt policies which take into account a wide range of external interests, precisely
in order to reduce the risk of electoral defeat. In practical terms, however, party
competition did not always work as an effective limitation on the government's
action. This was particularly the case during Conservative governments of 1979-
1992. Instead of smoothing the content of policy in order to appeal to wide
sections of the electorate, the Thatcher governments of the 1980s have actively
pursued radical and controversial policies. Probably because of a split in the
opposition during the 1980s, the role of party competition as a check on
government policy lost its effectiveness. Party competition provides an effective
balance to government's power only as long as there is a competing party which
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can credibly threaten to win the upcoming election. During the 1980s this threat
was not strong enough. The structural weakness of the Labour party and the
division of the anti-Conservative camp between two parties have given the Thatcher
governments a substantial degree of freedom to pursue their own objectives.
As a matter of fact, there is a substantial degree of agreement among those who
have studied British politics since 1979 on the fact that the election of Margaret
Thatcher as Prime Minister constitutes a major watershed in the government's
approach to policy-making (Budge 1996; Hayward and Klein 1994; Jessop et al.
1988; Kavanagh 1990; Riddel 1989). Unlike the 1980s, the post-war period is
generally seen as characterised by an overall consensus between the two main
parties in areas of economic and social policies. This notion of consensus refers to
a common orientation concerning the relative weight of the state and the market in
modern societies. Both parties accepted the idea that the state had the duty and the
abi lity to intervene in the economic system in order to redress the shortcomings of
an unregulated market (George and Miller 1994: 7).
It should be noted, however, that the British post-war consensus had little in
common with Lijphart's concept of consensual democracy discussed in Chapter 2.
It is true that there was convergence in the orientation of the main parties in
economic and social policy, but decision-making remained majoritarian throughout
the post-war period. Some attempts to set up corporatist networks were made, but
they were relatively short-lived (Regini 1984; Hall 1986). Moreover, the whole
post-war period was characterised by an alternation in government of the two main
parties, which did not encourage negotiation and inclusion of external interests. The
British 'post-war consensus', unlike Lijphart's consensual democracy, is a notion
that refers to the orientation of policy, and not to the patterns of inclusion and
exclusion of external interests into policy-making.
Moreover, consensus proved to be more fragile in Britain than in consensual
democracies such as Switzerland. After 1979 the common orientation in economic
and social policy was lost, and the majoritarian approach to policy-making was
emphasised. As a result, during the Thatcher years a substantial number of policies
adopted after War World II saw a clear reversal. In economic policy demand-
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management of Keynesian inspiration was replaced by monetarism and a preference
for economic laissez-faire. In social policy the desirability of having a welfare state
was questioned. In pension policy, it was the public/private mix in provision for
retirement that was going to be mostly affected.
This reversal in policy was made possible and encouraged by the structure of
British formal institutions. The electoral system, coupled with the geographical
dimension of economic and political cleavages, have allowed the Thatcher
governments to pursue extremely controversial policies without incurring in
substantial electoral losses. The lack of constitutional checks has allowed the
government a substantial degree of freedom in the elaboration of a strategy geared
at maximising the attainment of its objectives, including that of being re-elected.
The remainder of the section discusses this hypothesis
First-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system
The most obvious consequence of the FPTP electoral system in the UK is the fact
that it allows a party with a plurality of votes in the electorate to have a majority in
Parliament. This is precisely what repeatedly happened during the Thatcher years.
As table 4.1 shows, the Conservative party never received more than 44% of the
vote, yet it has had absolute majorities in Parliament throughout the period. Political
parties which have a strong regional basis are favoured relative to those which are
of medium strength nation-wide. This appears clearly in the 1983 election results,
in which the Alliance, with more than 25% of the vote, won only 23 seats,
whereas Labour, with less than 2 percentage points more, won 209 seats. The two
major parties tend to concentrate their support in some areas, and to be extremely
weak in others, while the Alliance (now the Liberal Democratic Party) are more
likely to end up second (this was the case in 303 constituencies in 1983).
Traditionally, the North of England, Wales and Scotland support Labour, while the
South-East has been the key Conservative stronghold.
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Table 4.1. British election results, 1979-1992
Year Conservative Party Labour Party Liberal/Lib-Democrats
% of votes MPs % of votes MPs % of votes MPs
1979 43.3 339 36.9 268 13.8	 — • 11
1983 42.4 396 27.6 209 25.4 23
1987 42.3 375 30.8 229 12.8 17
1992 41.9 336 34.4 271 17.8 20
Source: Keesing's Archives of World's Events, 1979; 1983; 1987; 1992.
A second implication of the FPTP electoral system refers to the fact that
governments do not need broad, cross-class support in order to win elections. A
plurality of votes is enough. This feature of FPTP seems to have been crucial in
influencing the direction of policy during the 1980s. As the former Prime Minister
herself put it: 'It [is} important to have a philosophy and policy which because thy
are good appeal to sufficient people to secure a majority' (Thatcher, quoted in
Riddel 1989: 1). In fact, if one looks at the major reforms adopted by the various
Thatcher governments, one will find that many have the quality of being palatable
to a relatively large section of the electorate. This is the case of reforms that
facilitated the establishment of the Conservative vision of 'popular capitalism' such
as encouraging home and share ownership, privatisation of state owned firms, and
the introduction of personal private pensions.
More precisely, however, these policies tended to have an asymmetric impact on
the population, which most often depended on income and on ideological
persuasion of individuals. In other words, those who had sufficient financial means
and were prepared to go along with the project of a 'popular capitalism' put
forward by the Thatcher governments, did rather well throughout the 1980s. The
number of individuals involved was quite substantial. The privatisation of council
houses resulted by 1988 in an increase by 3 million in the number of home owners,
of whom many had bought their house with a substantial discount (up to 50%).
The number of individual shareholders soared from 3 million in 1979 to 9 million
in 1989. (Riddel 1989: 111-124).
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The political significance of the various reforms falling under the rubric of 'popular
capitalism' was a reinforcement of what Jessop et al. (1988) have termed the
'social base' l of Thatcherism. In other words the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s
did have a positive economic impact on a relatively large section of the population,
which in turn became more inclined to stay- in or to join the Conservative camp.
This interpretation of Thatcherism is not new. Jessop et al. (1988) have suggested
the existence of a link between the content of government reforms in the 1980s and
the permanence in power of the conservative party, on the basis of a coherent
strategy which consistently directed the course of policy.
A Thatch erite project?
Jessop et al.' s analysis of Thatcherism starts from a critique of the ideological
interpretation, which basically sees the change of direction due to a shift in the
values and beliefs which animated elites and public opinion. According to them, the
main weakness of an ideological interpretation lies with the fact that 'it could
neglect the structural underpinnings of Thatcherism in the economic and in the state
systems and its specific economic and political bases of support' (ibid. 73). In
contrast, Jessop et al. view Thatcherism as a political strategy adopted by the
Conservative Party in response to the 'continuing relative decline of the British
economy and, more particularly, to its political repercussions' (ibid. 163). The key
element of this strategy is its 'two nation' character. In other words, it is based on a
division between two sections of the population: on the one hand the 'productive',
understood as those individuals who are able to extract resources from a
competitive market, and, on the other hand the 'parasitic', who rely for their
livelihood on the state or on non-competitive arrangements. The authors point out
that this division does not correspond to the classical vertical class-division.
Instead, the productive-parasitic cleavage cuts across social classes, so that among
the 'parasitic' are included the unemployed but also inefficient capitalists who rely
on state aid (ibid. 88).
1 The concept of 'social base' is defined in terms of the'... set of social forces which support - within
an institutional framework and policy paradigm - the basic structure, mode of operation and
objectives of the state system in its role as the official representative of civil society (Jessop et al.
1988: 156).
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The Thatcherite strategy, which precisely for this reason is characterised as a 'two
nations strategy', consists in the adoption of policies which reward the 'productive'
at the expense of the 'parasitic', by performing a transfer of resources from the
latter to the former. This transfer, took the form of various policies, such as
privatisation of state enterprises, de-regulation of financial services, sales of
council housing, and, of course, the partial privatisation of pensions. In return,
those who were favoured by the policies adopted by the various Conservative
governments, came to constitute the social base of Thatcherism, i.e. a coalition of
interests which would support the government when elections are fought. This
social base, which was created around 'popular capitalism' (ibid. 163), consisted
of various interests which included the financial community (the City), industry
(though only partially, since the lack of infrastructure and industrial policy has been
a constant complaint that British industry has addressed to the Conservative
governments), and the new share-holders, home-owners and others, in other
words the 'winners' in the transformation implemented by the Thatcher
governments.
The main problem with Jes sop et al.'s interpretation is its insistence on the coherent
and deliberate nature of the Thatcherite project. In fact, policy-making under
Thatcher was characterised by a high degree of experimentation and by the
tendency to go a step further in the adoption of policies such as privatisation or
marketisation of public services (Hayward and Klein 1994: 112; Riddel 1989: 5).
In addition, the claim that 'popular capitalism' reforms alone explain the
permanence in power of the Conservative party does not seem plausible. Even
though the new policies might have generated fresh support for the government by
those who gained from them, elections are affected by numerous factors of a very
different nature and are only partly influenced by individual perceptions of changes
in personal economic well being. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to consider that
when the neo-liberal policies were elaborated, their likely electoral repercussions
were taken into account. In this context, the idea of targeting the benefits of policy
on some given groups more likely to respond with electoral support might have
played a role. Interestingly share ownership was not spread evenly across the
political spectrum. In 1987 38% of Conservative party supporters bought shares as
opposed to a much lower 14% among Labour supporters (Riddel 1989: 124). In
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addition, among the few Labour supporters who did buy shares, between 1983 and
1987, the swing in voting from Labour to the Conservatives was more substantial
than in the rest of the electorate (Saunders 1995). While 'popular capitalism' alone
does not explain the Conservative's permanence in power, their wish to stay might
help to explain 'popular capitalism'.
Institutional opportunities
Despite some limitations, the interests of Jessop et al. 's approach in the context of
this study, lies in its ability to relate Thatcherism to the concept of majoritarian
democracy. The connection between the two notions is the common reference to a
situation in which a majority in a democracy is able to determine the course of
policy with little influence of the rest of the population. Thatcherism, thus, can be
viewed as an extreme version of majoritarian democracy, because of the openly
confrontational attitude in policy-making, and because of the refusal to use the
existing (though limited) instruments which have traditionally been used in order to
generate consensus. Namely, in the 1980s no Royal Commission was appointed in
Britain (Hayward and Klein 1994).
The durability of Thatcherism is also connected to the majoritarian character of the
British constitutional structure. As Jessop et al. themselves point out 'the
mechanisms of first-past-the-post electoral system, the elective dictatorship of
prime ministerial power under the British constitution [...] have provided the
crucial political preconditions for Thatcherism' (1988: 176). Interestingly, the two
preconditions mentioned by Jessop et al. correspond to two of the nine dimensions
of majoritarian democracy identified by Lijphart and discussed in chapter 2. In this
respect, it can be argued that Thatcherism, understood as a two-nation strategy,
found a fertile ground in Britain thanks to the majoritarian character of British
institutions.
In sum, it seems that Thatcherism was made possible, or at least facilitated and
perhaps encouraged, by the majoritarian character of British democracy. The most
obvious factor is certainly the electoral system. Following Jessop et al.' s
interpretation, the Thatcher governments adopted policies which were expected to
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reinforce their social base, by making it better off economically and by enlarging it.
The 1986 pension reform must be seen in this context, i.e. as an element of a
bigger strategy aimed at constructing and regenerating a social base of support for
the leadership.
4.2. THE BRITISH PENSION SYSTEM
Like those of other European countries, the British pension system is characterised
by a two-tier structure. The first tier consists of a universal, flat-rate contributory
state pension, commonly referred to as the basic pension. It is meant to provide
pensioners with a minimum level of income only. In addition to that, British
employees must belong to an earnings related scheme. This can be provided either
by the state or by the employer, in the shape of an occupational pension funds (the
1986 Social Security Act added a third option: a private personal pension).
During the 20th century, the British pension system underwent a number of
substantial changes. The overall trend, like in other countries, was one of
expansion of provision for the elderly until the mid-1970s. The basic features of the
current arrangements were laid down after World War II, when the Labour
government implemented the Beveridge Plan. The main concern for Beveridge was
to guarantee a minimum subsistence level to every resident. He also insisted on
abandoning the pre-war practice of means-testing, which was regarded as highly
stigmatising and had been extremely unpopular in the inter-war period. The Report
argued in favour of contributory benefits in order to establish a clear link between
financing and entitlements. Both contributions and benefits had to be flat-rate and
kept to a minimum level, so that voluntary provision would not be undermined
(Silburn 1995: 92-93). The actual implementation of the Beveridge report by the
Labour government in 1946, included some additional provision which was not
envisaged by Beveridge, such as a the granting of full pensions immediately instead
of adopting a 20 years transitional period (Brown 1990: 26). In the 1950s, the flat-
rate contributions approach came under increased scrutiny. Contributions could not
be increased beyond a certain limit or would not otherwise be affordable by low
earners, and yet the financial requirements of the National Insurance fund were
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growing (Baldwin 1990: 232). In 1958, a Conservative government introduced a
limited earnings-related element in the calculation of contributions and benefits.
The basic pension is currently granted to men over 65 and to women over 60 year
of agc?, who retire from regular employment and who have paid National
Insurance contributions. If the contribution record is incomplete, the amount of the
pension is reduced correspondingly. In order to qualify for a full pension,
contributions must have been paid or credited for around nine tenths of the
claimant's working life. There is an addition for a dependent spouse of around 67%
of the single person's pension. Until 1980, the value of the basic pension was
regularly increased in real terms so as to keep up with the evolution of earnings.
From 1980 onwards the basic pension has remained constant in real terms, which
means a decline in its replacement rate. In 1983 the amount of the single pension
corresponded to 32% of average male earnings, while in 1993 the same figure was
22% (Atkinson 1994: 8).
The other important reform which determined the structure of the pre-1986 pension
system was the Social Security Act 1975. On that occasion, National Insurance
contributions were made totally earnings-related, and a State Earnings-Related
Pension Scheme (SERPS) was introduced. The 1975 reform was the conclusion of
two decades of debates on the issue of 'superannuation'. The main problem laid
with the recognition that the level of the basic pension was in fact insufficient to
guarantee an adequate standard of living to most pensioners. While those working
for big employers were usually covered by an occupational pension, this was not
the case for many other pensioners who had to rely solely on the state pension. The
idea of a comprehensive second-tier pension gathered support among public
opinion, so that both major parties started producing proposals for a new
arrangement. Because many employees had already access to satisfactory
occupational provision, none of the political parties seriously contemplated the idea
of replacing existing pension funds (Heclo 1974: 265). Interestingly, in the early
1950s and 1960s the Conservative leaders considered the possibility of making
private provision compulsory for everyone, but private insurers did not meet such
2 Retirement ages are going to be equalised at 65 over a relatively long period of time. The first
cohort of women who will start drawing a state pension at 65 will be the one born in 1955.
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proposals with enthusiasm, because they feared that would mean stricter
government interference in their activities (ibid. 280).
The final shape of SERPS was thus the result of a compromise between the
different proposals. It did guarantee compulsory superannuation for all employees,
but allowed those who wished to remain members of their occupational funds to do
so. Also in the future, anyone would be entitled to contract out of the state scheme
if his or her employer provided an occupational scheme which met certain
conditions. The SERPS scheme granted an additional pension corresponding to
25% of earnings during the best 20 years (the pension formula was modified by the
1986 SSA).
Both the basic pension and SERPS are financed mainly through National Insurance
contributions. These are paid by employers (13.7%) and employees (7.75%) as a
percentage of gross salary3 . If an employee is contracted out of SERPS to join an
occupational scheme, the contribution rate is reduced by 2.5 percentage points for
the employee and by 4.5 points for the employer (all figures refer to the period
prior to the 1986 pension reform). The payment of National Insurance
contributions entitles employees to claim a number of contributory benefits
(including unemployment benefit). It should be noted, however, that National
Insurance contributions are not ear-marked for specific programmes, but they all
end up in the National Insurance Fund (NIF). In fact, the NIF is de facto
considered as part of the general government budget, so that the difference between
income from contributions and expenditure on benefits (usually negative) is made
up with government money.
With the introduction of SERPS, the state intervened to regulate the occupational
pension sector, which up to then had enjoyed a relatively high degree of freedom.
In order to be able to contract out of the state scheme (i.e. to receive the rebate on
National Insurance contributions), pension funds have to provide a Guaranteed
Minimum Pension, which corresponds to the amount an employee would receive
from SERPS, had he or she not contracted out. The state provides insurance
3 The figures refer to Class 1 contributions, which are paid by employees only. Self-employed pay
flat-rate contributions.
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against the risk involved in such long term commitment. Earlier, the 1973 SSA set
up a supervisory body, the Occupational Pension Board (OPB), charged with
overseeing pension funds and advising the government on occupational pension
policy (Hannah 1988: 64). The board is composed of representatives of employers,
employees and of the actuarial profession.
Pressures for change
In the debate which led to the adoption of the 1986 SSA, two main issues played a
key role. First, the problem of expected rising pension expenditure, due to
population ageing and to the maturation of SERPS. Second, the inadequate level of
pensions paid to employees who left an occupational pension before retirement
(usually job changers) commonly referred to as early-leavers.
As Brown notes, preoccupation with the cost of pensions has been a constant
feature of pension debates in the UK (1990: 206). The introduction of SERPS in
1978 added a new component to pension expenditure, which was likely to increase
significantly over the following years because of the maturation of the scheme.
This, together with the intellectual climate of the early 1980s, contributed to make
the future cost of pension provision a topical issue. A number of reports, articles
and influential interventions took place in the first half of the 1980s making
reference to the expected rise in pension expenditure (Nesbitt 1995: 40).
Particularly active were institutes and think-tanks which were sympathetic to new-
Right ideas, although the most influential documents were those published by the
government&
In 1982 the Government Actuary produced a report entitled 'National Insurance
Fund Long Term Financial Estimates', which included projections of future
expenditure and receipts of the state pension scheme. In the report it was argued
that the standard contribution rate was expected to rise from 15.4% in 1985 to
16.7% in 2005 and to 21.9% in 2025, and to increase by a further 2 %. The
projection was based on the assumption that earnings and flat-rate benefits would
4 In addition to the two documents examined below, a Green Paper published by the Treasury in
1984, emphasised the pressure on pension expenditure represented by population ageing and
particularly by the maturation of SERPS (HM Treasury 1984: 14)
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increase at 8% (average) a year while earnings-related benefits would increase at
6% after award. In the comment to these figures, it was pointed out that 'if flat-rate
benefits ... were uprated over a long period at a lower rate than earnings ... the
increase in the standard rate of contribution might be less steep and it might even
not increase at all depending on how big was the difference between earnings and
benefit increases' (Government Actuary 1982: 5). With the benefit of hindsight,
and considering the fact that flat-rate benefits have been uprated according to prices
since 1980, the projections of 1982 do not seem to reveal a particularly alarming
picture.
In 1984, however, the DHSS (Department of Health and Social Security)
published a background paper dealing with the issue of projected expenditure on
pensions. The document was presented as an updated version of the projections
made by the Government Actuary two years earlier, but was based on notional
contributions for pensions (i.e. the part of National Insurance Contributions
needed to finance the pension element of social security) as opposed to the actual
contribution rate (which include also contributions to unemployment insurance and
other contributory schemes). This difference makes a comparison between the
figures presented in the two reports impractical. The 1984 background paper
presented a range of possible scenarios based on different assumptions with regard
to fertility rates, mortality, unemployment, real earnings growth and benefits
upgrading. Table 2 gives the result of the central projection6 with benefits upgraded
according to prices and earnings respectively.
5 It should be noted that at the time of the publication of the Government Actuary report (1982), it
was generally assumed that the upgrading of flat-rate benefits in line with prices was a temporary
measure (Nesbitt 1995: 36).
6 This projection was based on the following assumptions: fertility rate of 2.1 in the period
concerned; unemployment rate of 6%; 25% improvement in mortality; and average real earnings
growth of 1.5% per year.
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Table 4.2. Projected employer/employee combined contribution rates for pensions
(percent of gross earnings)






Source: DHSS 1984a: 6, Table 5.
Because of the different basis used in the two projections, it is difficult to compare
these with those published by the Government Actuary two years earlier. However,
the government's interpretation of the new figures was more concerned with the
future cost of pensions. This was made clear in the introduction to the 1984
background report, signed by the then Secretary of State for Social Services,
Norman Fowler, who commented the findings of the report in the following terms:
'One of the main messages about the future in the Government
Actuary's projections is that expenditure on pensions is set to rise
significantly as pensioners increase in number and live longer, and as
more of them get higher pensions [...] some may say that looking
ahead to the next century is too uncertain [...] . In pension policy
twenty or thirty years is a relatively short time. We will not be thanked
by [...] future generations if we do not address now the problems
which they may face' (Fowler, in DHSS 1984a).
The government's interpretation of the projections was thus one of relative
urgency. The expected increase in pension expenditure was seen as, or at least
presented as, a reason to cutback on current commitments of the state pension
scheme. Both the projections, but even more strongly the implication of the
projections were challenged by a number of different interest groups and
commentators. This was not only the case of the opposition and of other groups
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traditionally antagonistic to the Conservative governments, but also of independent
commentators and academics (Abel-Smith and Townsend 1984; Reddin 1984).
The early-leavers problem
Pension schemes were designed at a time when stable full-time employment was
the norm in Western societies. Since the mid-1970s, however, stable patterns of
employment have become increasingly rare. In 1983, it was estimated that some
95% of employees change job at least once (The Economist 11/6/83). The issue of
compatibility of the UK pension system with these tendencies in the labour market
structure gained prominence in the pension debate prior to the 1986 SSA. The main
problem was the preservation of pension rights for those employees who left an
occupational pension scheme before reaching retirement age (early-leavers)
typically because they changed job. At the time (before the 1985 SSA, discussed
below), the situation of early-leavers was a particularly disadvantageous one, if
compared to those who remained in the same scheme for their whole career. The
law (1973 SSA) provided three options for those who intended to leave an
occupational scheme. First, job-changers could have their pension entitlement
transferred to their new employer, but only if an agreement between the old and the
new employer could be reached. Alternatively, the employee could receive an
entitlement to a 'deferred pension', which would be paid at the time of retirement
and be based on the contribution record achieved before leaving the scheme, but not
re-valued since7 . The third option was the simple retrieval of one's own
contributions, with no interest. According to estimates, the first option, potentially
the most satisfactory, was being used only by 5% of early leavers, while the third
affected some 75% of them (The Economist 11/6/83).
The problem of early-leavers was brought onto the agenda by a report of the
Occupational Pensions Board (OPB 1981) which included some figures estimating
the extent of early-leavers' losses. The estimate was based on the assumption that
earnings were going to increase by 7.5% a year. Under such conditions an
employee who changed job at 45, was left with a pension of 60% of what a stayer
7The problem of re-valuation concerned only defined benefit schemes, since the value of the pension
would be expressed as a proportion of the salary of the employee at the time he or she left the
scheme.
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would have received. If someone changed job three times, he or she might have
ended up with a pension of 50% of that of a stayer, despite having paid the same
amount in contributions. The OPB report insisted on the need for improving the
situation of early-leavers, and in particular it recommended improvements in the
preservation of deferred pensions, suggesting that pension rights in Final Salary
Schemes be increased in line with earnings (ibid. 69).
After the pubblication of the OPB report, the issue of adequate protection for early-
leavers was picked up by New Right institutes and think tanks in the context of
the introduction of personal pensions (Vinson and Chappell 1983). Also the
government played an active part in the early stages of the debate on the protection
of early-leavers' pensions, particularly by organising a conference on the issue, in
September 1983.
To a large extent the issue of early-leavers was dealt with by the 1985 Social
Security Act. The new legislation provided the right for employees to a 'transfer
value' in respect of their accrued contributions (although the new employer would
not be obliged to accept the transfer). It introduced an obligation for pension funds
to disclose to members information on the situation of their accrued contributions,
and provided for deferred pensions to be increased in line with inflation. This series
of measures were the first step towards the establishment of a competitive market in
provision for retirement. As argued by some commentators the 1985 SSA aimed at
creating suitable conditions for the introduction of personal pensions (Nesbitt
1995: 123; Brown 1990: 222). In particular the right to transfer and the disclosure
requirements were essential for an effective competition between different pension
providers to take place.
4.3. THE PENSION DEBATE IN THE EARLY 1980s
The intellectual and political climate of the early 1980s in Britain was dominated by
neo-liberal ideas of supremacy of the market over the state as an instrument of
resource allocation. The overall discourse of the Thatcher government was a key
factor in this, as well as the participation in the debate on social and economic
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policy of a number of London-based research institutes, commonly referred to as
think tanks, which shared and pushed forward neo-liberal ideas. It has been argued
that during the 1980s, these institutions played a key role in policy making. Novel
ideas on how to shift responsibilities away from the state and to the private sector,
frequently originated from these think tanks (Desai 1994; Hayward and Klein
1995). In the area of pensions, an important role was played by the Centre for
Policy Studies (CPS), which in 1983 published a paper entitled Personal and
Portable Pensions for All (Vinson and Chapell, 1983). This was the first important
published document which advocated a radical shift in pension policy by setting out
a reform proposal. The paper argued for the introduction of personal pensions,
mainly on ideological grounds. Some of the ideas expressed in that paper, were in
fact contained in subsequent government proposals for new legislation.
Politically, the period before the adoption of the 1986 SSA was characterised by
the overwhelming victory achieved by the Conservative Party in the 1983 election.
The party emerged with a majority of 144 seats, which gave the government a
position of extreme strength in Parliament. This had an impact on policy, which
became more uncompromising than before. As Nesbitt put it:
'as a consequence of the overwhelming Conservative majority in the
House of Commons, the post-1983 policies on retirement pensions
were of a more uncompromising nature than before. There was no need
to concede amendments to bills in order to secure their passage through
Parliament. Their implemented policies tended to represent the
operationalisation of Conservative philosophy in an almost pure form
(1995: 57).
The shape of power relationships in the British political system of the mid-1980s
can be qualified as an extreme version of majoritarian democracy. As pointed out
above, the various Thatcher government have typically profited from the
opportunities offered by majoritarian politics. The period between 1983 and 1987
is, because of the strength of the government, the one in which the search for
consensus was least needed and the majoritarian character of British democracy
reached its highest level. This, arguably, did have an impact on pension policy.
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The 'Inquiry into provision for retirement'
The official debate on a major reform of the British pension system started in
November 1983, when the then Secretary of State for Health and Social Services
Norman Fowler announced the setting up of an 'Inquiry into provision for
retirement', in order to 'study the future development, adequacy and costs of state,
occupational and private provision for retirement in the United Kingdom, including
the portability of pension rights' (DHSS 1983: 4).
The team which carried out the Inquiry was chaired by Norman Fowler himself,
which gave the Inquiry a strong political connotation. In the United Kingdom
policy change is often initiated by the work of ad hoc commissions. Particularly,
Royal Commissions were used to generate consensual approaches to a given policy
problem. Alternatively, the Inquiry could have taken the shape of an independent
Committee such as the Beveridge Committee. However, Norman Fowler decided
to opt for a more overtly political form. As he pointed out, the task of the Inquiry
was not to generate consensus nor new ideas, but 'proposals which I could get past
my colleagues' (Fowler, quoted in Nesbitt 1995: 69). According to Nesbitt, the
choice of an alternative format for the Inquiry, would not have allowed Norman
Fowler to have the same degree of control over the policy making process (1995:
68).
The main team of the Inquiry was composed of 12 members, half of whom were
Conservative ministers. Represented in the team were other government
departments, such as the DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) the Department
of Employment, and the Treasury. The remaining members were representatives of
the insurance industry, and experts, such as the Government's Actuary (Nesbitt
1995: 71). It is striking to note how little representative of the interests involved
was the team. For instance, not only there was no one who was supposed to
represent employees or pensioners interests, but also employers, occupational






These, as well as other interests, were consulted by the team in the following
months. In November 1984 submissions of written evidence were invited, and in
the two-month period of consultation, more than 1,500 different items were
submitted. The duration of the consultation procedure, however, was widely
regarded as inadequate for being to_o short. Strong criticism came from pressure
groups which felt they had no opportunity to influence the course of policy, such as
the CPAG (Ward 1985), but also from independent commentators (Financial
Times, 3/6/85; Nesbitt 1995: 73).
The Inquiry team met 23 times, including 11 meetings with external bodies or
individuals 8 , until January 1985. The Inquiry did not produce a final report,
although the Green Paper published in June 1985 can be regarded as the outcome
of it. Two other documents were published in the context of the Inquiry. The first
was a background paper containing data on current and future cost of state pension
as well as statistics on pensioners' living standards (DHSS 1984a). The second,
more significant, was a consultative document (DHSS 1984b) which set out the
overall objectives of the government in the area of pension policy. The main points
were the right for employees to have their own personal pension; a contribution-
defined opting out criterion (such as the GMP for final salary contracted out
schemes); the provision of special arrangements to avoid demographic
destabilisation of occupational schemes; and, the commitment not to ask employers
to contribute to personal pensions in excess of the National Insurance rebate.
4.4. THE 1986 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
The government's intentions in the area of pension policy were spelt out in the
Green Paper Reform of Social Security, which was published in June 1985
(DHSS 1985a). The main points of the paper were the gradual phasing out of
SERPS, although all entitlement earned to date would be preserved, and the
introduction of personal pensions. The Green Paper did not meet with much
approval from the various actors concerned. The most controversial issue was the
idea of phasing out SERPS which was opposed by groups antagonistic to the
government (such as the Labour Party the Trade Unions, and the anti-poverty
8These included The Centre for Policy Studies, the CBI, the IoD, the NAPF and the TUC.
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lobby) but also by more unlikely opponents, such as the CBI, the NAPF, and,
perhaps most significantly, by the Treasury (see below).
In the face of mounting criticism, Norman Fowler eventually decided to drop
plans for the abolition of SERPS. As a result, in the White Paper Programme for
Action (DHSS 1985b) published in December, plans to reduce the generosity of
SERPS were unveiled. The pension formula was to be changed so as to reduce the
amount of standard benefits and provision for widows was also to be reduced. The
White Paper maintained the introduction of personal pensions, and made
provision for a 2% additional rebate to employees who joined a personal pension
scheme.
The debate that lead to the adoption of the 1986 Social Security Act was highly
complex and controversial. The various actors involved put forward a number of
very different proposals and some of them even changed their requirements during
the policy-making process. In order to reconstruct the course of policy, and to
ascertain the level of participation of the relevant actors in decision-making, this
section concentrates on the proposals made by the most influential of them, and
on their reactions to the decisions taken by the government at the various stages of
policy-making.
The Government
The position of the government is itself the result of interaction and of aggregation
of the preferences of the different entities which compose it and of the interests
represented within it. In this respect, mechanisms of compromise and consensus
building are at work within the government as well as in the overall process of
policy making. In the case of the 1986 pension reform, three key governmental
actors took part in the definition of policy. The Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
because of her position of leadership, was obviously able to affect the course of
policy. Second, the DHSS, directed by the State Secretary Norman Fowler, was
the department with direct responsibility with regard to both the formulation and
the implementation of policy. Third, the Treasury frequently intervened in the
policy-making process whenever matters of spending arose.
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The Treasury, in fact, is often regarded as one of the most powerful government
departments in the UK. In general, its main concern lies with balancing the budget,
and historically the Treasury has been able to veto expensive economic policies
(Hall 1986: 62). It appears that the Treasury did play a substantial role in the
definition of pension policy. The review of social security was constrained within a
zero cost requirement, set by the Treasury (Nesbitt 1995: 69). This meant that new
programmes would have had to be financed by restrictions in existing ones, within
the social security system. In fact, in the course of the Inquiry into Provision for
Retirement, the representative of the Treasury in the team, intervened to block any
attempts made by Inquiry members to discuss issues relating to taxation (ibid. 71).
It has been pointed out that the format of the Inquiry was rather unusual, as
typically, the instruments used to generate new ideas for policy change are either
Royal Commissions, independent commissions or internal departmental Inquires.
In this case, however, Norman Fowler deliberately opted for a format which
would enjoy a considerable degree of independence form the civil service and
external bodies. In fact, the team did not include any civil servant, with the
exception of the secretary to the Inquiry, who however, had joined the DHSS only
recently (ibid. 68). Its particular format, gave the Inquiry a more political character
and, arguably enabled Fowler to develop more innovative ideas, without having to
convince the civil service9 . In this sense, the personal input of the Secretary of
State in the 1986 SSA has been fairly remarkable. Many of the views he expressed
in interviews (both before and after the adoption of legislation) have been to a large
extent incorporated into the 1986 SSA.
The extent of conflict within the 1983-1987 Conservative government should not,
however, be exaggerated. Comparatively, a one-party government with a strong
leadership is likely to display a significant degree of unity. In fact, with regard to
the 1986 pension reform, it can be said that there was a substantial degree of
agreement on the principles and on the overall direction of pension policy.
9According to Peter Hall, the British civil service has often resisted the development of innovative
policies. Top officials are sometimes more influential than cabinet ministers, who do not always
have access to alternative sources of information (Hall 1986: 62). The innovative ambitions of the
Review of Social Security, required policy to be formulated independently from the civil service. In
addition, the perception of the civil service as an entity which would resist change, might explain
the substantial reliance of the various Thatcher governments on external institutes and research
centres, the think-tanks (see below) rather than on the state's own resources.
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Assumptions relating to the proper balance of state and private provision, the value
of freedom of choice and of market-based competition were widely shared by
cabinet members. The bottom line of consensus within the government in relation
to pension policy, was well summarised in the 1983 Conservative election
manifesto, where it was stated that:
`[A conservative Government] would continue to maintain the value of
the state retirement pension, [and would] reintroduce measures to give
substantial tax incentives to personal pensions, and to enable members
of occupational schemes to make additional voluntary contributions to a
pension plan that is completely separate from their employers' scheme'
(Conservative Party 1983).
Interestingly, the language used in the election manifesto, is evasive with regard as
to whether personal pensions were going to replace some of the existing
arrangements, or to be introduced as a third tier of pensions. This issue, in fact,
was heavily contested and was a source of disagreement, mainly between the
DHSS and the Treasury.
Four main areas were particularly topical in the debate prior to the SSA 1986: first,
concern with projected rising expenditure; second, the situation of early-leavers;
third, the introduction of personal pensions and fourth, the future of SERPS. The
decisions taken in these four areas, determined the content of the reform and its
overall character.
Cost
With regard to the issue of cost, there seemed to be an overall agreement within the
government on taking steps to reduce projected costs of the state scheme. The
Treasury stressed that `... after the turn of the century numbers [of persons above
pension age] will rise rapidly as those born during the baby boom of the 1950s and
1960s reach retirement age' (HM Treasury 1984: 14). Similarly, virtually all the
DHSS publications concerned with the review of social security, pointed out the
sense of 'irresponsibility' involved in maintaining current arrangements:
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'We should not place on our successors the responsibility for meeting all our
financial expectations in retirement. Instead we should ensure that everybody
is able to save and invest for his own additional pension' (DHSS 1985a).
The critique of the pay-as-you-go system, which was one of the key bases for the
1986 SSA, had also a moral dimension, which seemed to be consistent with the
notion of individual responsibility embedded in the liberal-conservative ideology.
The Treasury's pragmatic interest in keeping state expenditure on pensions under
control was matched by the moral concerns of the ideologues, who saw the state
compulsory pay-as-you-go system as an infringement of economic freedom 10. As a
result, the issue of cost did not raise much controversy within the government: the
general agreement was on keeping state spending as low as possible. Nevertheless,
this correspondence between the requirements of neo-liberal ideology and the
Treasury's pragmatism in budget balancing, was not found everywhere in the 1986
SSA. As we shall see below, in other areas these two imperatives were in conflict.
Early-leavers 
The second important issue which characterised the pre-1986 pension debate, is the
comparatively disadvantageous situation of early-leavers, i.e. of employees who
leave an occupational pension scheme before reaching the age of retirement (see
above). The terms of reference of the Inquiry included the study of the 'portability
of pension rights' (DHSS 1983), and in fact, even before the launching of the
Inquiry, the DHSS had already organised a conference on the matter (Nesbitt 1995:
60-62)
Since the early stages of the legislative process, the problem of early-leavers was
seen by the government as connected to the introduction of personal pensions and
the creation of a competitive market for pension provision" . Under such
conditions, ideally, employees would be able to move their accrued pension rights
from one provider to the other according to their convenience and without incurring
any loss of income. In such a context, employees leaving a pension fund before
10For a discussion of notions of personal freedom and responsibility in the area of pensions in a
New-Right perspective, see Morgan 1984.
11-The main practical obstacle to the creation of a competitive market for pension provision is that
employers are often unwilling to pay contributions on behalf of their employees to an external fund,
such as an insurance company (Brown 1990: 245).
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retirement would not be disadvantaged, as they would be able to transfer their
accrued pension rights to their new provider, be it private or occupational. In fact,
the 1985 SSA (see above), which was intended precisely to deal with the issue of
early-leavers, introduced the right to a 'transfer value' for members of occupational
schemes. This corresponds to the amount of accrued contributions and must be
disclosed to the employee at any time. As pointed out above, legislation passed in
1985 had the twofold objective of dealing with the problem of early-leavers and
preparing the conditions for the introduction of personal pensions, by creating a
levelled playground for the different pension providers (Brown 1990: 222; Nesbitt
1995: 122).
Personal pensions 
There was substantial agreement within the government on the desirability of
introducing personal pensions. This fitted in well with both the neo-liberal ideology
and political concerns with resource allocation. In addition personal pensions
provided an answer to the most pressing socio-economic issues discussed above.
In the government's view, personal pensions did not represent a burden for future
generations, since they were funded 12 . In addition, by creating a free and
competitive market for pension provision, they tackled the problem of early-
leavers.
The government, and in particular Norman Fowler, were keen to emphasise the
individual choice dimension of personal pensions. As he put it in an interview:
'What I wanted to do, was to make it clear that what we were talking about was
your pension, you had ownership and pension holders had rights' (Fowler, in
BBC Radio 4 1996). Similarly, the White Paper stressed that 'the right to a
personal pension gives all employees a new dimension of choice' (DHSS 1985b:
16). In addition, the government insisted in pointing out that there was a substantial
popular demand for personal pensions. The DHSS commissioned a Gallup poll on
12The view that funded schemes do not represent a burden on future generations, while pay-as-you-
go ones do, holds only if one considers market transfers as more legitimate than state transfers. In
fact, the ratio between working and non-working population will not be affected by the financing
method of a pension scheme. The difference between the two methods concerns only the basis on
which a claim on existing resources is made: ownership in the case of funded schemes versus a
political decision in the case of pay-as-you-go schemes (see chapter 1; for a discussion see Gilliand
1988: 283; Johnson and Falkingham 1992: 148).
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social security, from which it emerged that two thirds of employees who were not
members of an occupational scheme thought that it was important or very important
to have access to a second-tier pension (DHSS 1985a, vol. 3: 75). This was
reiterated in the White Paper: 'the evidence suggests that many more people would
like to have their own occupational or personal pension' (DHSS 1985b: 3). _
There was, thus, an important ideological component in the government insistence
on personal pensions. While initially these seemed to be seen mainly as an
instrument to deal with the issues of projected cost and of early-leavers, it became
increasingly clear that the government viewed personal pensions as worth
introducing in their own right. In Norman Fowler's own words:
'I would have proposed personal pensions irrespective of what had
happened to SERPS because personal pensions seemed to me to be
simply an extra option as far as the public was concerned. It of course
was deeply unpopular with the occupational pension industry. It was an
option we would have wished to give to people come what may'
(Fowler 1993, quoted in Nesbitt 1995: 76).
Personal pensions became thus an element in the wider context of 'popular
capitalism', which was part and parcel of the Conservative Party ideology and
political strategy. Personal pensions were not necessarily aimed at the middle
classes, although as it turned out, do benefit more those who are not on low
incomes 13 (Waine 1995: 326). However, together with home ownership and share
ownership, pension ownership was likely to contribute to the creation of a
constituency who would resist changes in legislation likely to worsen the economic
advantages of their position. Given the policy orientation of the major parties at the
time, this amounted to a reinforcement of the Conservative's social base.
13 That is because for someone on a low income, the rebate on National Insurance contributions
would be so small that a substantial part of it would be needed to meet the cost of charges.
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SERPS
The future of SERPS was certainly the most controversial issue in the pension
debate during the 1980s, both within the government and in society at large.
Norman Fowler envisaged a pension system based on a two-tier structure, in
which there would be a strong basic pension coupled with a competitive market for
additional provision. This would be compulsory for employees and totally funded.
State provision would thus be limited to a minimum, so that there was no reason to
maintain SERPS (Fowler, in BBC Radio 4 1996). Despite controversy within the
Cabinet, Norman Fowler managed to transpose his vision almost intact into the
Green Paper. The argument of the excessive future cost of SERPS was reiterated
(DHSS 1985a: 22). In addition, the state additional pension was criticised because
it 'discourages the development of occupational pensions because of the complexity
of the state scheme's provision on contracting out and the open-ended commitment
that employers have to take on' (ibid. 22). As a result, the government concluded
that the best policy option was the gradual phasing out of SERPS. The possibility
of reducing its importance was considered but dismissed, since 'the impact of
restricting SERPS is essentially negative. It restricts the scope of state provision
but puts nothing in its place' (ibid. 24) .
The abolition of SERPS attracted criticism from a significant and probably
unexpectedly high number of actors. In addition to the Labour Party and
traditionally left-wing groups (such as the TUC and the 'anti-poverty lobby'),
substantial criticism came from interest groups traditionally sympathetic to the
Conservative government such as the CBI and the NAPF (Nesbitt 1995: 88; The
Economist 21/9/85). Moreover, there was no unanimity on the issue even within
the government. In fact, even before the publication of the Green Paper, the
Treasury had signalled its opposition to plans for abolishing SERPS. The episode
was described by Norman Fowler as an `all-out battle' with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer Nigel Lawson (BBC 1996). The reason behind the Treasury opposition
to the abolition of SERPS, was the additional cost that this would have implied for
the exchequer. In fact, while contribution rebates would have had to be granted
immediately, the state would have still been liable to fund current pensions and
those of people near retirement age. This was going to put additional pressure on
the state budget, and was seen as unacceptable by the Treasury.
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Given the extent of criticism raised by proposals to abolish SERPS, and given the
internal dissent 14 , the government decided to opt for a less radical solution: a
reduction in the value of future SERPS pensions. This change of direction was
announced in the White Paper. It was justified with the argument that 'the aim of
pension policy should be to seek as much agreement as possible' (DHSS 1985b:
3). In addition, it was argued that while not constituting an optimal solution, the
reduction of SERPS was acceptable because it made it possible to achieve the
government's two key objectives: 'to see the emerging cost of SERPS reduced'
and 'to ensure that the conditions are created whereby individual pension
provision can expand' (ibid. 4). The proposals contained in the White Paper were
translated into final legislation almost unchanged, in spite of continuing criticism
from other groups.
The Think-Tanks
The term 'think-tanks' became widely used in the 1980s, and referred to research
institutes putting forward ideas for policy change. The most influential think-tanks
in the 1980s were obviously those supporting neo-liberal ideas, and indeed it has
been argued that they contributed significantly to the spread of these ideas (Desai
1994; Hayward and Klein 1995). New-right think-tanks were extremely prolific,
both in publications and policy proposals, and constituted a genuine reservoir of
ideas from which the Thatcher government could pick up. Their common
character was a firm commitment to free-market ideology and the inclination to
take part in policy debates in order to influence them. As Desai points out, the
marketing of new right ideas by the think-tanks was targeted on the ruling elites,
rather than on public opinion at large (1994: 31).
Among the best known think-tanks, were the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA),
the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and the Institute of Directors (IoD), all of
which played an important role in the pension debate. While the IEA is, formally
an independent institute, the CPS, established by Margaret Thatcher in 1974, is
attached to the Conservative Party. The IoD is a pressure group which represents
14 According to Norman Fowler, his plans were opposed most significantly of all by the treasury (Fowler,
in BBC Radio 4 1996).
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company directors, and tends to be more sympathetic to the interests of the City
(finance) than to those of industry.
The CPS was among the first actors who came up with the idea of contracted out
personal pensions. The paper Personal and Portable Pensions for All (Vinson and
Chapell 1983) can be seen as the document which introduced the concept of
personal pensions into the debate. Published in April 1983, it preceded by 6
months the announcement of the Inquiry by Norman Fowler. The paper argued for
the introduction of contracted-out personal pensions as an alternative to SERPS.
This was justified on the basis of liberal notions of individual freedom and
responsibility, as well as a solution to the early-leavers problem. As Nesbitt notes,
the CPS paper was less radical than the DHSS Green Paper, as the former argued
neither for the abolition of SERPS - nor for allowing employees to contract-out of
their occupational pensions (1995: 51).
The IoD became a particularly influential institute during the Thatcher years. While
politically independent, its membership partially overlapped with that of the
Conservative CPS (ibid. 50). Together with the other think-tanks, the IoD proved
to be one of the fiercest supporters of personal pensions, and in general, of
transferring responsibility for pension provision from the state to the private sector.
Notably, the IoD was one of the few organisations which welcomed the proposal
of phasing out SERPS contained in the Green Paper: 'We welcome the abolition
(rather than the reform) of SERPS broadly for the reasons given in the Green
Papers. [...] The provision of an earnings-related pension is no proper function of
the state' (IoD 1985).
While it is difficult to assess the actual impact of think-tanks on government policy,
it seems appropriate to acknowledge their role as producers of new ideas, thereby
offering the government a constantly updated agenda for radical and sometimes
subversive change. In addition, think-tanks contributed to the spread of neo-liberal
ideas by giving them academic legitimacy, and by creating a vision of a `neo-liberal
better future'. Concepts such as 'share-owning democracy' or 'social market
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economy' 15 were created by the CPS and arguably had an impact on the public's
perception of political and economic issues.
The intellectual salience of think-tanks should not, however, be exaggerated. Some
of them were largely ignored in their first years of existence (the lEA was funded in
1955) and became prominent only when the political climate changed in the late
1970s. Rather than pure academic institutions, think-tanks are perhaps best
described as organisations concerned with the marketing of ideas and as part of a
wider political project, and it is in this capacity that they were able to have an impact
on policy-making.
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
The position of British employers in relation to change in pension provision was
characterised by a fundamental ambivalence. On the one hand, as an interest group
concerned with competitiveness and levels of taxation, the CBI was sympathetic
with the government's aim of shifting responsibility for pension provision from the
state to the private sector. The overall ideological orientation of British employers,
which favours economic freedom, is in line with the government's approach. On
the other hand, however, British employers have responsibility for occupational
pension schemes, and in this capacity they have tended to oppose measures which
were likely to affect the stability of pension funds, which constitute a form of
collective provision but are highly valued by employers. As some commentators
have pointed out, occupational schemes constitute an efficient instrument in human
resources management 16 , as they encourage employee loyalty to the company, and
constitute a means for tax-efficient self financing (Lusenti 1989: 396; Schmahl
1991: 35).
15 These concepts refer to a vision of society in which share ownership is widespread, and
individuals, through their rights as share-owners, would be able to control the economy and society.
It represents the ultimate and complete superseding of the state by the market. The relationship
between citizen and power, the vote, would be supplanted (although probably not replaced) by the
right of share-ownership. It should be noted that in Britain the concept of 'social market economy'
refers precisely to this vision and has nothing to do with its German translation
`Sozialmarktwirtschafe, which in contrast, denotes a capitalist system with a strong component of
state social intervention.
16This aspect is stressed in the CBI submission to the Inquiry: 'From the employer's point of view
the objectives of pension schemes include attracting and motivating employees as well as retaining
them...' (1984).
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Consistently with these priorities, the CBI suggested a three-tier pension system. In
the submission of evidence to the Inquiry, British employers argued that the basic
pension should be kept as a safety net, that the structure of the second tier should
remain unchanged, with pensions provided either by the state (SERPS) or by
occupational pensions, and that personal pensions should be made available and
encouraged through fiscal incentives as a voluntary third-tier level of provision
(CBI 1984:2). In this way, the introduction of personal pensions would not have
undermined the stability of occupational schemes.
On the issue of the projected costs of SERPS it was argued that 'provided the
economy continues to grow [...] it would appear that the current commitments for
State and occupational pensions can be met in the future within acceptable cost
[...]. The CBI therefore does not believe that there is a need to dismantle the current
State earnings related system [...]' (ibid. 3). The submission also suggested that
some reduction in SERPS benefits could be more appropriate, such as in the case
of widows' pensions and in the '20 best years' rule, which could by changed to
'lifetime earnings'.
The CBI showed a strong opposition to the proposal of introducing as an
alternative to occupational pensions. The main problem was the fact that personal
pensions were likely to attract younger employees I7 , and thus undermine the
demographic balance within occupational schemes. This, it was argued, would
make it impractical for employers to provide occupational pensions. As a result
many would contract back into the state scheme, with the result of achieving the
opposite effect of what was intended (ibid. 7). Strong opposition was also
displayed against the idea of employers contributions to externally provided
personal pensions on behalf of the employee, as this would imply having to meet
the cost of pension provision without enjoying the advantages provided to an
employer by having a pension fund (see above).
17Many defined benefit scheme have been set up in the post war period and had not yet reached
maturity by the mid 1980s. This means that these schemes were functioning (many still are) on a
partial pay-as-you-go basis, with younger employees do facto paying for current retirees, who have
not contributed for long enough to fund their own entitlement. Many occupational schemes, thus,
perform a redistributive function from younger to older employees. If large numbers of young
employees were to leave occupational pensions, this might have constituted a serious problem for
their financial viability.
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When the Green Paper was published, the CBI understandably manifested its
opposition to the government's plans. Particularly, the suggested phasing out of
SERPS was attacked, because it would have meant a higher rate of pension
contributions (National Insurance and occupational), as employers and employees
would have had to fund current SERPS pensions and the future (occupational or
personal) pensions of current employees 18 . As a result, the CBI reiterated the
suggestions made in the original submission of evidence, of a reduced version of
SERPS rather than its abolition (CBI 1985)
The White Paper met with more approval, as the plans for scrapping SERPS had
been abandoned. The Paper was described as 'broadly in line with CBI
recommendations'. However, the demographic stability of occupational schemes
was still cause of concern for British employers. In particular, the 2% tax incentive
for personal pension buyers, was attacked as it was likely to encourage younger
employees, attracted by a higher take-home pay, to opt out of their occupational
scheme. The CBI requested that the 2% tax incentive be made available only to
employees who would contract out of the state scheme, or, alternatively, to all
contracted out employees. The first one was the option adopted by the government.
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF)
The NAPF, an association representing the interests of British occupational pension
funds, perceived the government's plans for reform as a threat to the stability of
their activities. Like the CBI, the NAPF was concerned that the introduction of
contracted out personal pensions would have a detrimental impact on the
demographic balance of occupational funds. In the various submissions of evidence
and reactions to government proposals, the NAPF expressed sometimes strong
criticism against the idea of contracted out personal pensions and little satisfaction
with the government's motives.
The reaction to the CPS paper, which was one of the first appearances of the
concept of personal pensions in the debate, was particularly negative. As the then
I8This issue relates to the problems involved in shifting from a pay-as-you-go financing system to
a funded one. For a discussion see Johnson and Falkingham 1992: 147).
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Chairman of the NAPF put it, at an annual Conference of the Association: 'Let us
hope that the Centre for Policy Studies document is never taken seriously by any
politician who sees half a chance to win a vote or two' (Oldfield 1983, quoted by
Nesbitt 1995: 54). The same aversion to personal pensions was expressed in the
submission of evidence to the Inquiry. In that document it was argued that current
occupational pensions were in fact personal, since 'the benefits for and in respect of
each individual are based on his service and his salary', and the only difference
with a personal pension is that 'the individual does not have his own pot of gold'
(NAPF 1984, emphasis in the original). The same paper went on to argue that
defined contribution schemes, such as personal pensions, would involve much
bigger risks for employees than was the case with current arrangements, as the
amount of the pension they will draw will depend on unpredictable investment
returns. Like the CBI, the NAPF was prepared to accept personal pensions only as
a third-tier arrangement, and not in the proposed contracted out form (ibid.).
The NAPF, had been criticised for its lack of action in relation to the early-leavers
problem (The Economist 11/6/83). In fact, an improvement of the situation of
early-leavers was seen to depend mainly on the introduction of an upgrading
mechanism for earned entitlements, which would have involved substantial
additional cost for pension funds, hence their reluctance to accept such proposals.
Indeed, the NAPF own suggestion in 1982 in relation to the early-leavers problem,
was the creation of a central fund, in which early-leavers contributions would be
paid (Nesbitt 1995: 44). However, this proposal was regarded as impractical, as
the central fund would probably have grown fast and become one of the largest
financial institutions in the country (ibid.).
Predictably, the NAPF reaction to the Green Paper was particularly negative. First
the speed of the policy making process was attacked: 'the introduction of legislation
on pensions should be held back until there has been sufficient time for full
consultation' (NAPF 1985). The proposals were described as a 'threat to the
stability of the partnership between the occupational pensions movement and State
provision'. The paper recommended that the government reconsider its plans for
the abolition of SERPS, and expressed concern with the commitment made by the
Labour Party to reverse such legislation once back in office. The overall argument
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of the NAPF reaction, was to ask the government to adopt a more consensual
approach to pension reform attributing a bigger role to consultation and by seeking
agreement with the opposition, in order to avoid a reversal of legislation with a
Labour government.
The Labour Party
In the British political system, the opportunities for the opposition party to directly
influence policy-making are particularly limited. In the 1986 SSA, moreover, the
distance between the two parties on policy was such that it would have been
extremely difficult for the Labour Party to have an impact on legislation. The 1983
election manifesto set out the main priorities of Labour party policy on pensions,
and these included the restoration of the link between the basic pension and increase
in earnings (removed by the Conservative government in 1980); and the movement
towards a common retirement age for men and women at 60 (Labour Party 1983).
As a result there was little common ground between the two parties on which
agreement could be sought. The sort of minor changes that the government might
have agreed to introduce were insignificant in relation to the differences between the
two parties.
Labour Party officials did complain, however, about the lack of independence of
the Inquiry team and about the absence of an effective consultation procedure
(Meacher 1984). In fact, the Labour Party, rather than attempt to directly influence
policy, worked at its own proposals for social security reform. In total
independence from the government, the then Social Security spokesman Michael
Meacher, headed a parallel Inquiry which produced an alternative reform package to
that of the government. The Labour Party's proposals were presented at a press
conference on the 15 April 1985, almost two months before the publication of the
government's Green Paper. Michael Meacher's plans consisted mainly of a
significant increase in the value of child benefit (by 100%), which would be
financed through the removal of the ceiling on National Insurance contributions and
the abolition of tax relief for mortgage holders and married couples (The Guardian,
16/4/1985). The plans did not include any major change in the area of pensions,
which suggest that the opposition was relatively satisfied with the kind of provision
existing at the time.
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The Labour Party's plans were not only disregarded by the government, but also
fiercely attacked in parliamentary debates (Hansard, 22/4/85). Norman Fowler
argued that the Labour plan would have cost an additional f15 billion and as a
result be impractical. This is not surprising. Given the gap between the priorities
_ .
of the government and those of the opposition, a mutually satisfactory
compromise was simply impossible.
Conversely, when Norman Fowler announced the content of the Green Paper, the
Labour Party's reaction was one of fury. Michael Meacher, described the
proposals as the 'erosion of the fundamental principle of a welfare state for all
citizens' and as 'the reintroduction, for the first time this century, of Victorian
values in an invidious distinction between deserving and undeserving poor'. The
government was also attacked for the stated intention of abolishing SERFS, since
the 1983 election manifesto did not mention any such plans. Finally, the validity
of the demographic projections was challenged, in particular with reference to the
forecasts made by the Phillips Committee in 1954, whIcIt turned out. to be
excessively pessimistic (Hansard, 3/6/1985).
The Green Paper was further criticised at the Labour Party Annual conference:
'This Conference, having noted the Government's proposals for the 'reform of
social security' totally rejects the contents of this review as it is a blatant attack on
the financial provisions made by the state for those most in need' (Labour Party
1985: 307).
In particular, the conference adopted a document which `condemn(ed) the
Government plans to abolish the state earnings related pension scheme' (ibid.) and
which included a commitment for a future labour government to re-introduce a
state earnings-related pension scheme if it were abolished (ibid. 308).
The decision of the government to abandon its plans for the abolition of SERFS,
did not manage to bridge the gap between the two parties. In 1986, Labour Party
policy on pensions was to block the implementation of the SSA 1986 if in
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government before April 1988, and to repeal the Act if elected after that date
(Randall's Parliamentary Services 1986). In fact in the 1987 election manifesto,
there was no mention of what a Labour government would do with regard to
personal pensions, which suggests that the potential electoral -appeal of such
schemes was being recognised by Labour Party officials as well. The Manifesto
included, however, a commitment to reverse two other major changes introduced
by the Conservative government: an increase of the basic pension above the rate of
inflation and eventually the return to the inflation/earning indexation formula; and,
in relation to the changes brought about by the SSA 1986, the restoration of the
former pension formula for SERPS (Labour Party 1987).
In subsequent years The Labour Party came to accept the existence of contracted
out personal pensions, a reversal of this policy being extremely impractical19.
However, some modifications were envisaged. The 2% tax rebate was to be
abolished, and personal pensions, in order to be approved, were to be required to
guarantee a minimum pensions, i.e. subject to the same sort of requirements
applied to defined benefits occupational schemes (Meacher 1991).
The Trade Union Congress (TUC)
Like that of the Labour Party, the TUC priorities in the area of pensions were
substantially different from those of the government. In the early 1980s, TUC
policy aimed to 'establish a comprehensive State social security scheme that
provides a range of benefits which ensure an adequate standard of living for people
in retirement' (TUC 1982: 63). The value of the basic pension was to be increased
to 50 percent of gross earnings for a couple, and to a third for a single person
pension. These improvements could have been financed through an increase in
employer's contributions, which, it was argued, were too low by European
standards, and by an increase in the tax-financed part of National Insurance (ibid.
64).
19As argued by Pierson (1994) this is a clear case of policy 'lock in', ie. a policy choice which
creates a situation in which the initial choice cannot be reversed without incurring in substantial
expenses.
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These priorities were entirely out of line with those of the government, so that
when the Inquiry was launched, the TUC had little opportunity for fruitfully
intervening in the policy process. Understandably, much of the TUC 's discourse
and activities during the three year period prior to the adoption of the 1986 SSA,
emphasised the total refusal to co-operate with the government's on the introduction
of personal pensions. As stated in the TUC 's submission of evidence to the
Inquiry:
'The TUC has no intention of assisting those who wish to reduce the
protection to pensioners and workers in agreed final salary schemes.
We do not accept that millions should be returned to the vagaries of the
market-place and poverty for the unlucky' (TUC 1984a).
Opposition to personal pensions was reiterated at the TUC 1984 Annual
Conference. A document was adopted, in which the danger represented by personal
pensions for the demographic stability of occupational schemes was emphasised.
Instead, the TUC 's approach was to increase the value of the basic pension and to
support the 1975 SSA framework, or the combination of SERPS and occupational
pensions as second-tier providers. (TUC 1984b).
The TUC response to the Green Paper was thus in line with its approach in the
previous months. The support for the 1975 SSA framework was reiterated, with
emphasis on the wide extent of public support for occupational provision, as they
give employees 'some control on their pension arrangements. In contrast, the
personal pension holder would have no voice and would be simply an individual
subscriber among thousands' (TUC 1985). The TUC decided also to support the
Labour Party's commitment to re-introduce SERPS once in office (ibid.), and
launched a campaign to try to persuade the government to drop its plans (The
Guardian 22/7/85).
The anti-poverty lobby
The term anti-poverty lobby usually refers to pressure groups and charities who are
actively engaged in providing services to people in need, as well as in trying to
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influence policy debates in the relevant areas. In the case of older people, the most
influential pressure group is Age Concern. In the early 1980s, its overall orientation
in pension policy, was towards a Scandinavian-like pension system. In particular,
the pressure group supported an increase of the basic pension and a change in the
eligibility rules for it, so as to make it not dependent on a contribution record (Age
Concern 1982).
It its submission to the Inquiry, Age Concern did not display a particularly strong
aversion to personal pensions. However, it was pointed out that there were more
pressing issues to be dealt with than the introduction of personal pensions: 'the
more serious problem is that many people are not covered by company schemes
and face retirement on inadequate state benefits' (Age Concern 1984).
Consequently, the support for an increase in the basic state pension, was reiterated.
In relation to the early-leavers problem, it was suggested to adopt full indexation
and full transferability of preserved pensions (ibid.).
Age Concern's reaction to the Green Paper was highly critical. In particular plans
for the abolition of SERPS were attacked, as personal pensions would not
guarantee the same level of income security as the State scheme. As David
Hobman, then director of the charity put it: 'We fear for the pensioners of the
future, who will be left in the jungle of making their own pension arrangements.
Personal pensions will never give the safeguards of SERPS' (Age Concern 1985).
After the publication of the White Paper, Age Concern welcomed the retention of
SERPS by the government, but was not satisfied with the treatment of women in
the modified scheme, as the abolition of the 20 best years rule was likely to affect
them to a greater extent than men (Age Concern 1986)
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4.5. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE 1986 PENSION REFORM
The new law, which was passed in July 1986, introduced a number of changes in
the British pension system as well as in other areas of social security 20. The
changes affected the whole area of second-tier pensions, by modifying the state
scheme (SERPS) by changing some of the rules governing occupational provision
and, most significantly, by introducing the possibility for employees to take out
personal pensions.
First, the new law reduced the amount of future SERPS pensions, by changing the
pension formula and by decreasing the value of widow(-ers) pensions. The benefit,
up to then calculated as 25% of relevant earnings, was to be gradually decreased
until 2009 to 20%. In addition, the basisfor the calculation of the pension was
extended from the average earnings in the 20 best years to whole career earnings,
with effect from 1998 (when SERPS would be 20 years old). Finally, widows
pensions were reduced from 100% of the husband's entitlement to 50%. As Brown
pointed out, one of the effects of these measures was to make SERPS less
competitive in relation to occupational and private pensions, which the government
intended to promote (1990: 234).
With regard to occupational pensions, the SSA 1986 introduced provision which
would facilitate the development of defined contribution schemes, by specifying a
contribution defined opting out criterion. This was meant to encourage small
employers who might have been deterred from setting up an occupational scheme
by the commitment implied by a defined benefits scheme (GMP). In addition, the
calculation of the GMP would be based on the new rules of SERPS and the
minimum period of membership in order to qualify for preservation of pension
rights (introduced by the SSA 1985, see above), was reduced from 5 to 2 years. A
2 percentage points contribution rebate was granted to newly contracted out
occupational schemes. Finally, membership of an occupational scheme could not be
made compulsory by an employer, although he or she could assume that, unless
20 The pension reform was undoubtedly the most significant part of the SSA 1986. Other important
changes included the introduction of an income support scheme, which replaced a number of means-
tested benefits; the creation of a social fund which provides loans for particular circumstances (such
as maternity or funerals); and the requirement for housing benefits recipients to pay a proportion
(20%) of the rent.
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notified differently by the employee, the latter wished to be a member of the
scheme.
Finally, the most controversial aspect of the new law concerned the introduction of
personal pension schemes. Personal pensions are provided by insurance
companies, as well as by other financial institutions on a competitive market.
Employees can then shop around to find the pension which best suits them. This
constitutes a third option for the provision of an earnings-related pension .
Employees are obliged to make supplementary pension provision, and can chose
between the state scheme (SERPS), an occupational scheme (if the employer
provides one) or a personal pension.
In order to encourage employees to take out the new personal pensions, the SSA
1986 provided some fiscal incentives. First, as was the case for contracted out
occupational schemes, employees were entitled to a rebate in National Insurance
Contributions of 5.8 percentage points (2% on employees contributions and 3.8%
on employers contributions). In practice, both employers and employees continued
paying the full contribution rate, and the DHSS (now DSS) then pays the amount
of the rebate into his or her personal pension21 . This measure was intended to
prevent possible hostile employers from refusing to pay contributions to an external
body.
In addition to that, a temporary 2% rebate was granted to new buyers of personal
pensions (until April 1993). This incentive was only available to employees who
belonged to SERPS, in order not to undermine the balance of occupational
schemes. The employees' incentives were exempted from income tax, so that
someone paying taxes at the standard rate of 25%, would receive an additional 0.67
percentage point rebate, as a result of which an employee taking out a personal
pension would be paying into it 8.47% of his or her earnings, without having to
spend any extra money (Nesbitt 1995: 98).




In 1986 there was considerable uncertainty about the number of employees who
were going to buy a personal pension. The official estimates made by the
Government Actuary, forcasted 500,000 new contracted out pensions, in either
occupational or personal pension schemes. On this basis, the 2% temporary rebate
was expected to cost some £60 million in lost revenue to the exchequer. The reality
was going to be quite different. As table 4.3 shows, the number of personal
pension holders soared from over 1 million in 1988 to more than 5 million in 1992.
The cost to the exchequer proved to be much bigger than expected. In the period
1987-1993, the 2% temporary rebate cost some £ 2.5 billion in lost revenues, while
the grand total (including all rebates) reached £ 9.7 billion (Waine 1995: 328).
Table 4.3. Pension coverage for British employees (employees paying class 1
contributions at the standard rate)
SERPS OP APP
1987 10,878 8,042 -
1988 10,043 7,904 1,288
1989 7,973 8,030 3,397
1990 7,679 8,270 4,172
1991 7,436 8,202 4,810
1992 6,653 8,068 5,340
1993 6,335 7,804 5,667
1994 6,527 7,476 5,732
Source: DSS 1996: 280 (table H103) and 287 (table 112.01)
Two factors arguably contributed to this unexpected popularity: first, the
importance of the incentive package offered by the government, and second, the
intensity of the advertisement campaign carried out both by the government and by
the pension industry. The hostile attitude of the government to state provision and
in particular to SERPS, certainly contributed to convince many members of this
scheme to opt out of it.
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The main problem identified in relation to personal pensions related to the quality of
the advice given by pension salespersons to prospective buyers. The insurance
industry was admittedly unprepared to handle the rapid development of this new
sector, so that salespersons had to be trained in very short time and frequently were
not competent enough to correctly advise prospective buyers ( BBC, Radio 4 1996;
Waine 1995). Most of those who were badly advised were people on low income,
for whom the rebate was not important enough to be attractive in comparison to
SERPS, or people who were advised to leave their more generous occupational
schemes (Waine 1995: 326).
4.6. MAJORITARIAN POLITICS AND PENSION REFORM
The analysis of the decision-making process which lead to the adoption of the 1986
SSA, shows quite clearly the majoritarian character of pension policy-making in the
UK. The official bodies involved in the debate, such as the 'Inquiry into provision
for retirement', were securely controlled by the government, and particularly by the
Secretary of State for Social Services. This allowed the government a wide room
for manoeuvre in the early stages of the definition of a new pension policy. The
result was that the government was able to produce a Green Paper with relatively
detailed suggestions for policy change before explaning its approach to external
interests.
The confrontation with interest groups took place mainly between the publication of
the Green and the White Papers, over a six-months period. In fact, such a short
time did not allow much interference in government plans, though eventually, the
latter was forced to drop a key element of its plan, i.e. the abolition of SERPS.
This was a major concession by the government, which, nonetheless, does not
necessarily constitute an instance in which the UK government abandoned its
typical majoritarian approach to policy-making. It is true that a majority of the
relevant interest groups opposed the abolition of the earnings-related scheme, but it
is also true that this issue was source of disagreement within the government as
well. As seen above, the abolition of SERPS was strongly supported by the DHSS
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and equally strongly opposed by the Treasury. The result was a division within the
cabinet between two important Departments, which introduced an element of power
fragmentation and arguably reduced the potential for majoritarian policy-making.
One of the key dimensions of majoritarian democracy, in fact, is the asymmetry of
power between the executive branch of power and the rest of society. On that
occasion, the internal divisions of the government arguably reduced its ability to
impose the adoption of controversial measures. It seems that the abandonment of
plans for the abolition of SERPS was more a result of this internal division than a
concession to external interests as suggested by the various quotations by Norman
Fowler reported above.
A second important feature in pension policy making throughout the 1980s is the
lack of agreement among the relevant actors on whether or not the British pension
system needed to be reformed. In the two other countries studied here, the pension
issue is generally viewed in the same terms by the various relevant actors, which
usually disagree only when it comes to put forward solutions to commonly
accepted problems. As seen above, in Britain the case for retrenchment of public
pension provision was far from being unanimously accepted. Particularly the left
and the labour movement were not persuaded of the need to radically reform the
system. Similarly, other interest groups such as the CBI, did not feel that the
pension commitments involved by SERPS were going to represent an excessive
burden22 (CBI 1984: 3). In this context, what is striking is the fact that the British
government managed to push through a relatively radical reform, despite the lack of
shared views on the pension problem. In other European countries, the political
sensitivity of pension reform usually requires a widespread sense of urgency before
governments can take action. In this respect, it seems that the British government
benefited from the majoritarian character of the UK's constitutional structure and
majoritarian tradition in policy-making.
Third, the British pension reform of 1986 stands out for the asymmetry of its
impact on various sections of the population. Unlike the pension reforms adopted
in other European countries, the British 1986 Social Security Act cannot be
22 Scepticism with the government's view on the urgency of pension reform was reflected in the
comments of academics and independent commentators, see for instance Abel-Smith and Townsend
1984; Reddin 1984; Ward 1984; Waine 1995).
126
qualified as simply unpopular. It made provision for personal pensions which were
subsequently taken out by some 5 million people, and this, if anything, is a clear
indicator of popularity. Possibly, not all of them will be better off than if they had
stayed in a collective arrangements. However, what is important here is their
perception of a change in their economic situation and retirerr y-nt prospects.
On the other hand, employees with low salaries, non-continuous career patterns,
and particularly women, were the main losers of the 1986 pension reform. The
state scheme SERPS included some de facto redistributive measures, such as the
fact that it took into account earnings during the best 20 years, which benefited
employees who did not have a full contribution record. The reduction from 25% of
reference salary to 20% in the pension formula constituted an additional loss for
employees who because of age, career patterns, salary, or personal beliefs, did not
find it convenient to take up a personal pension.
Finally, employees covered by occupational arrangements, a large section of the
British electorate, were not affected by the saving measures adopted in the 1986
SSA. Thanks to the structure of the British pension system, and particularly to the
division between occupational and state second-tier provision, the government was
able to target savings on a section of the population only, which reduced
substantially the risk of electoral punishment.
The differentiated impact of reform on various sections of the population is a typical
feature of the social and economic policies of the 1980s. It must be seen in
connection with the majoritarian character of British democracy. Those who felt
they were going to lose out in the reform of 1986 had little opportunity to influence
the course of policy. On the other hand, the government did not need to worry too
much about the electoral repercussion of its retrenchment measures. Those who felt
that they were going to be better off with or unaffected by the new arrangements,





THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUAL
RETRENCHMENT
With regard to the constitutional structure and to patterns of exclusion and inclusion
in policy-making, Switzerland can be considered as the mirror-image of the UK.
Formal institutions allow a substantial degree of influence to external groups. Most
notably, this is the case of the referendum system, whereby any act passed by
parliament can be challenged at the polls if 50,000 signatures are collected. In
addition, well-established decision-making procedures tend to include a wide range
of different and often conflictual intPres f s, and to produce compromises that are
more or less acceptable to as many actors as possible. This peculiar approach to
policy-making constitutes an important limitation of the room for manouvre
available to the government in virtually all areas of policy. Pension policy, of
course, is no exception.
The 1995 Swiss pension reform was adopted after more than a decade of intense
negotiations between political parties and the social partners. Despite a series of
attempts to reach a mutually acceptable compromise, a totally consensual solution
was not found. Eventually the reform included both expansion and retrenchment
elements. This combination proved instrumental in guaranteeing the final adoption
of the pension bill, as the retrenchment measures alone would have been at a much
higher risk of defeat in a referendum. As pointed out elsewhere (Bonoli 1997b),
this strategy has been used in other welfare reforms in the early 1990s, and can be
seen as a response to the institutional constraints that limit policy-making. The
combination of improvements in provision, on which there was widespread
agreement, with retrenchment elements, has contributed to the successful adoption
of reform also in the areas of unemployment benefits and health insurance.
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This chapter looks first at the key features of consensus democracy in Switzerland,
on the basis of existing studies. It then describes the structure of the Swiss pension
system and provides an account of the developments that lead to the adoption of the
1995 pension reform. The final section explores the link between consensual
politics and welfare retrenchment.
5.1. THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY
To explain the roots and the underpinnings of consensual policy-making, has been
a constant preoccupation in the work of Swiss political scientist. Their
achievements have been quite substantial, so that we now know relatively well how
consensual politics works, how it originated and, perhaps most importantly, what
its limits are. In fact, the main challenge in understanding Swiss politics is probably
to avoid an excessive idealisation of the Swiss model. The term of consensus itself
can be misleading in this respect, because it conveys an image of general and
widespread agreement and harmony in politics. Of course, it is not like this. Swiss
policy-makers disagree on what to do as much as any of their counterparts in other
countries. Nevertheless, they have been brought to develop a number of
mechanisms which reduce the impact of disagreement and favour the adoption of
mutually acceptable solutions. The search for a common platform among key actors
is a basic rule in policy-making.
Moreover, notions of power-sharing and inclusion, which are central to the concept
of consensus democracy, should not be seen as resulting in an above the average
degree of democratisation. It is true that participation to policy-making is extended,
but only to groups who have a significant threat potential, economically or
politically (or both). Other groups are not invited to join elites in the definition of
policy. This is most evidently the case of foreigners, who make up some 15% of
the resident population but are not allowed to vote at the federal level; of some
radical social movements (such as some environmentalist and pacifist groups); and
of women, who, having been granted the right to vote only in 1971 are still
catching up in terms of political influence with their European counterparts.
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However, Swiss institutions are unique in many respects. Besides referendums
there are other unusual elements by international comparison. First, the government
(Federal Council) is a 'collegial' institution. This means that unlike in other
democracies, there is no single individual head of government nor head of statel,
these two functions being fulfilled jointly by the seven members of the Federal
Council. Decisions within the Federal Council are taken through majority voting,
and individual ministers are expected to conform to the majority view, regardless of
their initial opinion. The result is that the Federal Council is a place for consensus
building in so far as it includes members of the four largest parties across the
political spectrum. Compromise is a necessity in the government coalition if it is to
survive. Second, Switzerland has a symmetric bicameral parliamentary system,
shaped after the US. Legislation has to be accepted by both chambers. The upper
chamber, the Council of States, represents the member-states of the confederation,
or Cantons. Each Canton, irrespective of its size, has two members in the Council
of States. In contrast, in the lower chamber, the National Council, Cantons have a
number of MPs which is proportional to the size of their population. What is more,
the Swiss constitutional order is characterised by a strict separation of powers
between the government and parliament. This means that the executive has
comparatively little control over decisions taken by parliament, which creates an
additional opportunity for minorities to influence legislation. These elements,
referendums, collegial governance symmetric bicameralism with a strong influence
of the Cantons, and separation of powers, constitute a series of potential veto
points that bills have to overcome in order to be adopted. The result is a legislative
process characterised by the inclusion of minorities and a limited scope for policy
innovation.
Political scientists are virtually unanimous in arguing that the availability of
referendums to unsatisfied minorities is the main factor in the development of
consensual politics (Kriesi 1995: 90; Katzenstein 1984: 144; Neidhart 1970) 2 . The
'There is in Switzerland a 'President of the Confederation', however this position has an exclusively
representative function (like in international summits, etc.). The Presidency is assumed by each
Federal Council member, by yearly rotation.
2According to Lijphart, however, referendums are not an element of either consensus or majoritarian
democracy, because they can favour the majority as well as minorities. The weakness of Lijphart's
argument is that it does not consider differences in the way referendums are called. As Kobach notes
'... variations in the manner referendums are called produce entirely different effects on the
surrounding political system' (1995: 60). When a referendum is called by the government it can be
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fact that Swiss voters have the opportunity to call a referendum on any piece of
legislation, provided they collect the appropriate number of signatures, has been a
major element in the development of a consensual political system. Neidhart (1970)
goes even further, and argues that referendums are the reason why Swiss
policy-makers act mon?_consensually than most of their European counterparts. He
substantiates his claim by looking at the origin of consensus building procedures,
which go back to the late 19th century. In 1890, the government was defeated in a
referendum on a proposal for the introduction of compulsory health insurance,
which had nevertheless received wide support in parliament. As a result of this
event, it introduced consensus building mechanisms such as a consultation
procedure, precisely in order to minimise the risk of being defeated at the polls. In
addition, the inclusion of 'unnecessary' parties in the ruling coalition began as a
response to an obstructive use of referendums. Until 1891, in fact, the Liberal-
Democrats (PRD) were able to rule alone, but found it difficult to implement
policy because of the obstructive strategy played by the Conservative-Catholic
Party (now PDC). Between 1871 and 1891 the Conservative-Catholic party called
20 referendums on acts passed by parliament and won 15. This created a situation
of legislative impasse, which was solved by the ruling PRD by incorporating the
Conservatives in the ruling coalition. (Kriesi 1995: 207-9). Referendums are
certainly a powerful force behind consensual politics. Typically, every effort is
made in order to avoid the polls, as a defeat generally means a considerable waste
of time and a loss of legitimacy for federal authorities, who are as a result unable to
legislate in the relevant area for a number of years.
Referendums, however, are not the only factor responsible for the emergence of
consensual democracy. Similar policy-making arrangements in fact developed in
other countries as well, which do not have a referendum system. Katzenstein
(1984;1985), though he recognises the impact of institutions ( 1984: 144) has
offered a structural-economic explanation. Small European countries, because of
the size of their economy, are extremely dependent on world markets and cannot
rely on protectionism. The result is that they have developed a system of
used to legitimise the view of the majority (like De Gaulle's referendum on the independence of
Algeria); in contrast, when referendums are called by unsatisfied groups (as it is the case in
Switzerland), they provide an additional opportunity for minorities to prevent the adoption of
unwanted legislation, and thereby increase their influence on power.
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compensation for economic change which implies concertation between conflicting
interests and the development of corporatist arrangements. The Swiss version of
democratic corporatism is dominated by export-oriented business; nevertheless, the
well established decision-making procedures tend to magnify the influence of the
labour movement, by 'relying on a policy-process that prizes the co-ordination of
conflicting objectives through uninterrupted political bargaining in the policy
network' (1984: 118).
Decision-making procedures
The legislative process in Switzerland is characterised by a series of stages at which
the different relevant actors have the opportunity to intervene in the process and to
make sure that their priorities are taken into account. When new legislation is
initiated by the government, as was the case for the pension reform analysed here,
the preparatory work is done by the civil service. The procedure is strictly regulated
(Directive concerning the pre-parliamentary procedure for the adoption of
legislation, 6/5/70). The relevant department of the federal administration (in the
case of pensions, the Office of Social Insurance, OFAS), has the authority to
decide the form of preliminary work. Legislation can be drafted by officials,
however, if the decision is relatively important or likely to be controversial, it is
usually drafted by an ad hoc expert commission3.
Expert commissions are the first and perhaps most crucial element in the consensus
building mechanism and in the elaboration of legislation4 . Typically, expert
commissions include civil servants; representatives of organised interests (usually
employers and trade unions and other interests if relevant); academics;
representatives of a number of Cantons and can include politicians. They have the
task to produce the first draft of a bill. According to KlOti these commissions have
a double function: 'they have to bring in the scientific state of the art and the
expert-knowledge needed by the government and the civil service, but they also
have to assess the political feasibility of given proposals' (1984:322). In his view,
3 In the case of pension policy there is a permanent expert commission, which is always responsible
for drafting new legislation (the AVS federal commission).
4 According to a survey carried out by Kriesi among policy-makers, the initial stages of the
law-making process are regarded as the most important insofar as the result is concerned. Typically,
a viable compromise is reached there, and it is relatively difficult to depart from that compromise at
later stages (1995: 175).
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this double function can limit the government's ability to implement innovative
policies, as typically agreement can be reached on some sort of minimum common
denominator (ibid.). The combination of the two functions (to provide expertise
and to shape a compromise) can also be seen as an attempt to de-politicise the
consensus building effort. According to Katzenstein 'all those represented share the
inclination to conceal these commission's political nature' (1984: 119). Expert
commissions, thus, tend to avoid political confrontation by emphasising the
technical aspects of legislation.
During the work of expert commissions, a constant concern is to avoid the prospect
that some unsatisfied group might call a referendum on the bill. According to a
survey carried out among expert commission members the threat of a referendum is
never mentioned explicitly, but is implicitly present all the time (Germann, quoted
in ICriesi 1995: 182). This finding seems to confirm the importance of the impact
that referenda have on the policy process (Neidhart 1970; see above). Expert
commissions, thus, are by far the main mechanism for consensus building. A
second practice, albeit less effective, is the 'consultation procedure' (Kriesi 1995:
181). In this case a much wider number of organisations are consulted, who can
comment and express positions on an existing draft. In general, it is only bills
which are likely to be controversial that go through all these stages. A study by
Poitry (1989) has shown that between 1971-1975, 53% of acts of parliament went
through some form of consultation. Some 16% went through a simple consultation
procedure; 11% were drafted by an expert commission, and 26% went through
both mechanisms. Consensus building procedures are used more often if the bill is
seen as an important one, if it involves constitutional change or if it is in the area of
social and economic policy (Kriesi 1995: 181).
When the bill is finalised, it is presented in parliament by the government, it is
examined by the relevant parliamentary commission which can propose
amendments and then voted. This procedure is repeated in each of the two
chambers of parliament, until they can agree on a common text. According to most
commentators, however, the impact of parliament is relatively limited, as usually
the content of a bill is not changed substantially (Kriesi 1995). This, however, was
not the case with the pension reform of 1995, which was elaborated mainly by a
133
parliamentary commission of the National Council. After the acceptance of a bill
by both chambers, there is a 90 days deadline to call a referendum, which requires
the collection of 50,000 signatures.
The existence of consensus building procedures, however, should not be. seen as
an opportunity given to all relevant groups in society to have some influence on a
bill. For an interest group, the fact of being invited to join an expert commission
largely depends on whether or not it is regarded as Referendumsftihig, able to call a
referendum and to stand some chances of winning it (Kliiti 1984; Kriesi 1995). It is
relatively easy to call a referendum, as to collect 50,000 signatures costs on average
around 250,000 SFR (ICriesi 1995: 91), but the level of expenditure required on the
campaign is far higher, if the group wants to stand some chance of winning it. The
subordination of inclusion to Referendumsfaigkeit, is an important limitation on
the extent of minority inclusion. The rights of minorities are guaranteed with a
virtual veto power, only insofar as they can convince the government that they are
capable to call and win a referendum if unsatisfied. This element might have played
an important role in the 1995 pension reform, as the savings were targeted on
women who are in the labour market between the age of 62 and 64, a group less
able than others to mobilise a majority in the electorate.
The politics of oversized coalition government
In order to understand the way Swiss politics works, it is crucial to emphasise the
difference between the concepts of majority and government. While in most other
democracies the two tend to overlap (most notably in the UK), this is not the case
in Switzerland. Especially in the areas of social and economic policy, there is a
parliamentary right-wing majority, which includes the Liberal-Democrats (PRD)
the Christian-Democrats (PDC) and the ex-farmers' party (UDC). These three
parties, though they represent slightly different constituencies, share an overall pro-
market orientation in economic and social policy, and together, have majorities in
both chambers of parliament. The Swiss government consists of these three parties
and the Socialists, who, in contrast, have a more left-wing approach in social and
economic policy. The result is a constant tension between these two entities,
majority and government, because the two often take different views on social and
economic issues. This was very clear in the 1995 pension reform, where the
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government decided not to increase women's retirement age, but the parliamentary
majority overuled it and introduced this measure.
This is an inevitable feature of oversized coalition government, especially if the
coalition includes parties representing conflicting interests. The practice of
oversized coalition governments developed relatively early in Switzerland. Until
1891 the PRD, helped by a first-past-the-post electoral system 5, ruled the country
alone. Then it admitted the Conservative-Catholic party in government, arguably in
order to neutralise their referendum-based obstructive strategy. Subsequently, in
1923 the UDC was also included in the governing coalition. The Socialist party,
however, did not enter government through the use of referendums. The origins of
the Socialists' inclusion go back to the early 1930s. Before that, the PSS was not
interested in collaborating with a liberal-conservative government. In the 1930s,
arguably as a response to the fascist threat (both internal and external), the PSS
adopted a more moderate approach and expressed the wish to join the ruling
coalition. The inclusion of the PSS in the government coalition, however, did not
materialise until the end of 1943. Then, in order to improve the image of
Switzerland with the Allies, tarnished by the not-so-neutral relationship with Nazi-
Germany, the right-wing coalition invited a Socialist minister to join the
government. The current composition of the ruling coalition, described as the
'magic formula' , was first adopted in 1959 and comprises 2 PRD, 2 PDC, 2 PSS
and 1 UDC.
As decisions within the government (Federal Council) are taken through majority
voting, the impact on policy of the two Socialist ministers is much smaller than
that of their right-wing counterparts. According to Kriesi, the left has relatively little
power in government. In general it can reject proposals that are seen as
unacceptable, or initiate debates in the area of social policy, but has relatively little
control on the overall government machine (1980; 1995). The marginality of the
position of the PSS in government is clear when Federal Council members are
elected. Members are elected individually by parliament and need a majority. As a
result, PSS members need the support of other parties in order to get elected. In
5The first-past-the-post electoral system was kept until 1919. Then, after a massive wave of strikes,
it was decided to adopt proportional representation, in order to allow a fairer representation of
minorities (in particular of the Socialists) in order to defuse social tensions and conflicts.
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recent years, on two occasions, the right voted against the official candidate put
forward by the PSS, and elected another candidate, belonging to the right of the
Socialist Party6.
Referendum politics
The Swiss constitution provides for different kinds of referendums. First,
constitutional change requires acceptance in a referendum. In this case an
amendment must be accepted by a majority of voters and by a majority of cantons.
The second kind, which is called 'initiative' is a proposal for constitutional change
and has to be backed by 100,000 valid signatures. Third, on any law a referendum
can be called if backed by 50,000 valid signatures. The political implications of the
three instruments are different. For instance, constitutional referendums magnify
the impact of small rural cantons, as a majority among cantons is required in order
to adopt change. The initiative allows marginal groups to raise their concerns to
matters of national debate. However, what is most relevant here, is the legislative
referendum, because that was the instrument that was used in the case of the 1995
pension reform.
Referendum politics is substantially different from parliamentary politics, for two
main reasons. First, referendum politics favours the formation of 'unholy'
coalitions within the electorate, which are less likely in parliament and stand good
chances of defeating a bill. Typically, a government sponsored bill is supported by
the centre of the political spectrum. It can happen that both the far right and the far
left oppose the bill, as it is seen as being 'too little' for some and as being 'too
much' for the others. A highly heterogeneous coalition is possible in a referendum,
as it is a one-off event and it does not require agreement on the alternative to the
bill, as it is normally the case in parliament.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, party discipline among voters is not as
strong as it is among MPs. Typically, political parties issue voting
6This occurred in 1983, when the right-of-centre majority refused to endorse the official candidate of
the Socialist party, Lilian Uchtenagen, and elected Otto Stich instead. The same thing happened in
1993, when Christiane Brunner was replaced by Ruth Dreyfuss as the official socialist candidate
(Kriesi 1995:212).
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recommendations for each referendum. However, it has been estimated that on
average, 12.5% of voters do not respect party recommendations in referendums
(Papadopoulos 1996: 30). This figure might seem relatively low in relation to the
fact the government coalition can count on the support of some 80% of the
electorate at general elections. Nevertheless, it should be noted than many
referendums are relatively uncontroversial which implies stronger compliance with
party recommendations. On the other hand, of course, in the case of controversial
decisions, non-respect of party guidelines is more widespread.
Referendum politics, thus, is characterised by a higher level of uncertainty than
parliamentary politics though the government does have some instruments to try to
control the outcome of a referendum. For instance, it can decide the date for a
referendum to take place, and thus wait for the most favourable moment. It can
combine an initiative (constitutional change backed up by 100,000 signatures) with
a bill going in the same direction, but being more acceptable to the government.
Finally, like political parties, the government issues voting recommendations which
are printed in the voting instructions that are mailed to every voter. These
instruments allow the government to reduce the extent of uncertainty involved in
referendum politics, which, nevertheless remains important. In fact, defeats have
become more frequent in recent years. The fact that government's decision are
increasingly often challenged by unsatisfied minorities has prompted a number of
commentators to argue that the 'consensus' model might be facing an impasse
(Cattacin 1996; Church 1995; Kriesi 1995).
Current challenges and consensus democracy
It has been argued that the consensual nature of the Swiss political system reduces
adaptability and promptness of government action, and that given the character of
current challenges, it constitutes a burden for the country. This for a number of
reasons.
First, the complexity of these procedures requires much longer periods for the
adoption of law than it is the case in most other European countries. For instance,
in the case of the 1995 pension reform, preliminary work started in 1979 and the
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law was passed 16 years later. While this is long even by Swiss standards, it is by
no means exceptional. Second, the existence of consensus building mechanisms
prevents policy-makers from developing innovative solutions, since compromise is
generally easier to reach if close to the status quo. Third, new issues have
emerged, on which it is extremely difficult to achieve a compromise. This is the
case of the question of whether or not to join the European Union. As a yes/no
question, this does not offer many opportunities for a compromise (Church 1995).
The issue of the capacity of a consensual system to implement reform in the area of
social policy has been addressed by Cattacin (1996). He argues that existing
mechanisms are inadequate to deal with current challenges, because of the long time
span they require to produce policy responses and because of the objective
difficulty involved in reaching consensus in an unfavourable economic context. In
general, the Federal Council in order to be able to legitimise its intervention, must
wait until there are strong economic pressures pushing for change. The federal
government can de facto play only a reactive role. Cattacin argues that in recent
years substantial change has come from the Cantons, which have implemented
autonomously legislation for an income support system 7 ; and from the voluntary
sector, especially in the area of social services for Hiv/Aids sufferers. In these two
cases, smaller units have been able to come up relatively fast with innovative
policies, which might in the future be used to justify an intervention at the federal
level.
Perhaps, however, the biggest strain on consensus politics is the impact of the
recession. In the early 1990s, Switzerland went through the worse economic
downturn since World War II, and is now facing social and economic problems
that its European neighbours have long known: rising budget deficits, mass
unemployment, employers' pressures on the welfare state and on wages, and so
forth. This new economic environment is making it more difficult to achieve
consensual solutions to current problems.
7 This has been the case, for instance, in Cantons of Geneva, Vaud and Ticino, which have adopted
an income support system as an alternative to social assistance for long term unemployed persons
who lose the right to unemployment insurance benefits. Social assistance in Switzerland is
administered by the municipalities, it is seen as highly stigmatising and involves an important
component of social control. In the past, social assistance recipients were mainly 'unemployable
people' whereas now the System is increasingly needed by long-term unemployed.
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As a result of these economic changes, the debate on welfare retrenchment has
become topical in Switzerland. In fact, this is a fairly new feature in the Swiss
political arena. Until the recession of the 1990s, there was an overall consensus on
the desirability of maintaining the existing arrangements and structures. Given the
low rate of unemployment and the overall good economic conditions, the financing
of social programmes was not seen as problematic. With the recession and with
rising government budget deficits, pressure has built up to rethink much of the
Swiss welfare state. Between 1994 and 1995 three big reforms have been adopted,
in the areas of pensions, health insurance and unemployment benefits. They are
something rather new in the Swiss social policy landscape, in the sense that for the
first time they have the explicit aim of achieving savings. Unsurprisingly, these
three reforms represented a big challenge for the consensus building mechanisms,
two of them were subjected to referenda, but eventually they were all accepted. As
argued elsewhere, their common feature is the combination of retrenchment
measures with elements of improvement and expansion (Bono11 1997b). This
strategy, which as will be shown has been largely used in the 1995 pension reform,
seems to be a new way round the referendum obstacle. While in the past the search
for a consensus provided a means to keep the impact of referendums under relative
control, now, consensus being more difficult to achieve, the majority seems to have
adopted a 'combination strategy' which consists in including in a single legislative
package elements requested by different groups, in the hope that this will produce a
majority in the electorate. In the three reforms of 1994-1995, this strategy seems to
have worked, as all the three, despite containing highly unpopular elements,
became law.
5.2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SWISS PENSION SYSTEM
The Swiss pension system is generally described as a three-pillar system each of
which caters for a distinct level of provision. The first pillar (AVS) is meant to
cover the basic needs of retirees. It is partly earnings-related and provides a means-
tested pension supplement (PC). The second pillar (LPP) has the task of providing
retirees with a standard of living close to the one they had while working and
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consists of a compulsory system of occupational pensions. Finally, the third pillar,
consists of non-compulsory private provision which is encouraged through tax-
concessions. This functional division between three levels of pension provision is
upheld by the federal constitution since 1972 (Article 34), and it is widely
regarded as an important constraint with regard to policy change in the area of
pensions. The 1995 pension reform, which is being analysed in this study,
concerned only the first tier of provision (AVS).
The second pillar of the Swiss pension system, occupational pensions, was first
granted tax-concessions in 1916 8 . They developed substantially throughout the
20th Century, but coverage remained patchy. In 1970 some 50% of employees
were covered by an occupational pension, but only 25% of women (OFAS 1995:
4). Since 1985, however; occupational pension coverage is compulsory for all
employees earning at least twice the amount of the minimum AVS pension (about
35% of average salary). Coverage is virtually universal among male employees
but only around 80% of female employees are covered (OFAS 1995b: 10). A full
occupational pension is granted to employees with an adequate contribution
record (currently 37 years for women and 40 for men, the starting age being 25).
Those who were first covered by an occupational pension after the age of 25 are
granted contribution credits in order to compensate for shorter contribution
periods. Benefits vary according to the type of pension fund and are uprated
according to inflation. As far as financing is concerned, occupational pensions are
funded schemes. They are financed by employer/employee contributions, the
former contributing at least as much as the latter. The sums involved in
occupational pensions are quite impressive: in 1992 occupational pension funds
owned capital stock for Sfr 257 billion , equal to 72% of GDP; receipts amounted
to Sfr 43 billion and outlays to Sfr 19 billion.
The third tier of the pension system, private provision, consists mainly of tax-
concessions on personal pension schemes. These can be more substantial for
people who are not covered by an occupational pension (self-employed, part-time
or temporary workers). In 1994, some 1 million people had personal pensions,
8 On Swiss occupational pensions (LPP), see Hebling (1992) or Schneider (1991). For a comparative
analysis including Switzerland, see Lusenti (1990).
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with a total capital stock of Sfr 17 billion (OFAS 1995: 15). Personal pension,
thus, play a relatively minor role in the Swiss pension system, where the main
provider of income in old age are occupational pensions.
The basic pension scheme (AVS)
The AVS pension scheme is generally regarded as the most progressive element of
the Swiss welfare state. A trade unionist interviewed for this study described it as a
'little miracle' as it is an unusually redistributive scheme in the Swiss context. Even
if compared to other Bismarckian schemes (in France or in Germany), the Swiss
AVS fares rather well as far as redistribution is concerned. In fact, while there is no
ceiling on contributions, the amount of the benefit can vary between a floor and a
ceiling, the upper limit being twice as much as the lower one. Within these limits,
the amount of the benefit is related to the contributions paid while in work. In a
way the Swiss basic scheme is a compromise between the Bismarcldan tradition of
earnings-related contributory pensions and the Beveridgean flat-rate approach.
Interestingly, in international comparisons the AVS is sometimes considered as a
flat-rate pension scheme (Schmahl 1991: 48).
The scheme was introduced in 1948 9. A previous attempt had been made in 1931,
but on that occasion the government sponsored proposal was defeated in a
referendum. The legislation enacted in 1948, which in contrast was accepted by an
overwhelming majority at the polls, provided the basis for the current system. The
scheme, which since then has been amended a number of times, is universal in its
coverage.
Financing
The AVS works almost on a pure pay-as-you-go basis. It has a fund which
consists of roughly one-year outlays. It is financed through contributions (4.2% of
salary each for employees and employers; up to 7.8% for self employed), and
90n the history of the AVS pension scheme, see Bernstein (1986) and Binswanger (1987).
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receives a subsidy equal to 19% of outlays 10. The coverage is universal, so that
those who are not working (like students) are required to pay flat rate contributions
or, if providing informal care, are entitled to contribution credits. Unemployed
people pay contributions on their unemployment benefits, which is treated as a
salary (the unemployment insurance fund contributing or—their behalf 4.2% of the
unemployment benefit). Like in Bismarckian systems, the AVS has a separate
budget from the government. The social partners do take part in the management of
the scheme at the local level, by running some branch-related funds. The central
fund however, is managed by the federal administration. The AVS budget is
relatively healthy for the time being, as table 5.1 shows. However, a worsening is
expected due to demographic ageing (see below).
Table 5.1.: Receipts and expenditure of the basic pension scheme (AVS)
million Sfr. 1992 1993 1994 1995
Receipts 23,160 23,856 23,923 24,511
- contributions 18,005 18,321 18,307 18,646
- subsidies 4,241 4,523 4,585 4,809
Outlays 21,206 23,046 23,363 24,503
Balance 1,954 810 561 9
source OFAS 1995: 7, table 12.1; Securita sociale 2/96: 77
The balance of the AVS fund has deteriorated in the last few years, though still
making a slight surplus. The reasons for this development are twofold. On the one
hand, benefits were increased by 3.2% in 1995, and the number of beneficiaries
rose by 1.9% in the same year. On the other hand, because of the recession,
receipts from employer/employee contributions have increased slower than outlays.
The federal subsidy, moreover, has been reduced from 17.5% of expenditure to
17%. The fund has reserves for some Sfr 24 billion, which roughly correspond to
one year expenditure.
10 The Federal government provides a subsidy of 17 % of outlays, while the Cantons jointly provide
an additional 2 %.
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Benefits
The replacement rate varies, because of the existence of a lower and a upper limit
on benefits, between 100% (for someone on an extremely low income, up to 18%
of average salary) to 40% (for someone on a average earnings) and decreases for
higher incomes (see table 4.2). The lower limit, applies only to those who have a
complete contribution record (currently 45 years for men and 42 for women,
retirement age being 65/62 respectively), otherwise the pension is reduced
correspondingly. Table 5.2 gives the level of benefit in relation to insured salary.
Insured salary is the average of re-valued (according to increases in average
incomes) career earnings.
Table 5.2. Level of benefits of the AVS pension scheme (1995-1996)
Annual salary (uprated) pension benefit (ser month) Repl.rate
in Sfr % ay. salary in Sfr % ay. salary
u s to 11,640 18 940 18 100%
34,923 54 1475 27 50%
69,846 and more 107 1940 36 33% (or less)
Source: recalculation of data from Sgcurite sociale 2/1995:66 and 6/1994: 250)
Benefits are uprated according to a mixed index, i.e. the arithmetic average between
changes in consumer prices and in gross earnings. This means that retirees receive
a share of increases in productivity, but it also means that in the long run, the
replacement rate is going to deteriorate, albeit less fast than in the UK, where
indexation of pensions is based on prices only. The uprating takes place every two
years, unless consumer prices increase by more than 4%, in which case benefits are
increased when that threshold is reached.
According to the federal constitution as amended in 1972, the AVS pension scheme
must cover the basic needs of retirees. This makes it a Beveridgean scheme in its
orientation. Nevertheless, since it was introduced as a compromise between a
Beveridgean and a Bismarckian scheme, it still includes elements of the latter,
namely a partial relationship with former earnings. The tension between these two
conceptions is present in the Swiss pension debate. Given current financial
constraints, the fact that benefits remain partly earnings-related means that those at
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the bottom end do not receive enough to cover their basic needs. In fact, the
introduction of a flat rate benefit has been considered during the debate leading to
the 1995 reform, but plans going in that direction were eventually dropped l 1 .
Because the minimum pension is regarded as insufficient to cover basic needs, a
supplementary means-tested benefit has been introduced in 1965. Initially the
pension supplement was meant to be a temporary measure, but in fact it has now
become part of the pension system. The pension supplement, depending on
individual circumstances, can increase the AVS benefit to up to Sfr 27,768 per year
(42% of average earnings, 1995) and is applied also to those with incomplete
contribution records. In 1993 there were some 160,000 recipients or 19% of all
pensioners (Securite sociale 1/1995: 13).
Pressures for change
The main concern which prompted policy-makers in the late 1970s to start a debate
on a new pension reform was the particularly discriminatory treatment of women in
the AVS pension scheme. Basically, married women were not entitled to a pension
of their own, instead, their husband would receive a 50% pension supplement.
Contributions paid by married women were taken into account as far as earnings
were concerned, but could not fill in an incomplete contribution record. In addition,
there were no contribution credits for years spent providing unpaid informal care.
The result was that women in general, and most notably divorced or separated
women, got a particularly bad deal out of the AVS. This was reflected by the
impressive difference in the amount of average pensions granted to different
groups, as shown in table 5.3.
"In 1993 the Council of States (upper chamber) asked the Federal Office for Social Insurance
(OFAS) to produce a report on the impact of benefits and cost of the introduction (OFAS 1993). The
proposal, however, was dropped because if it were to be cost neutral, it would mean a reduction in
benefits for some 50% of recipients; if it were to be at the level of the maximum benefit, it would
have cost some Sfr 3 billion in 1993. Both options were regarded as politically unfeasible and thus
abandoned.
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Table 5.3. Average amount of AVS benefit according to gender and marital status
(in Sfr per month, 1994), and percentage receiving means-tested pension
supplement
Women Men
marital status average benefit %	 receivingmeans-tested
sus Dlement
average benefit %	 receiving
means-tested
sup element
unmarried 1371 24.1 1373 23.7
married 1028 2.2 1644 4.1
separated 1089 NA 1548 NA
widow(er) 1701 18.4 1699 12.7
divorced 1442 35.3 1601 24.5
source: Sácurite sociale 2/1995: 63
The most striking difference in benefit levels between men and women are in the
cases of separated couples and divorcees 12. Average pensions are lower for
women especially in the case of separated couples. Among divorcees, the reliance
on the means-tested pension supplement is much higher among women than men
(by more than 10 percentage points).
It was in response to pressures to remove these discriminatory practices from the
AVS that in 1979 the government requested the AVS federal commission, a
permanent expert commission, to produce a reform proposal which would have
improved the treatment of women in the scheme. The government was reacting to
demands by women's organisations, and concern which had been expressed by
some interventions in parliament (Binswanger 1987: 251). Pressure to adopt a
more favourable treatment of women in the AVS pension scheme increased further
in 1981, when the constitution was amended so as to include provision for gender
equality (Art. 4).
12The big difference between married men and women is due to the fact that women were not entitled
to their own pension under 'standard' circumstances. This was unless the husband did not receive a
pension (for example because he worked abroad), a relatively infrequent event. The fact that only
2.2% of married women receive a pension supplement suggests that in fact most of those belonging
to this group have other sources of revenue as well.
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Progress on the reform was slow (a bill was presented only in 1990), so that when
it was debated in parliament in the early 1990s, the overall economic and political
climate had changed quite dramatically. First, the recession caused a massive
increase in the number of unemployed people, which had an impact on the balance
of AVS fund (see table 5.1, above). In addition, concern was growing with regard
to the future financing prospects of the scheme because of the worsening
contributors/beneficiaries ratio. According to the projections published by the
Federal office of social insurance in 1993, the ones which were used by policy-
makers in the debate on the 1995 reform, the balance of the fund would become
negative from 1999 on, and, if nothing was done, would make losses of some Sfr
5 billion by 2015 (Sdcurite sociale 1/1994: 7). In this context of sluggish economic
performance and predicted imbalance in the fund's budget, the right-wing majority
found a relatively fertile ground for introducing an element of retrenchment, an
increase in women's retirement age, in a pension reform which was initially
designed to improve the situation of women.
5.3. THE 1995 PENSION REFORM13
Pre-parliamentary work
Following interventions (postulats) made by a number of MPs, in 1979 the Federal
Council asked the Federal Commission for the AVS to elaborate a reform proposal
meant to improve the situation of women and eliminate the discriminatory practices
in the way contributions are taken into account. The Federal Commission for the
AVS is the equivalent of an expert commission, but has a permanent status,
because the AVS requires virtually constant debate on reform. Its task, as for expert
commissions, is to elaborate reform proposals which must be technically viable,
13 With the term 1995 pension reform I designate the second part of the 10th revision of the AVS.
In fact, given the long time span required by the legislative process, it was decided to introduce a
first set of non- controversial measures already in 1992 through a temporary decree (AFPG 19/6/92) ,
which would expire upon acceptance of the overall package. 'f he temporary decree included measures
to increase the value of pensions for people on average incomes and a contribution credit for
divorced women with children.
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and, especially, politically feasible. The Federal Commission for the AVS 14, in
fact, includes representatives from a number of different organisations who have a
stake in pensions and who can effectively oppose measures regarded as
unsatisfactory. It is essentially an instrument for pre-testing the political feasibility
of reform proposals and thus, ultimately, for consensus building.
The AVS Federal Commission came up with a reform proposal in 1982. This
included some minor improvements for women. However, since the government
had requested the adoption of a cost-neutral reform package, these were
compensated by an increase in the age of retirement (for women only) from 62 to
63. The reaction to these proposals was rather lukewarm, and even within the
Commission there was controversy with regard the increased retirement age for
women. The Commission was asked by the government to reconsider its plans,
but was nevertheless was unable to produce a different proposal. According to
Binswanger, (1987: 250) it was the combination of cost-neutrality and the need to
reach consensus that prevented the Commission from producing a more satisfactory
proposal.
Towards the end of the 1980s, after Flavio Cotti, a Christian Democrat, took office
as Interior Minister 15 , the government decided to abandon the cost-neutrality
requirement, which was blocking progress towards effective gender equality. In
March 1990, the Federal Council was at last able to produce a bill for the reform
of the AVS pension scheme (FF, vol.2, 1990: 1-231). The key element of the bill
was the introduction of gender equality, without abandoning couple pensions for
married people. The bill, thus did not introduce an individual right to a pension for
married women as was being advocated by a number of influential organisations.
Quite simply, contributions paid by the two spouses were to be combined and
computed for a couple pension. This could have been split (half each) upon
request. Basically, the proposed change was limited to the removal of all reference
to gender in the calculation of the pension, making the law compatible with the
14 Typically, the AVS commission includes representatives of the trade unions, employers,
insurance societies, the Cantons, organisations of retired persons, women's organisations, the
federal government and the army.
15The Department of the Interior has responsibility for social insurance as well as for most social
policy areas (inlcuding health care).
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constitutional requirement for gender equality. The rationale of this decision was
that, being the married couple still the predominant type of cohabitation, the
introduction of a system of individual pensions for everyone regardless of marital
status was regarded as premature.
In relation to the question of women's retirement age, the government argued that
the constitutional requirement of gender equality will eventually have to be applied
to retirement age as well as to other areas. However, given the fact that gender
equality in the labour-market (in terms of wages, career patterns, access to
occupational pensions, etc.) was far from being achieved, it was thought that the
existence of a positive discrimination in favour of women was justified.
The pension reform in parliament
The lack of an individual right to a pension regardless of gender and marital status
in the 1990 pension bill became an important political issue. In the late 1980s, in
fact, all major political parties and the Federal Commission for Women's issues,
published documents in which they suggested the introduction of a system of
individual pensions regardless of gender and marital status calculated on the basis
of a contribution-sharing system. In general, it was suggested that contributions
paid by the members of a couple be summed, divided by two, and counted
separately and individually for each of the two spouses, a system which became
known with the term of splitting. Such plans were put forward by the
Liberal-Democrats (PRD 1988) and by the Socialist Party (PSS/USS 1987) which
produced a joint document with the trade unions. The Christian-Democratic Party
did not produce a detailed proposal for a contribution-sharing system, but in a
document published in 1988, it argued in favour of a system which would
guarantee full gender equality and an overall arrangement which would favour the
family (PDC 1988: 6). This was not a clear-cut statement in favour of individual
pensions. In fact the Christian-Democrats, were concerned that such a system
might discriminate against married couples, which they regarded as unacceptable
(Darbelley, TSR 10/6/95).
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Consequently, the 1990 pension reform bill was seen by many as a disappointing
reform package, especially by women's organisations and by women MPs in the
Social Democratic and Liberal Democratic parties. The bill was nevertheless
adopted by the upper chamber of Parliament, the Council of States in March 1991.
Accordg to the standard procedure, it was subsequently examined by the
Parliamentary Commission for Social Security of the National Council (the lower
chamber) in April 1991. Some members of the Commission were clearly
unsatisfied with the bill, as it did not include provision for individual pensions
regardless of marital status nor contribution-sharing between spouses. As a result,
the Commission requested the Federal Office for Social Insurance (OFAS) to
produce a report which would explore the technical issues involved in the
introduction of a contribution-sharing system. The report was to be based on the
three proposals made by the Federal Commission for Women's issues (1988), by
the PRD (1988) and by the Socialist Party jointly with the Unions (PSS/USS
1987).
The report was published in August 1991 (OFAS 1991) and was debated by the
Commission in September of the same year. It did not make practical proposals but
provided simply a comparison of the three documents published in 1987/88 and
outlined a number of problems, such as provision for couples with one member
abroad, which could not be treated satisfactorily by any of the three systems
suggested. On that occasion, two members of the commission, Gret Haller (PSS)
and Lili Nabholz (PRD) suggested setting up a working group with the task to
elaborate a viable proposal for the introduction of a contribution-sharing system.
The working group included MPs of the main political parties 16 and convened
seven times. It produced a final report that was published in March 1992 (Groupe
de travail 'splitting' 1992).
This document was examined by the social security commission of the National
Council which on that basis was going to draft a new version of the pension reform
16 The composition of the working group was a enlarged form of the "magic formula" of the Federal
Council (government). It included 2 PSS, 2 PDC, 2 PRD, 1 UDC, 1 Adl, 1 Green Party, and 1 PLS.
The President was Heinz Allenspach (PRD) who was also president of the Social Security
Commission and the two MPs who initiated the debate on the Splitting system within the
Commission (Gret Haller and Lily Nabholz) were also member of the working group.
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bill that would have been subsequently submitted to parliament. What happened
within the social security commission is not entirely clear since the proceedings of
the commission's debates are not disclosed. Nevertheless, by looking at the debates
that took place afterwards in Parliament (which, in contrast are transcribed and
available for consultation), one can reconstruct the dynamics of decision-making
within the Commission with a fair degree of approximation. This is of great
importance, since it was there that the proposals which subsequently became law
were first elaborated.
The president of the Social Security Commission presented its final report in
parliament in March 1993 (B OAF. CN 103, 9/3/93). The proposal picked up
heavily from the work of the Groupe de Travail 'splitting' which had been
published the previous year. The new version of the bill included the notion of an
individual entitlement to a pension regardless of gender and of marital status. As
suggested in the papers published by the main political parties in the late 1980s, the
contribution records of two spouses while married was to be summed, divided by
two, and counted half for each of the two spouses. In order not to penalise one
earner couples, a generous credit for couples with children was introduced. In
addition, however, the report included provision for raising the retirement age for
women from 62 to 64.
There was substantial agreement among the main political parties on the
introduction of a contribution-sharing system for contributions paid by spouses.
Only the Christian-Democrats were somewhat sceptical initially, but by 1993 they
came to accept the predominant view. The government, which in its 1990 bill
argued that the introduction of a contribution-sharing and individual pensions was
premature, rallied to the majority's view and accepted the substantial changes made
by parliament. The position of the Federal Council on the changes adopted by
parliament was expressed by Flavio Cotti as follows:
'The Federal Council welcomes the changes introduced by the National
Council, except some reservation with regard to the question of raising
the age of retirement for women. However, if Parliament decides to
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take this stance, the Federal Council is not going to oppose it' (B OAF.
CN, 103, 6/3/1993).
A major problem which occurred as a result of the introduction of contribution
sharing for married couples, was that one-earner couples were going to end up with
two individual pensions which when combined, could be lower than a current
couple pension. 17 However, in each of the three initial reports and subsequent
proposals, provision was made to reduce the incidence of the abolition of a couple
pension. There was an overall agreement on the view that the best way to do that
was through the introduction of a contribution credit for persons who are not
engaged in paid work in order to take care of children or relatives. The three initial
reports, however, came up with three different proposals as to how the credit
system should work. The joint report PSS/USS (1987) argued that the contribution
credit should correspond to at least the contribution amount paid on a salary equal
to three times the minimum pension (in 1992 Sfr 32,400 p.a.), as long as the
couple has at least one child under the age of 16. The Commission for Women's
Issues, in contrast, suggested a 20% increase in the retirement pension for people
who have taken care of children or relatives for at least 15 years. For shorter
periods the amount would be reduced correspondingly (CFQF 1988). Finally, the
Liberal-Democrats, although in favour of the principle, suggested to leave to the
Federal Council the task of working out the details of the credit system. The
Groupe de Travail 'Splitting' (1992: 9) picked up the proposal made in the
PSS/USS joint report, which was carried through by the social security
commission, accepted by parliament and is now law.
The most controversial issue, however, was certainly that of retirement age. As the
overall aim of the pension reform was to achieve gender equality, it was generally
accepted that equality should have been applied to retirement age as well as to other
areas. However, in the 1990 pension reform bill, the government argued that given
the persistence of substantial discrimination in the labour market at the expense of
17 A couple pension corresponds to 150% of a single person pension. If the contribution record of
the husband is split between the two partners, they will receive a pension worth 50% of a single
person pension each. As there is no supplement for being a couple, one earner-couples would be
disadvantaged.
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women (wages, access to occupational pensions, and so forth) 18 , the difference in
retirement age was justified for the time being, and the issue would have been dealt
with in the next (the 11 th) revision of the AVS pension scheme (FF, vol.2, 1990:
1-231). This reflected to some extent the position of the Christian-Democrats, who
also argued in favour of a common retirement age of 64 t3-be phased in within the
context of the 11 th AVS revision (PDC 1988: 11). In contrast, the joint PSS/USS
report (1987) suggested the introduction of a flexible age of retirement between 62
and 65, for both sexes. Early retirement would be possible without reductions in
the level of the benefit, but conditional upon giving up work (at least 50%).
Finally, the Liberal-Democrats advocated a common retirement age of 65, with
provision for early retirement from the age of 62, but with a reduction of 6.8% in
the level of the benefit for each year of anticipation. The choice was justified with
the need to achieve savings in the light of the expected increase in pension
expenditure due to demographic ageing (PRD 1988). Finally, the Federal
Commission for Women's Issues, which included members of all the above
parties, suggested by a weak majority, to raise the age of retirement for women, but
did not specify at what age; and introduce provision for early retirement from the
age of 60, with a reduction in the level of the benefit equal to 6.8% per year of
anticipation (CFQF 1988).
The Groupe de travail 'splitting' did not take a position on the issue of retirement
age. This would not have been within its mandate. In fact, it was within the social
security commission of the National Council that the final arrangement (65/64) was
adopted 19 . As mentioned above, it is not possible to have access to the proceedings
of Parliamentary commissions. However, by looking at the positions expressed
before the examination of the proposals by the commission, and at the
parliamentary debate which followed the presentation of the final report on the 6th
of March 1993, it is possible to find out what the debates might have been like
within the commission.
18 While occupational pension coverage for men is virtually universal, only about 80% of women
are currently covered (OFAS 1995b). This is because women are more likely to earn less than the
limit above which occupational pensions become compulsory. With regard to gender-based wage
discrimination, see Bauer 1994.
19 The Commission was composed of 29 members of the National Council. Its president was Heinz
Allenspach (PRD) who was also president of the umbrella organisation of Swiss employers (UCAPS)
The Commission accepted the final report with a majoiity of 23 to 3 (and 3 abstentions)
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During the parliamentary debate, a number of conservative MPs 20 suggested that
the bill be referred back to the Commission (or to the Federal Council) for
consideration of a flat rate benefit. This would have eliminated the relationship
between contributions and benefits and thus the need for a complex splitting
system and contribution credit. The majority of the National Council, however,
agreed to keep the Commission's proposal as a basis for discussion.
The vote was carried out on an article by article basis, without encountering any
serious problem, with the exception, of course, of the issue of whether or not to
raise retirement age for women. The report adopted by the majority of the
Commission had argued that:
'the constitutional article on gender equality requires that the age of
retirement be the same for man and women' in addition, 'since the
proposals made by this Commission eliminate differences based on
gender [...I one cannot deny the need for equalising the age of
retirement for men and women [...] . Finally , there is no doubt that
because of demographic ageing a balanced budget for the AVS is not
guaranteed in the long term' (BOAF. CN. 103, 9/3/93, pp. 222).
The Commission gave basically two reasons for raising the age of retirement for
women: compliance with the constitutional requirement of gender equality and
achievement of some savings in view of the predicted worsening of the
contributors/beneficiaries ratio within the state pension scheme. The decision to
adopt a retirement age of 64 for women, however, was not taken unanimously. In
fact, the National Council had to vote four different proposals on this issue.
Besides the majority proposal which was included in the final report, there were
three minority proposals. The first was supported by the Socialists and consisted of
a flexible retirement age for men and women between 62 and 65, without reduction
in the level of benefit but conditional upon giving up work. It was the same
proposal which had been presented in the joint document PSS/USS published in
20 This was the case of Walter Frei (PDC), Hugo Wick (PDC) and Toni Bortoluzzi of the ex-farmers'
party (UDC)
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1987. The second minority proposal was supported again by the Social-Democrats
and by a Christian-Democrat. In case of the first minority proposal not being
accepted, it requested to leave thing as they are, i.e. to have a differentiated age of
retirement for men and women at 65/62. There was a third minority proposal,
which came from the right-end of the political spectrum. It was supported by MPs
of the UDC (ex-farmer's party ) and by some right-wing MPs of smaller parties
and intended to equalise the age of retirement at 65. Unsurprisingly, the National
Council chose the majority proposal, which in some respect, however, represents a
compromise between the different options examined. It should be noted, in fact,
that the then majority party, the PRD initially supported a common retirement age of
65, but within the Commission it was decided to adopt a 65/64 arrangement.
The bill was then examined by the upper chamber, the Council of States, where it
was subject to some minor changes, and was subsequntly debated a number of
times in both chambers until the two could agree on a common version. The
decision of the USS to call a referendum because of the increase in the age of
retirement for women was made clear from the beginning, i.e. when the
commission's proposal was presented in the National Council. As a result, both
chambers tried to devise a new compromise which could have persuaded the trade
unions to abandon their plans to call a referendum. First, in the Council of States, it
was decided to adopt a smother transition period. For the first 4 years after the
adoption of the new law, it was going to be possible to retire at 62 without any
reduction in the benefit, and for the next 8 years, to take early retirement from 62
with a reduction of 3.4% per year of anticipation. The full reduction rate of 6.8%
(actuarially determined) would be in force only 12 years after the adoption of the
pension bill. (BOAF. CdE. 104, 8/6/94, pp. 546-612). The compromise was
accepted also by the National Council, but was not regarded as sufficient by the
unions, who persisted on the idea of calling a referendum. A second attempt to
avoid the referendum was made within the Social Security Commission of the
National Council. A majority of the Commission's members suggested to
differentiate in retirement age for women, according to whether one was still
working in the five-year period before 62 or not. If that was the case, then
retirement would have been possible at 62 without reduction until 2005, and
thereafter at 63, always without reduction. This last attempt to reach compromise,
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despite its complexity, did not manage to persuade the unions either. As a result,
the PRD and the PDC, whose members had approved the proposal made by the
commission, withdrew their support and the amendment was eventually
abandoned.
The referendum represented a big issue, especially within the left, because the new
law included provision on gender equality that the left (both the PSS and the
unions) had been backing for a long time. The introduction of a generous credit for
taking care of a child or a relative was also seen as an important social advance,
since it constituted a powerful recognition of the unpaid caring work carried out
mainly by women. The other side of the coin was, of course, the increase in
retirement age for women to 64, which was seen as unacceptable by the trade
unions and by the PSS. This was against what the left had been arguing recently,
i.e. that there should be a tendency towards lowering the age of retirement, in
order to free up jobs for the unemployed. The left, as seen above, was in favour of
a flexible retirement age between 62 and 65, regardless of sex and without
reduction in the level of the pension. This combination of elements which were
strongly supported and other elements which in contrast were powerfully opposed
in a single bill constituted a big dilemma for the left (Interview USS 3/5/96).
Referendums, in fact, can only be called on an entire bill, not on parts of it.
A last minute attempt to find a way round was made in Parliament in September
1994. The trade unionist and Socialist MP Christiane Brunner, speaking on behalf
of a minority of the Social Security Commission, proposed to split the pension
reform into two different acts. One included the articles on contribution credits and
on contribution-sharing for couples, while the second was only on the increase in
retirement age. This would have made possible to call a referendum only on
retirement age, without taking the risk, in case of rejection, to postpone the
introduction of gender equality, perhaps indefinitely. The proposal was repelled by
the two other main parties (PDC and PRD) and was defeated, although it managed
to attract the votes of some Liberal-Democrats and Christian-Democrats (BOAF.
CN. 104, 21/9/1994 pp. 1342-1368).
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The above analysis of the policy-making process in the area of pensions shows
quite powerfully the centripetal pressure exercised by the referendum threat. Up
to the last days before the final vote by Parliament, concessions were made to
convince the unions to drop their plan to call a referendum, though
unsuccessfully. This, in spite of the fact that acceptance by parliament of the
bill did not represent a problem for the right-wing majority. In addition, upon
closer scrutiny, the policy-making process which led to the adoption of the
1995 pension reform, contains various elements of compromise between the
different actors. The shape of final legislation was influenced by the proposals
made by the Socialists and the Liberal-Democrats, with the exception, of
course, of retirement age. The latter was imposed by the right-wing majority,
and constituted, perhaps, a compromise between the PRD, who supported
immediate equalisation at 65 and the PDC who advocated equalisation at 64 in
the next reform. The fact that the new retirement age of 65/64 will be phased in
over a 12-year period supports this interpretation. The 1995 pension reform
was not adopted consensually, nevertheless, the fact that each relevant actor
had managed to get some of its priorities included in the proposed legislation,
was going to strengthen the bill vis-a-vis the referendum challenge.
The referendum
The decision to call a referendum was taken jointly by the federation of Swiss
Unions (USS) and by the Christian unions (CSC). For the USS, the inclusion
of an increased retirement age for women could not be accepted. In fact, the
general trend in USS pension policy was towards a reduction in retirement
age. The USS (together with the PSS) had previously collected signatures for
an initiative which proposed, among other things, the introduction of a
flexible retirement age for men and women between 62 and 65 without
reduction of benefit, but conditional upon giving up work 21 . For this reason it
was not conceivable for the unions to accept an increase in women's
retirement age. On the other hand, however, if the bill was to be defeated in a
referendum, also the improvements of provision for women would have been
rejected, and these had been long advocated by the unions. To avoid this
21 The vote on the USS/PSS initiative took place on the same day as the pension reform referendum
(25/6/96). The proposal and was rejected by 72% of voters.
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dilemma, the USS and the CSC decided to collect the 50,000 signatures needed to
call a referendum, but at the same time, to call a second referendum (initiative) with
the aim of introducing, after the possible defeat of the pension bill in the
referendum, what they regarded as the 'good' elements of the 1995 pension
reform, i.e. contribution-sharing and credits (interview USS 1/5/96).
A similar dilemma faced the leadership of the Socialist party. They too were against
raising retirement age for women, but this was not the point any longer. In fact, the
referendum was going to be on the whole bill, so that a division within the party
emerged as to whether the good elements of the reform outweighed the bad ones,
or vice versa (PSS 1995). The situation of the PSS was further complicated by the
fact that the minister responsible for social security was now Ruth Dreyfuss, a
Socialist, who had to comply with the majority view of the government. Her view
on the issue was the following:
'It is most unfortunate that the issue of raising women's retirement age
has been tied to the improvements of the pension reform [...] I keep on
thinking that this measure was not needed in this reform. Nevertheless,
my support for the reform is based on a conviction that the positive
elements of the reform outweigh the negative ones' (Dreyfuss, in TSR
1995).
The leadership of the Socialist party decided to deal with the dilemma by consulting
party members. Some 30% of them took part to a ballot, of whom 66% were in
favour of the reform (Securite sociale 2/1995: 59). The result was that the official
voting recommendation of the PSS was to accept the 1995 pension reform.
For other parties and organisations the decision on whether to support or not the
referendum was a fairly straightforward one. In general, all other main parties had
supported the reform in Parliament, so that they were going to recommend to back
the pension bill to their supporters. Similarly, the two main employers associations
(the UCAPS and the USCI) favoured the new pension bill. Women's organisations
were divided, those more left-wing oriented being against and their right-wing
counterparts being in favour of the pension bill. The overall picture before the
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referendum, was one where the unions were mainly alone in fighting the pension
bill. Nevertheless there was some concern among federal authorities that the bill
could be defeated in the referendum. According to a civil servant, there was
concern that conservative-catholic voters might join the unions in rejecting the
proposal, as the conception of the family on which the new law was based did not
reflect traditional views on gender roles (interview OFAS 25/4/96). Concern for the
outcome of the referendum was also reflected by the important campaign launched
by the federal office of social insurance through its periodical Securite sociale.
Almost half of the 2/1995 issue addressed the pension reform, and included articles
by Ruth Dreyfuss and Walter Seiler, then director of the office, in support of the
bill.
The vote took place on the 25th of June 1995. The turnout was of 40.4%, which is
the norm22 and saw a relatively clear prevalence of those in favour of the bill
(60.7%). There were cantonal variations though, as the bill was accepted in all
German-speaking cantons but was rejected in four out of six French-speaking
cantons and in the Italian canton. According to an opinion poll carried out just after
the vote, the best predictor of voters behaviour was not language but party
preference. Among those who said they supported one of the three right-wing
government parties (PRD, PDC and UDC), the proportion of yes voters was some
10 percentage points higher than the average (Vox 1995). The survey inquired also
about the reasons given for voting yes or no in the referendum. The results are
reported in table 5.4.
22Depending on the year, the average turnout at referendums is between 35% and 45% (Kriesi 1995:
114).
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Table 5.4. Reasons for accepting or rejecting the 1995 pension reform in the
referendum (spontaneous r lies, multiple answers wer ossible)
REASONS FOR VOTING 'YES' % REASONS FOR VOTING 'NO' %
1. It is a—general improvement 25 1. Higher retirement age for
women
59
2. Higher retirement age for
women
10 2. Unemployment 20
3. Gender equality 17 2. It is a drawback 10
4. Contribution splitting 14 4. Was not necessary 3
5. Contribution credits 15
6. Savings 6 .
7. Recommended by government 8
Source: Vox 1995
As table 5.4 shows, the main division in the electorate was between those who
believed that the positive aspects outweighed the negative ones on the 'yes' side,
and those who believed the opposite on the `no' side. The reasons given by a clear
majority of 'yes' voters concern the improvement side of the bill (items 1,3,4 and
5). According to the poll, only a minority would have supported the bill regardless
of the presence of these improvements (items 2,6 and 7). The bill would have
encountered stronger opposition if it had not included elements which were widely
regarded as improvements.
Conversely, among `no' voters, the main reason for opposing the bill was,
overwhelmingly, the increase in women's retirement age (59%). Items 2 and 3 in
fact refer to the same reason, as an increase in retirement age is expected have an
impact on unemployment. The 'unholy' alliance between the left and Catholic-
conservative voters, feared by federal authorities, did not take place. Only 3% of
`no' voters rejected the bill on grounds that it was not needed, the only item which
might imply a preference for the traditional vision of the married couple upheld by
the pre-reform system.
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Data from table 5.4 suggests that an increase in retirement age for women, adopted
independently from the improvement side of the bill would have been at a much
higher risk of being defeated in a referendum. What made possible the only
retrenchment element of the reform was its combination with a series of
improvements. This conclusion must be taken carefully, though, because we have
no guarantee that respondents replied with their genuine motives. Possibly, they
might have followed the recommendation of their party or group of reference and
subsequently rationalised their choice backing it up with a sensible argument23.
However, the fact that, always according to the same opinion polls some 30% 24 of
voters who said they identified with one of the three right-wing government parties
voted against the bill, lends support to the hypothesis that an increase in women's
retirement age would not have been accepted if not accompanied by improvements.
5.4. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE 1995 PENSION REFORM
As anticipated in the previous sections, the 1995 pension reform includes three
main elements: the introduction of a contribution sharing system for married
couples, of contribution credits for informal care providers, and the increase in
women's retirement age. In this section, I will look at the details of these measures.
Contribution sharing system
This is perhaps the most innovative and element of the 1995 pension reform. The
basis of the sharing system is the introduction of an individual entitlement to a
pension regardless of gender and marital status and the computation of half of
contributions paid by a married couple for each spouse individually. This implies
the abolition of the couple pension, as from now on each of the two spouses will be
entitled to an individual pension. The way the splitting system works is shown in
figure 5.1. Contributions paid before marriage are counted 100% for each of the
23 The validity of this interpretation depends also on the reliability of opinion poll results.
Interestingly, the proportion of 'yes' voters found in the opinion poll (59.5%) is very close to the
actual referendum outcome (60.7%). This is not always the case as differences of up to 10 percentage
points can be found. This suggests that respondents had relatively strong views on how to vote and
felt that their choice was legitimate, which arguably strengthen the findings of the opinion poll.
24This is a rather high rate of 'party indiscipline' among referendum voters. According to a study the















two spouses; contributions paid by either of them during marriage are counted 50%
for each, as well as contribution credits.
Figure 5.1.: The Contribution sharing system
There were two main problems with the introduction of contribution sharing and
the abolition of a couple pension. On the one hand, one-earner couples were going
to be penalised, because instead of a couple pension worth 150% of the husband's
entitlement, they were going to receive two individual pensions, each based on
50% of the husband's contribution record, which in any case was going to be
lower than a former couple pension. On the other hand, the new system was going
to favour two earners couples, as again a couple pension of 150% of the husbands
entitlement was going to be replaced by two individual pensions worth up to 100%
of the husband's entitlement (assuming similar career pattern and earnings between
the two).
Two elements were introduced to deal with this issue. The situation of one-earner
couples was improved with the introduction of a relatively generous contribution
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credit for those providing informal care, while it was decided to introduce a ceiling
for couples with both spouses receiving a pension corresponding to 150% of the
maximum pension. Since the ceiling is based on the maximum pension, this
measure affects mainly couples on high earnings. It should be noted that one-earner
couples without children and which are not taking care—of elderly or disabled
relatives are in fact disadvantaged by the contribution sharing system.
Contribution credits
Contribution credits are granted to persons with children or providing other sorts of
informal care (for instance to an elderly or a disabled relative). The amount credited
corresponds to the contributions paid on a salary equal to 3 times the minimum
pension, or 54% of average earnings. The credit is granted irrespective of whether
the carer(s) give(s) up work. In the case of children, the credit is granted for as
long as the household includes persons below the age of 16. Like actual
contributions, the contribution credit is split between the members of a couple (see
figure 5.1).
It should be noted that the impact of the credit is higher for one-earner couples and
for couples with low earnings. As earnings increase, its impact decreases. In the
case of a couple in which both members earn 107% of average earnings or more,
contribution credits do not add anything to their pension entitlements, because both
spouses receive the maximum pension anyway.
Retirement age
The retirement age for women was raised from 62 to 64. This will be achieved over
a relatively long transition period. The new pension legislation came into force in
January 1997, but until 2000 women will be able to retire at 62 without any loss in
the level of their benefit. Between 2001 and 2004 the standard retirement age for
women will be 63, but it will be possible to retire at 62 with a reduction of 3.4% in
the level of the benefit. Between 2005 and 2008 the standard retirement age for
women will be 64, though it will be possible to retire at 62 or at 63, always with a
3.4% reduction of the pension per year of anticipation. The transition period will
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end in 2009. Then the retirement age will be 64, and early retirement will still be
possible, but with a reduction of 6.8% in the level of the benefit, which
corresponds to the actuarially determined rate. Early retirement is possible for men
as well, though with a reduction rate of 6.8% per year of anticipation since its
introduction.
The fact that the increase in women's retirement age is going to be phased in over a
relatively long period of time means that the financial impact of the 1995 pension
reform will be an increase in expenditure for the first few years. In fact, the
improvements (contribution sharing and credits) come into force immediately.
Nevertheless, by 2009, when the standard retirement age for women will have
reached 64, the overall impact of the reform will be to generate annual savings of
Sfr 142 million - (at 1993 prices), which corresponds to 0.6% of 1993 outlays.
During the transitional period, however, additional costs are expected to amount to
some Sfr 9 billion (OFAS 1995a: 82-83). In the long run, thus, the overall impact
of the reform is cost neutral.
5.5. CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF
WELFARE RETRENCHMENT
One of the key questions emerging from the analysis of the Swiss case is whether it
is possible to reach viable compromises on the adoption of retrenchment measures
of social insurance schemes. As seen above, the extent and the degree of influence
that institutions allow to external interest, means that the Swiss political machine
can function conveniently only if policy-makers are able to generate a generalised
consensus on their policy proposals. In the past, during the expansion phase of the
AVS pension scheme, it was certainly easier to achieve consensus among the
relevant actors. Between 1950 and 1979, the AVS scheme was reformed nine
times. These reforms consisted mainly of improvements in the generosity of the
scheme. Interestingly, out of nine reforms, only one (the 9th) was challenged by a
referendum. The other reforms were adopted without serious controversy and in
four cases by unanimous vote in both chambers of parliament. Improvements in the
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quality of pensions were highly popular with the electorate, so that it was in the
interests of political actors to be associated with these widely supported reforms.
In contrast, the current phase of retrenchment takes place at a time when the public
has got used to high standards of welfare provision. Policy-makers find it difficult
to reconcile the level of public expectation with budgetary constraints. As a result,
retrenchment policies tend to be more unpopular than expansion ones. As Pierson
put it, retrenchment constitutes 'an exercise in blame avoidance' (1994:2). The
politics of retrenchment is different from the politics of expansion also with regard
to the impact it has on broad coalition formation patterns. In the past, the overall
popularity of measures aimed at improving the coverage of social programmes was
a powerful incentive for political actors to be part of the pro-expansion coalition.
Policy-makers of different orientations had a clear interest in being associated with
widely supported reforms, as this made electoral reward likely. In contrast, when
policy change entails unpopular measures it is rational for actors who want to
maximise their public support to abandon the pro-retrenchment coalition. This
mechanism, which certainly played a role in the process which led to the adoption
of the 1995 pension reform, is of crucial importance in the Swiss context, where,
because of the institutional structure, policy change requires the support of large
coalitions of parties and interest groups.
As seen above (5.1), the Swiss inclination for consensual politics has been widely
interpreted as the result of a particular institutional environment, which grants to
minorities the opportunity to intervene at various stages of the law-making process.
If this interpretation is correct, the inadequacy of the standard consensus building
procedure to deal with current issues in the area of social policy, cannot be dealt
with through the introduction of a majoritarian form of policy-making. Swiss
institutions, in particular the referendum, do not allow a majority government to
rule effectively. As a result, it becomes relevant to address the question of what will
replace the consensual approach to policy, if its most widespread alternative,
majoritarian policy-making, does not seem to be an available option for
Switzerland?
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The analysis of the process which led to the adoption of the 1995 pension
reform is instructive in this respect. The standard decision-making procedures
were unable to produce a compromise which could be regarded as satisfactory
by all key actors. The 1990 pension bill, subsequently radically reviewed by
parliament, constituted the minimum common denominator of the objectives of
the main political actors. The government, because of its composition
(ministers belonging to 4 different parties), and because of the well established
practice of taking decisions collegially, seems to have been unable to come up
with anything more than the minimum change required in order to comply with
the constitutional article for gender equality. The result was that while being
acceptable to all relevant parts, the bill was widely regarded as unsatisfactory,
as it did not include provision for individual pensions regardless of gender and
marital status. After 1990, the pension bill became the responsibility of
parliament, which, in comparison to the government, is a much more
majoritarian institution. There, within the Social Security Commission of the
National Council, a more far reaching version of the reform was elaborated.
But consensus was lost. Change was brought about by a short-lived coalition
between the Socialists and the Liberal-Democrats, who agreed on the principle
of introducing a contribution sharing and credit system. Nevertheless, they
disagreed on whether or not additional cost should be compensated by an
increase in women's retirement age. The result was that while the first part of
the new pension bill, i.e. contribution splitting and credits, were supported by
virtually all political parties, its second part, the increase in women's retirement
age to 64, was imposed by the right-wing majority.
The two measures, however, were included in a single piece of legislation. As a
result, the left was unable to challenge the one element of retrenchment, the
increase in women's retirement age, without taking the risk of undermining the
parts of the bill it supported. The combination of elements of retrenchment and
expansion in a single piece of legislation was imposed by the right-wing
parliamentary majority against the will of the left. This strategy, of combining
different components in a single act, can be regarded as a substitute for
consensus. The bill, in fact, included a retrenchment element which satisfied
the right-wing majority. At the same time, however, it also comprised widely
supported expansion measures. The result was that in the referendum,
the combination of these two elements was likely to be
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supported more widely than the simple adoption of a higher retirement age for
women.
The opinion poll carried out on the referendum (Vox 1995, see above table 5.4)
indicates that only 10% of those who voted `ye el did so because they supported a
higher retirement age for women. In contrast, at least 59% of those who voted 'no'
did so because they were against that measure. This suggests, quite powerfully,
that it would have been much more difficult for the majority to get an increase in
retirement age alone accepted in a referendum. The combination of measures of
different nature in a single reform contributed to widen its support basis, and thus
to its success at the polls. In addition, this strategy proved an effective tool for
blame avoidance for the right-wing majority, who were able to avoid to be
identified as retrenchers. In fact, media exposure of a bill is highest during the
referendum campaign. At this stage, retrenchment advocates can focus their support
on the popular parts of the bill, and do not need to a openly argue in favour the
unpopular ones. This is precisely what happened in the referendum on the 1995
pension reform. The right-wing majority was able to campaign in favour of the
reform, without explicitly supporting the increase in women's retirement age. It is
instructive to point out that the organisers of a televised debate on the pension
reform referendum were unable to find a speaker who would argue in favour of
raising retirement age for women per se (TSR, 10/6/95). Those who were
responsible for the introduction of this measure in the bill were now arguing that
perhaps a higher retirement age for women was not particularly desirable, but, as it
was part of a wider reform, it had to be accepted since the remaining measures were
highly positive and badly needed.
It seems thus, that despite the change in the direction of policy, institutions are still
exerting a significant impact on Swiss policy-making. The pressures for consensus
remain strong. This was shown by the several attempts made to avoid the
referendum and, perhaps, also by the apparently odd decision to chose a retirement
age of 65/64, which still does not comply with gender equality. When the
referendum became inevitable, then the right-wing majority had to maximise the
chances of winning it, hence their refusal to go along with the proposal of dividing
the reform into two different pieces of legislation and take separate votes. The
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combination of expansion and retrenchment within a single piece of legislation
proved an effective strategy for the right-wing majority to deal with the uncertainty





THE SEARCH FOR AN ELUSIVE CONSENSUS
As far as theory is concerned, France is probably the most interesting case among
those covered by this study. Policy-makers unintentionally created ideal
conditions for testing hypotheses concerning the determinants of pension policy
and the factors that favour or hamper success in pension reform. In the space of
only two years, two very similar plans for pension reform were put forward. The
first one concerned only private sector employees and was successfully
transformed into law in summer 1993. The second one, in 1995, consisted of the
extension of the same measures to public sector employees. It generated a massive
wave of strikes, mainly among rail workers, and as a result the government was
forced to withdraw its plan.
In this chapter, I try to answer the question of why two very similar plans for the
reform of pensions generated such different public reactions. In line with the
theoretical approach adopted in this study, particular attention is paid to
institutional factors, though other possibile explanations are also considered.
6.1. INSTITUTIONS AND PATTERNS OF POLICY MAKING
Political scientists have generally considered France as a country where policy-
making is characterised by a substantial degree of centralisation. Typically,
public policy is decided at the top with little or no negotiation with external
interests. In his comprehensive study of interest-group politics in France, Wilson
has pointed out that, albeit with some exceptions, the relationship between the
state and organised interests in France is characterised by 'a power situation of a
state capable of resisting interests and proceeding with its own ends regardless of
group pressures' (Wilson 1987: 238). This view is reflected in the literature on
corporatism, which typically views France as a counter-example. Lijphart and
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Crepaz, in their review of expert opinion on the degree of corporatism in various
countries, found that France is most often considered as one of the least
corporatist countries (1991: 240). Tripartite negotiations between employers, trade
unions and the government in the areas of social and economic policy did not
develop in France as they did in other European countries.
The absence of corporatist practices in France has been explained with reference
to the asymmetry of power between, on the one hand, the state and organised
interests on the other (Kriesi 1994; Merrien 1991). As seen in chapter 2, a key pre-
condition for corporatism is a relatively balanced power relationship between the
various institutional and socio-economic actors which interact in the policy-
making process. Such balanced relationship cannot be found in France.
Historically, the modern French state is the result of a long cumulative process of
power concentration within the top level of the bureaucratic apparatus. (Badie and
Birnbaum 1979). Economic development was to a very large extent instigated by
the state, during both the industrial revolution and the post war boom. After War
World II, planning was adopted as a standard instrument of economic policy and
had, until the mid-1970s, an effective impact on the French economy (Hall 1986:
140ff). In addition, the existence of a relatively large state owned industrial and
financial sector has further increased the grip of the state on society and on the
economy. Finally, the creation in 1945 of a specialised school (ENA - Ecole
Nationale d' Administration) where virtually all top civil servants are educated,
guarantees a community of background and views among bureaucrats.
It should be stressed that the use of the term 'state' instead of 'government' is not
incidental. Power is not always concentrated in the hands of the government, as
substantial influence is exerted by a few top layers of officials within the civil
service. While carrying out the interviews needed for this study, I was impressed
by the ease with which high rank officials of the Ministry of Social Affairs were
openly critical of current government policy. To some extent, the impression they
gave was that they believed themselves to be the ones who knew what needed to
be done in order to deal with the relevant issues. They considered themselves to be
aware of the general interest, while all other actors, like trade unions, employers
and politicians, were seen to be after their own. This attitude is in sharp contrast
with what I was able to observe in Switzerland and in the UK, where the
obedience and respect of civil servants for the respective governments seemed
much more substantial.
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On the other hand, organised interests cannot match the impressive level of power
resources available to the state. First, with regard to labour, France has one of the
lowest unionisation rates in the Western world. While the exact number of
unionised_employees is not known, it is believed to be between 10% and 14% of
the workforce (Join-Lambert 1994: 110). In addition, the labour movement is
divided along ideological lines. As a result, there are five major national
federations of trade unions, which operate independently from each other. The
divisions reflect the political spectrum. Starting from the left, the Confederation
Generale du Travail (COT) is of Communist inspiration. Force Ouvriere (FO)
originated from a division within the CGT in 1947 and constitutes its non-
Communist component (it is sometimes referred to as CGT-FO). The
Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC) is a federation of
Catholic unions. Finally, the Confederation Francaise Democratique des
Travailleurs (CFDT), emerged from a division of the CFTC and constitutes the
non-religious component. In recent years it has been much more cooperative with
the government than its counterparts. Finally, there is also a federation
representing managers (CFE-CGC Confederation Francaise de l'Encadrement -
Confederation Generale des Cadres).
On the employers' side, interest representation is more integrated, as the only
division is between large companies belonging to the Conseil National du
Patronnat Francais (CNPF) and small and medium size firms (CGPME). The
CNPF, however, because it represents companies with a wide range of different
and possibly conflicting interests, is effective only in defending basic and
common interests of French employers. That is why large firms rely more on
individual lobbying rather than representation through the CNPF. The result is of
course a substantial weakening of the institution (Kriesi 1994).
France thus, with a strong state and a weak and fragmented system of interest
intermediation, lacks the preconditions needed in order to establish corporatist
practices. Organised interests are consulted selectively, and their position is not
seen as a basis for negotiation. Policy is imposed by the central government.
Among the consequences of this approach to policy-making is the inability of the
government to exert some sort of control over the reactions of the public to its
decisions. This, coupled with an extraordinary mobilising capacity of the trade
unions, explains the relative frequent occurrence of protest movements, which on
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occasions have been rather effective in forcing the government to abandon
unpopular policies.
This analysis of French politics refers to broad and general trends, and it is
accurate on that level. However, if one looks at the details of different areas of
policy and of various combinations of political contingencies, one will find that
this interpretation of the way French politics works, needs to be somewhat
nuanced. In the following sections, it will be argued that there are two particular
instances, both relevant to the understanding of pension reform politics, in which
the interpretation reviewed above does not seem to be entirely satsifactory. This is
the case when the two key institutions of the French political system, the
presidency and parliament, are controlled by different parties; as well as within the
area of social security policy.
The politics of cohabitation
In the French political jargon, the word cohabitation refers to a situation in which
the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister belong to two different
parties. The fact that Parliament and the President are both elected directly and in
two different polls makes this possible. The likelihood of having a majority in
Parliament and a President belonging to the opposition party is further increased
by the fact that presidential and general elections do not occur at the same time
and have different political cycles. Parliament is renewed every 5 years while
presidential elections are fought every 7 years. The result is that between the two
contests there may be substantial swings in public opinion, which can result in a
situation of cohabitation.
Since the establishment of the Fifth Republic, cohabitation has occurred three
times: first, between 1986 and 1988 with Mitterrand President and Chirac Prime
Minister; second, between 1993 and 1995 with Mitterrand President and Balladur
Prime Minister and finally, since May 1997 with Chirac President and Jospin
Prime Minister. On all these occasions, the power of the French President has been
substantially reduced. When President and Prime Minister belong to the same
party, it is the former who plays the key role in deciding policy. Prime Ministers
are chosen by the President and, since the latter is the key figure within his or her
party, there are good chances that the person selected will be supported by
parliament. In case of incompatibility emerging between the two figures, the
President can always sack the Prime Minister. The result is that, in what is
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regarded to be the 'normal' situation, the President is the one who decides the
orientation of government policy.
The balance of power is reversed when the two figures belong to different parties.
In that case, the President has very little influence on the selection of a Prime
Minister. Although formally it is always the President who makes this decision, in
practice he or she is forced to choose the candidate supported by the majority of
parliament. The result is that in times of cohabitation, it is in fact the Prime
Minister who determines the general orientation of government policy (Duverger
1987; Bigaut 1995). This was precisely what happened in 1986-1988, when
Jacques Chirac was Prime Minister. The latter adopted a series of typically right-
wing social and economic policies, such as privatisation of state owned
companies and welfare retrenchment. Some of these policies proved extremely
unpopular, and certainly contributed to his defeat in the 1988 presidential election.
The first cohabitation ended in 1988, when Mitterrand won a second term in
office and called an early general election which gave a majority to the left.
This situation was repeated after 1993, when the right-wing coalition won that
year's general election. There is little doubt that when Balladur became Prime
Minister, a key concern for him was to avoid a repetition of what had happened in
1988. In fact, being himself a presidential candidate for the 1995 election, he
could not afford to adopt unpopular measures and thus take the risk to alienate
public support. This combination of contingent factors resulted in a situation in
which the standard law-making process became impractical for the French
government. To impose policies from the top, possibly against the will of external
interests, entailed a considerable element of risk. As one commentator put it:
'The decision of the Prime Minister [Balladur] to run for President in
the 1995 election acted as a brake on the government's action. [...]
Edouard Balladur was in a position in which he could not upset too
large sections of public opinion. He had to avoid a return to popularity
of the Socialists and the loss of legitimacy of his candidature.' (Bigaut
1995: 9)
In fact, during the two years he spent in office as Prime Minister, Balladur
renounced to impose controversial measures on a number of occasions. For
instance, when the government tried to reduce the level of the statutory minimum
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wage for young unemployed people a trade union-led protest movement forced
the withdrawal of the relevant bill. The same happened with a reform in the
education system which would have expanded the private sector as well as with a
plan to restructure the state-owned airline Air France. In sum, during his term in
office, Balladur tried to avoid conflict as much as poscible, and seemingly
renounced the centralised approach to policy-making that is typical of France. As
will be seen below, this particular contingent situation, cohabitation coupled with
the upcoming Presidential election, played an important role in determining the
government's approach to pension reform.
The politics of securite sociale
The structure of the French social security system is relevant to understanding
why policy-makers decided to follow a given path to pension reform. To some
extent, the position of the different actors within the system determines what their
interests are, and creates opportunities for negotiation that do not exist in other
countries. A key element in this context is the fact that social insurance in France
is managed jointly by the social partners. This affects in a significant way the
trade unions - government relationship in matters of social insurance reform.
While in most other countries the controversy between government and trade
unions concerns mainly the level of provision, in France the issue of who controls
the system is also one of paramount importance. Here I will concentrate on the
implications of this particular institutional design on the politics of social security.
A more detailed description of the French pension system is provided in the next
section.
The French social protection system can be characterised as a dual welfare state.
Its main component is a wide-ranging social insurance system, referred to as
Securite sociale l . It is almost entirely financed through employment-related
contributions and provides earnings-related benefits. Securite sociale, in theory
at least, works according to the principles of social insurance, which implies a
relatively strong connection between what one pays into the system
(contributions) and what one gets out of it (benefits)2.
1 Sicurite sociale provides coverage for health care, basic pension and family benefits.
Unemployment insurance was set up at a later stage (1959) and is not part of the social security. Its
organisational structure, however, is very similar to that of the main system, as it is also managed
jointly by the social partners, contribution financed and grants contributory benefits.
2 For an informed discussion on the principles of social insurance, see Clasen 1997
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The second component of the French welfare state, which is referred to as
solidarite nationale, consists of non-contributory schemes, generally designed to
cater for those who have been unable to build up an adequate contribution record.
The distinction between the two systems, however, is more theoretical and
normative than real. Social insurance schemes have been amended numerous
times since 1945, and currently contain elements of both components. This is
especially the case with health insurance, where coverage is granted on a non-
contributory basis to a number of disadvantaged categories (such as long-term
unemployed people), and with the family benefits scheme, which since 1978 has
lost its insurance character and now grants universal and means-tested benefits
only.
The same is true for pensions. While the bulk of pension expenditure goes to
contributory benefits, there are a number of exceptions to the social insurance
principle. For instance, older people who do not have a sufficient contribution
record to be entitled to what is regarded as an adequate pension, are eligible for an
income-tested minimum pension (minimum de vieillesse). In addition, there are
measures such as contribution credits granted to unemployed persons and parents
raising children which are also considered to be alien to social insurance.
Of crucial importance here, is the fact that the social insurance system (Securite
sociale) is managed jointly by employees' and employers' representatives. This is
what was agreed in 1945, when the existing system was set up. At that time, it
was the trade unions (particularly the CGT, which was dominant) which insisted
for this type of arrangements (Guillemard 1986). Since then, the trade unions have
always shown a strong attachment to joint management by employers and
employees. This is understandable. First, to take part in the management of social
security gives the unions an important degree of visibility and of legitimacy in
the eyes of public opinion. It has been argued, in fact, that the managerial role
played by the unions in social insurance somewhat compensates for their
relatively low unionisation rates (Rosanvallon 1995: 81). Second, and not
unimportantly, social insurance schemes constitute an important source of
employment for trade unions' members.
In contrast, the non-insurance component of the French welfare state (solidarite
nationale) is considered to be the responsibility of the government. In fact the two
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systems are generally seen as two different sets of policies, which have to be kept
separated. For instance, according to Rosanvallon:
'Social insurance should be distinguished from solidaritg nationale
[non-contributory element]: this cry is becoming one of the most
widespread platitudes of the end of this century. Everything, from
administrative constraints to philosophical uncertainties, is pulling in
that direction' (Rosanvallon 1995: 82).
The two components are regarded as two coherent and independent sets of
elements. For instance, social insurance has to be strictly contributory, grant
earnings related-benefits and is to be managed by the social partners. Solidarite
nationale, in contrast, is financed through general taxation, managed by the
government, and grants non-contributory benefits. This is a relatively widespread
normative perception, which, as seen above, is not always strictly followed.
The implementation of the distinction between the two systems, however,
becomes problematic because of its political implications 3 . As argued elsewhere
(Bonoli and Palier 1997a), governments of different political orientations, have
tried to increase their control over the social insurance system. To some extent,
increased state control over the system is seen by the government as a
precondition for the adoption of successful cost containment measures. Needless
to say, such moves are strenuously resisted by the trade unions, who might risk to
loose their influence in the management of the system. The conflict between trade
unions and the government for the control of the social insurance system has been
going on for at least a decade. However, it seems to have reached its climax in
recent years, particularly during the 1995 wave of strikes against the Juppe plan,
which among other things included provision to extend the control of government
over the social insurance.
The organisational structure of French social insurance, and particularly the
managerial role played by the unions, has some important implications for the
politics of pension reform. First, since social insurance is widely seen as
something belonging to the realm of employment (as opposed to a state policy),
3 In this respect, France is not a unique case in Europe. In particular debates in Germany on the
relative roles of social insurance and non-contributory provision refer to a similar notion of a
strict distinction between the two components. There the presence of non-contributory elements
within the social insurance system is regarded as a 'alien provision' (Fremdleistungen).)
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trade unions find it easier to mobilise public opinion on matters relating to social
insurance than is the case in other areas of public policy. This undoubtedly puts
considerable pressure on the government to adopt a more cooperative approach to
reform in the area of social insurance than is the case in other areas of public
policy. Second, and most importantly, trade union& have a clear set of demands
with regard to the control and the management of social insurance. This allows
some additional scope for negotiation and creates the opportunity for non-zero
sum games to take place. For instance, the government can trade retrenchment in
the level of provision with concessions on the management side of social
insurance. As will be seen below, this is precisely what happened in the 1993
pension reform, and arguably what made it politically feasible. A similar quid pro
quo was not sought in 1995, hence the failure of Juppe s attempt to reform public
sector pensions.
Policy-making patterns and pension reform
The analysis of pension reform in France put forward in this chapter is based on
the hypothesis that two institutional factors played a substantial role in
determining the government's approach to change and the fortunes of government
policy. First, cohabitation, coupled with the upcoming presidential election,
persuaded the right-wing Balladur government to adopt a relatively cooperative
stance in the 1993 reform as far as the unions were concerned. Second, the fact
that social security is managed by the unions (jointly with employers) gave him
the opportunity to trade cutbacks in provision with guarantees concerning the
control of the system.
The situation was reversed in 1995 when the Juppe government tried to extend
the measures adopted in the 1993 reform to the public sector. The right-wing
majority then controlled both the presidency and parliament. With the next
general election scheduled for 1998, the government was under no pressure to
negotiate with the social partners over the content of pension reform, and it did
not. The result, however, was a massive protest movement that eventually forced
the government to renounce its plans for public sector pension reform.
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6.2. THE FRENCH PENSION SYSTEM4
The current structure of the French pension system is characterised by an
impressive degree of fragmentation along occupational lines. Its origins go back
to 1945, when French_ social reformers, under the influence of the Beveridge
report, set out to create a comprehensive and universal social security system
(Kerschen 1995). Their explicit intention was to develop a scheme which would
have incorporated all the existing ones, thereby achieving the goal of universality.
This ambition, however, proved to be an excessive one. A separate scheme for
farmers was accepted from the beginning, given the different socio-economic
profile of this group5 . In addition, immediately after the introduction of the
Regime general, it became clear that groups already covered by pension
arrangements, mainly public sector employees, had no intention to join the
newborn social security system, and were allowed to maintain their own.
Similarly, various groups of self-employed who felt economically secure enough
on their own, declined to join the general scheme (Baldwin 1990: 252-287)
As a result France has a pension system which distinguishes between four large
collectivities: waged employees in industry and commerce who are covered by the
regime general (65%); farmers (3%); public sector employees (20%) and the self-
employed (12%). The last two groups, moreover, are further fragmented
according to employer or profession. Within the public sector, for instance, there
are separate schemes for civil servants; local government employees; miners; rail
workers; electricity and gas employees. In general, with the exception of miners,
public sector employees enjoy a more generous treatment than their counterparts.
In order to reduce the impracticality of pension fragmentation, a system of 'inter-
regime compensation' was introduced in 1974, which consists of actuarially
determined cash transfers from schemes with a favourable demographic profile
towards those which are worse off. In practice the regime general subsidises
schemes such as the ones for farmers or for miners, which currently have among
4 The following description refers only to basic pensions. In addition, however, most French
workers are covered by a second tier of provision known as 'regimes complementaires% Since
pension reform affected only basic pensions, these are not treated here. For a good presentation of
second-tier pension in France, see Reynaud 1994).
5 According to Dupeyroux and Pretot (1993: 113), among the key reasons for having a separate
scheme for farmers were the unfavourable demographic profile; the individual quality of farming,
and the slower growth rate of incomes relative to industry and services, which implies that farmers
are unable to contribute to a social insurance system on the same basis as other professions. The
scheme, in fact, is heavily subsidised.
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their members more retirees than contributors. These cash transfers, however, are
supplemented by government subsidies for schemes which have been particularly
disadvantaged by socio-economic developments, particularly by low wage
growth. (Chatagner 1993: 53; Reynaud 1994: 12).
The regime general (general scheme)
All private sector employees (except in agriculture) are covered by the regime
general. The scheme is financed through employers' and employees
contributions and provides earnings-related benefits. Contributions are 14.75%
(employer: 8.2%; employee: 6.55%) of gross salary, with a ceiling 6 ; and an
additional contribution of 1.6% of gross salary without ceiling for the employer
only. With regard to benefits, before the 1993 reform, a full pension of 50% of
reference salary was granted to those who had paid contributions for 37.5 years
(now 40 years). For shorter contribution records the pension is reduced
correspondingly. The reference salary was calculated on the basis of earnings
over the last 10 years (now 25).
Retirement age is at 60 for both men and women. However, someone with an
inadequate contribution record can go on working until he or she fulfils the
qualifying conditions for a full pension, or reaches 65. Those who retire at 65 are
entitled to a full pension regardless of their contribution record. For shorter
contribution periods, the pension is reduced by 5 percentage points for each
missing year. Longer contribution periods, however, are not compensated with
higher pensions since the 50% replacement rate is considered as the maximum
level. (Dupeyroux and Pretot 1993: 50 ff.).
In addition to contributory pensions, the regime general provides means-tested
coverage for older persons whose income is below around 55% of an average net
wage (Join-Lambert 1994: 365). The means-tested pension, known as the
minimum vieillesse, is a key source of income for the very old (over 80) and for
lone elderly women. Althought it is managed by the regime general, the
minimum pension is granted regardless of the former occupation of the recipient.
Means-tested pensions are used mainly by workers who, because of the late
introduction of old age insurance were unable to build up an adequate
contribution record. As younger generations have started reaching retirement age,
6 The ceiling is set at around 120% of the average net wage (Joint-Lambert 1994: 301)
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the number of beneficiaries of the minimum vieillesse has fallen dramatically from
2.5 million in 1960 to 1.3 million in 1990 (Livre Blanc 1991: 62).
The regimes speciaux (separate schemes)
As seen above, the existence of separate schemes comes from the fact that a
number of occupational groups who already had pension coverage in 1945, when
the current social security system was created, declined to join it. In fact, these
schemes constitute the legacy of the first efforts in the area of provision for
retirement. Like in other industrial countries among the first groups covered by a
pension arrangement were the civil service, seamen, rail workers, gas and
electricity workers, and so forth. Separate schemes, which are generally more
generous than the general scheme, have not been incorporated into it. At the end
of World War II there were some 160 of them. Currently there are about 100, of
which only 15 accept new members. Altogether, separate schemes have 4.4
million members and provide pension coverage for some 3 million retirees
(Reynaud 1994: 12).
Pension formula and qualifying conditions vary according to the various schemes,
but they are generally more generous than it is the case in the general scheme. For
instance, the scheme for civil servants uses the last salary as a reference salary,
and the pension is calculated as 2% of reference salary per year of contribution.
The full pension, granted after 37.5 contribution years, corresponds thus to 75%
of the last salary, well above the 50% granted by the general scheme (Reynaud
1994: 12)7 . Retirement age can also be lower than in the general scheme. For
instance, train drivers of the national railways company (SNCF) and of the
Parisian underground (RATP) retire at 50; some employees of the national
electricity and gas companies at 55 (Dupeyroux and Pretot 1993: 106).
Pressures for change
Concern for the medium and long term financing of pensions emerged as a
political issue in the mid-1980s. This was the result of actual deficits in the social
security budget but also the consequence of long term demographic projections
produced by the statistical service of the French government in 1986. For the first
7 It should be noted that public sector employees are not covered by a second-tier pension
arrangement. The combined replacement rate of first and second tier provision for private sector
employees is around 70% for a full contribution record.
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time these projections looked at the expected impact of ageing on pension
expenditure until 2025. Their conclusion was rather bleak: in 2025, in order to
keep the scheme balanced, contributions had to be increased by 170% or,
alternatively, benefits had to be halved (RueIlan 1993: 911-912). This report
marked the beginning of a long pension debate, characterised by a series of
subsequent official reports, mandated by governments of different political
orientation, which lead to the 1993 pension reform. These reports are discussed in
the next section.
The existence of deficits in the social security budget, which are mainly due to the
health insurance and old age pension branch of the system, is seen as a short term
problem which has to be solved rapidly. The social security schemes, which are
not included in the general government budget, cannot borrow to finance current
expenditure (Hirsch 1993: 52). In the past, in case of a budget deficit, the
equilibrium between receipts and outlays was generally restored by increasing
contribution rates. For instance, in 1986, the employee contribution to the basic
pension scheme was raised by 0.7 percentage points; a year later by another 0.2
percentage points. In 1990, the ceiling on employers' contribution is removed for
1.6% of salary, though compensated by a reduction in their payment to the family
benefits scheme (Oudin 1992: 146-154).
More recently, as governments became unwilling to raise additional revenues
through contribution increases, a practice has been introduced whereby the
governments lends to the social security system the funds needed to cover their
expenses. The debt thus accumulated by the system, however, must be repaid. In
fact, as will be seen below, one element of the 1995 Juppe Plan is an additional
tax meant to repay the debt of the social security system.
Table 6.1. Deficit of the basic pension scheme regime général, in FF billion.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
4.6 6.6 18.7 17.9 39.5 12.8 14.7* 14.4*
*: projection
Source: French Government 1995
Beside budget deficits, an important pressure for reform was certainly the
expected impact of demographic ageing on pension expenditure and on the
viability of the French pension system as a whole. The White Paper on pensions,
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published by the government in 1991, provides a review of projections based on a
number of different assumptions with regard to fertility, labour force participation
rates in the 55-64 age group, and unemployment. For each scenario, the paper
gives the contribution rate needed in order to keep the budget balanced, if pension
legislation remains unchanged. The projections refer to an hypothetical universal
pension scheme The result can also be read as the weighted average of
contribution rates of the different basic schemes.
Table 6.2. Contribution rates needed to finance pension expenditure, based on
pre-1993 legislation (% of gross salary, combined rate for employers and
employees)
Fertility rate 1.8





1990 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
2000 21.1 20.7 21.1 20.7
2010 26.2 25.1 25.5 24.4
2020 33.4 32.1 31.0 29.9
2030 39.9 38.0 35.1 33.9
2040 41.9 40.5 36.3 35.1
Fertility rate 2.1
LFPR stable after 2010 increasing after 2005
Unemployment high low high low
Year
1990 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
2000 21.1 20.7 21.1 20.7
2010 26.0 25.0 25.3 24.3
2020 32.2 31.0 29.9 28.9
2030 36.4 35.1 32.5 31.4
2040 36.7 35.4 32.0 30.9
Key to table 6.1:
• Fertility rates refer to an average in the 2005 - 2030 period
• LFPR: Labour Force Participation Rates for the 55-64 age group. Stable = 39.2%; increase =
54% in 2040.
• Unemployment:	 Low = 4.5% between 2005 and 2010 and 3% after 2030
High = 8% between 2005 and 2010 and 6% after 2030
Source: Livre Blanc 1991: 96
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Table 6.2 shows a rather bleak picture for the future of pensions in France. Even
in the best case scenario the combined contribution rate to finance basic pensions
will be somewhere in the region of 30% of gross salary. The model does not take
into account increases in productivity because, being based on pre-1993
legislation, it assumes that increases in wages will be offset by corresponding
increases on the benefits' side (according to pre-1993 legislation benefits were
uprated according to gross wages).
Since the mid-1980s, and particularly in the early 1990s, financial pressures to
reform the basic pension scheme have become rather strong. In comparison to
other countries, and particularly the ones reviewed in this study, what is striking is
the fact that in France pension reform did not anticipate an expected deficit in a
pay-as-you-go pension scheme. In contrast, reform came after a decade of budget
deficits. To some extent, this is due to the fact that unlike in Britain or
Switzerland, in France the basic pension is virtually entirely financed through
contributions and does not receive substantial government subsidies. Under such
circumstances it is more difficult to have a balanced budget, especially during a
recession. However, the different approach adopted in the three countries is
arguably related to variations in institutions and political situations.
6.3. THE PENSION DEBATE IN THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s
There is an apparent contradiction in French pension policy-making from the mid-
1980s onwards. On the one hand, there is an agreement among all major political
parties (with the exception of the Communists) that cuts are needed in order to
restore the financial equilibrium of the basic scheme, let alone to guarantee the
viability of the system in the future. On the other hand, no saving measure is
adopted until 1993. In contrast, contribution rates are increased regularly. The
reasons behind this contradiction belong to two different but related areas.
First, governments of different political persuasion havebeen equally afraid of the
public's reaction to a pension reform (Ruellan 1993). Opinion polls show the
comparatively high level of popularity of public pensions in France (Ferrera
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1993b: 34), and the attitude of the general public toward the social security
system has been characterised as one of strong emotional attachment (Palier
1991). In addition, it is well known that French trade unions, despite their low
degree of representativeness, can have a substantial mobilising capacity. Like
public opinion, and perhaps more, trade unions are likely to oppose cutbacks in
the area of pensions. In this context, it is understandable that a pension reform is
considered to be an extremely sensitive political issue. Of course, pension reforms
are politically dangerous exercises everywhere, but given the proven vehemence
of France's informal protests, governments were perhaps less inclined to risk
political capital on a pension reform than some of their counterparts.
Second, politicians willing to embark on a pension reform are likely to wait for
the most appropriate timing. Like all potentially unpopular policies, cutbacks in
pensions are easier to implement when there is no upcoming important election.
While this is a common feature to all democracies, France has the specificity of
having a double electoral cycle: as seen above general elections take place every
5 years whereas presidential ones are fought every 7 years. The result is a
narrowing down of the size of these windows of opportunity when pension
reforms can be forced through with reduced political risk. Since the mid-1980s,
French voters have been asked to elect a parliament three times, in 1986, 1988,
1993, and a President twice, in 1988 and 1995. The two-year lag between the two
political cycles means a reduction in the period of time available to 'safely'
implement unpopular measures.
The result is that between 1985 and 1993, one can count at least seven official
reports on pensions, all of which give policy recommendations, which,
incidentally, are surprisingly similar. In fact, it seems that these reports, produced
by various commission have a double objective. To some extent, they have to test
the political feasibility of given options for reform. On the other hand, however,
they create the impression that the government is actually doing something to
guarantee the current and long-term viability of the pension system, without
putting much political capital at stake. Interestingly, over the same period, the
employee contribution rate rose from 4.7% in 1984 to the current 6.55%, and an
additional employer's contribution of 1.6% without ceiling has been introduced
in 1990.
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The emergence of pension reform as a political issue
According to Ruellan (1993: 912), it is a report commissioned by the Socialist
Prime Minister Laurent Fabius in 1985 that marks the beginning of the official
debate on basic pensions reform. The report (COP 1986), published in June 1986,
took a fairly pessimistic view of the future financial problems of French pensions.
Its main conclusion was that an increase in retirement age was inevitable. With
regard to other possible measures, the report rejected as impractical proposals to
move from a pay-as-you-go system to a funded one. In contrast, a shift from
defined benefits towards defined contributions, through an increase in the period
over which the reference salary is calculated, was viewed more positively.
Similarly, the removal of non-contributory provision from the insurance based
scheme was also given some consideration, as this would ease the financial
pressure on it. Some of these suggestions were going to be extremely influential
in the upcoming debate on the reform of basic pensions.
After the change of government in 1986, the newly appointed Minister for Social
Affaires, the Gaullist Philippe Seguin, followed his predecessor and mandated
another study, with very similar terms of reference, i.e. 'to make suggestions so
as to ensure a satisfactory equilibrium of the general scheme's basic pension in
2000-2005' (RueIlan 1993: 912). One of the objectives of this second report
(Schopflin 1987) was to test the political feasibility of various proposals,
including those suggested in the previous one. The task of writing it, in fact, was
given to a Commission which included representatives of both employers' and
employees' organisations. The result was a watered-down version of the first
report. The increase of retirement age was seen as something that could be done,
but in a flexible way. With regard to a possible extension of the period over which
the reference salary is calculated, the Commission could not reach an agreement.
Concerning benefit uprating, it was suggested to use a mixed index, combining
changes in earnings and prices.
The Etats Generaux of social security
The pension issue was brought up again at the 'Etats generaux de la securite
sociale', a major convention on the future of social security organised by the
Chirac government in 1987. The declared objective of this exercise was to initiate
a national debate on the options for reform of the social security system. The
debate was lead by a 'Committee of wise men', appointed by the Prime Minister,
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who had the task of consulting a wide range of relevant interest groups and,
through postal submissions of evidence, the public at large. Much emphasis was
placed on the government's intention to develop a reform process based on the
inclusion of the various interests and of the population. In the words of the Prime
Minister 'It belongs to the French people to get the information and to express
views on a problem that affects them all [...]. Together they will have to suggest
the direction for the future. It is only through the concertation of all of us that we
will succeed in saving our social security' (Chirac 1987). At that time, the
government discourse was characterised by a strong emphasis on the need for
consensus. The unilateral imposition of what were nevertheless seen as necessary
measures was ruled out both by the Prime Minister and by the Minister for Social
Affairs on various occasions (Palier 1991: 46).
A number of reasons explain the choice of a non-conflictual strategy by the
Chirac government, some of which have already been anticipated above. First,
there was a general preoccupation with the possible reaction of the trade unions
and of the public to a reduction in pension entitlements. But there was more than
that. The convention was only a few months away from the 1988 presidential
election in which Chirac intended to run. Obviously, the time was not particularly
favourable for the adoption of unpopular policies. In addition, in 1986, the
government tried to impose a reform of the higher education system which would
have allowed a bigger role for the private sector. The proposal was met with
significant resistance by students' organisations which managed to set up a
relatively strong protest movement, with strikes and demonstrations in the streets
of Paris and other big cities. After serious incidents broke out between
demonstrators and the police, the government accepted to withdraw the bill. The
whole event was regarded as a major setback for the government and for Chirac's
personal image, particularly because he had allowed riot police to intervene
against the students. A few months later, moreover, in early 1987, Chirac had to
withdraw plans to reform the civil service in the face of mounting criticism.
The result of these setbacks was a change in the government's attitude to policy-
making. In the official discourse, much emphasis was placed on the notion of
'decider autrement' (to decide in a different way), which referred precisely to a
consensual approach to policy-making. The Etat Generaux of social security
provided an excellent opportunity for the government to improve its image just
one year before the presidential election. According to Palier 'The prime minister
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hoped that thanks to this wide ranging debate, he could avoid new social conflicts
as he could not afford to be seen as the only responsible person for unpopular
measures in the area of social security' (1991: 50).
The final report produced in autumn 1987 by the LCommittee of wise men'
included a section on pensions (Comitó des sages 1987). Despite the solemnity of
the exercise, however, the proposals made were not significantly different from
what had been suggested on previous occasions. As far as retirement age was
concerned, it was argued that an increase was inevitable. A shift towards a defined
contribution system was seen positively as well as an extension of the qualifying
period for a full pension. Finally, with regard to uprating, the 'wise men' argued
in favour of net wages. Nevertheless, with a presidential election only a few
months away, the Prime Minister and Presidential candidate Jacques Chirac had
more pressing things to worry about than a risky pension reform. As a result no
action was taken on that occasion.
The Socialist approach to pension reform (1988-1992)
The first consequence of Mitterrand's victory in the 1988 presidential election
was to call an early general election which gave a relative majority to the
Socialists. With the external support of the Communist party, the left was able to
govern France for another 5-year term. With regard to pension policy and more in
general to social protection, the task of producing a framework for reform was
given to the Commissariat General au Plan. 8 A report was published in June
1989 which picked up many of the measures suggested by its predecessors. More
specifically, it argued in favour of benefit uprating based on net wages; to extend
the reference period for the calculation of a pension from the 10 to the 25 best
years; to extend the qualifying period for a full pension from 37.5 to 41.25 years;
and, finally, it suggested to change the pension formula from 50% of gross wage
to 60% of net wage. The removal of non-contributory benefits from the old age
insurance scheme was considered but discarded because it was seen as
impractical. (CGP 1989).
8 The Commissariat General au Plan (General Planning Commission) is a peculiar French
institution. It was set up in 1946 and had the task to produce a five year plan which would guide
the government's actions in the broad area of economic policy. The Plan is seen as an important
institution in the period immediately after World War II, but has lost influence in more recent
years. Currently, the documents produced by the Planning Commission are little more than
contributions to a general debate ( Jobert 1981; Hall 1986: 140f1).
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The report was met with mixed reactions. First, as far as the trade unions were
concerned, the moderate CFDT, in its official response, did not comment on
individual proposals but argued against raising retirement age, even if this was to
be done through an extension of the qualifying period for a full pensions. It
suggested that the purchasing power of retirees should evolve in parallel to that of
the working population, and `express[ed] regret that the commission decided to
drop proposals for removing non-contributory elements from the old age
insurance scheme' (CFDT 1989). More solid opposition to the COP report came
from the more radical FO. In its official response it argued against each saving
measure suggested. It concluded that 'It is absolutely unacceptable for Force
ouvriere to reduce the pension entitlements of salaried workers and retired people,
as suggested in the CGP report' (FO 1989). Total dissatisfaction with the CGP
report was expressed also by the Communist CGT, which `... reject[ed it] and
calle[ed] on salaried employees and retired people to fight with determination the
proposals.' (CGT 1989). In contrast, the report was welcomed by the employers'
association (CNPF 1989). Nevertheless, the approval of employers was of little
use to a Socialist minority government, who needed the votes of the Communists
and did not receive support from within the labour movement. In these conditions,
a successful pension reform was almost unthinkable. On the other hand, the
financial pressures on the social security budget were growing, and the pension
scheme accounted for a substantial part of it.
The following step was the publication of a White Paper (Livre Blanc 1991) on
the reform of pensions, which, again reiterated the suggestions made in the
previous reports. In particular, it argued for the extension of the qualifying period
for a full pension to 42 years and the reference salary to be calculated on the basis
of the best 25 years. Benefit uprating, it was suggested, should be made on the
basis of inflation, but with a clause (not specified in the report) saying that
pensioners were to profit from economic growth.
The task of testing the political feasibility of the proposals mentioned in the White
Paper was given to a commission set up by the Ministry for social affairs. After
consultation of the relevant interests, mainly employers' and employees'
organisations, the commission produced a report which rejected much of what had
been argued in the White Paper. The extension of the period over which the
reference salary is calculated to 25 years was rejected, and instead of prices the
report suggested net wages as a basis for the uprating of pensions. Only the
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extension of the qualifying period was accepted, but to 40 years instead of 42. The
report (Mission Cottave 1992) mentioned again the suggestion of removing non-
contributory elements from the insurance scheme. In addition, for the first time, it
was suggested to modify the scheme for private sector employees only (regime
general), and to leave the public sector for a later reform. The reactions of the
trade unions this time were fairly positive, as the report was based to a large
extent on their requirements (Le Monde 16/1/92, p.15).
On the basis of this last set of proposals, the Minister for Social Affairs set up a
second consultation in early 1992 (Mission Bruhnes). Basically the results of the
first consultation were confirmed. In addition it was suggested to devolve the task
of setting contribution and uprating rates to the administration board of the basic
pension scheme, composed of representatives of the trade unions and employers.
This indicates that there might have been some scope for compromise between the
government and the unions. The latter were prepared to accept reductions in the
generosity of pension entitlements if these were compensated by more autonomy
for the social partners in the management of basic pensions and by the removal of
non-contributory benefits from the insurance scheme (which would reduce the
financial pressure on it). However, the two actors were still far apart with regard
to the size of such reductions and to the issue of uprating.
At that stage, the only element of the reform which seemed able to attract a
sufficient level of support was the removal of non-contributory elements from the
old age insurance scheme. For the government, it had the advantage of reducing
the deficit that every year appears in the social security budget, though the cost
would simply be transferred from there to the general government budget. For the
trade unions this measure had the advantage of transforming the basic pension in
a pure social insurance scheme. This removed state money from the scheme and
by the same token state influence on it. The result was the prospect of increased
autonomy and legitimacy for the management of old age insurance by the social
partners, which was clearly in the interest of the trade unions.
A bill setting up a tax-financed fund designed to pay for non-contributory benefits
was presented in Parliament in November 1992, as a first step towards a pension
reform. The bill was nevertheless defeated at the first reading: the right rejected
the proposal as an 'accounting lifting' since it did not produce actual savings, but
only shifted some pension expenditure from the social security to the general
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government budget. Similarly the PCF declined its support since 'the new
measure could open the way to a two-tiered system in retirement' (Le Monde
12/12/92 p. 1) While the general election was approaching a final attempt to deal
with the pension issue was made in early 1993, but it failed to gain the agreement
of the trade unions.
6.4. THE BALLADUR GOVERNMENT AND THE 1993 PENSION
REFORM
The 1993 general election gave an overwhelming majority to the right-of centre
coalition. A controversial pension reform could easily have been pushed through
in parliament. Nevertheless, the upcoming presidential election made this prospect
unlikely. The RPR leadership was extremely wary not to repeat the mistakes of
1986-1988. Then, the attempted imposition of controversial measures resulted in
a loss of popularity of the Chirac government and ultimately contributed to his
defeat in the 1988 presidential election. In fact, between 1993 and 1995, the
Balladur government renounced to impose controversial measure on a number of
occasions (Bigaut 1995: 9). In the area of pensions, however, the government
managed to push through a reform which had been in the waiting for almost a
decade, and which all its predecessors failed to implement. In fact, to the surprise
of French commentators (Le Monde 30/8/1993, p.1; Ruellan 1993) the 1993
reform went through relatively smoothly, both in parliament and as far as the
trade unions' and public opinion's reactions were concerned.
To some extent, this came as a result of the impressive electoral victory of the
right-wing coalition, which, at least, guaranteed the compliance of parliament to
the government proposals. By contrast, the previous Socialist government, having
to rely on the external support of the Communists, was in a much less powerful
position. In addition, the fresh landslide victory gave the right-wing coalition a
strong legitimacy in the eyes of the public, which made the organisation of an
informal protest certainly more difficult. In July 1993, when the reform was
announced, Balladur was still in his honeymoon period with the French electorate.
Beside these contingent factors, what certainly played a role in explaining the
unexpected success of Balladur's pension reform, is the approach adopted in
policy-making. The final content of the reform was decided only after intense
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negotiations with the trade unions (interview, Ministere des Affaires Sociales,
20/12/96). It is true that the proposal put forward by the government reflected to a
large extent the suggestions made in the White Paper, which had been heavily
criticised by various trade unions. In addition, however, the government was
_ .
prepared to include elements that were likely to be more acceptable to the unions.
In particular, it was planned to set up a tax-financed fund run by the government,
which would finance all non-contributory benefits in the area of old age pensions.
The effect of such a fund is twofold. First, by removing non-contributory elements
from the insurance scheme, it relieves the financial pressure on it. Second, it
marks a clear distinction between social insurance and non-contributory provision.
As seen above, this had been a key demand of some trade unions. The separation
of these two components of pension provision, in fact, meant the recognition and
acceptance by the government of the managing role played by the social partners
in social insurance.
This measure, as seen above, had been advocated by the CFDT (1989) and was
also likely to be acceptable to FO. In fact, according to a civil servant who took
part to the negotiations with the social partners, these two confederations were a
privileged target in the government's effort for concertation. In his own words:
It was important for us to gain the approval of the CFDT because we
knew that FO and the CGT would be hostile anyway. ... We needed at
least the neutrality of the other confederations. It was also important to
avoid that FO would adopt too a violent position. In fact they were
against, but did not react as they did in 1995 against the Juppe plan.
They did not mobilise their members saying that the new legislation
was shameful. (interview, Ministêre des Affaires Sociales, 20/12/96)
The government proposal was subjected to a vote at the administration board of
the CNAV, which is composed of representatives of employees and employers.
The two elements of the reform, cutbacks and the creation of a tax-financed fund
for non-contributory benefits, were dealt with separately. With regard to the saving
measures, only employers and the Catholic unions CFTC were in favour. In
contrast, the creation of a solidarity fund was approved by CFDT, FO, CFTC, and
employers (CNAV 1993). This vote did not have any legal consequence, but gave
a clear indication to the government with regard to the likely reaction of the
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various unions to the new legislation. On this basis, the government decided to go
ahead, and the pension reform was adopted on the 22 July 1993 (law) and on the
27 August (decrees). The new pension legislation came into force at the beginning
of 1994, albeit with a transition period for some of the measures.
The content of the 1993 reform9
The changes adopted in 1993 fall under two categories. First a 'Fonds de
solidarite vieillesse' has been created, which has the task of funding non-
contributory benefits. Second, in line with the proposals made in the White paper,
the qualifying period for a full pension is extended from 37.5 to 40 years; the
period over which the reference salary is calculated, is extended from the best 10
years to the best 25. These measures, which affect the regime general only, are
being introduced gradually over a ten-year transition period. Finally the uprating
of benefits is based on prices (as opposed to earnings) for a five-year period.
The Fonds de solidarith vieillesse (FSV) is a new institution which has the task of
financing non-contributory benefits. It provides pensions for retired people with
an inadequate contribution record, but it also compensates social insurance
schemes for the contribution credits they grant to unemployed people and other
groups of people who are not engaged in paid employment. In addition, the FSV
has the task to repay the debt accumulated by the social security system. It is
financed by an earmarked tax i°, which was raised by 1.3 percentage points on that
occasion and by duties on alcohclic and non alcoholic drinks (Chadelat 1994).
With regard to the uprating mechanism, the law has been modified so that it is
now possible for the government to fix the amount of uprating by decree. Under
previous legislation this decision had to go through parliament. At the same time,
the government has adopted a decree that for a five-year period links the uprating
of pensions to consumer prices. In fact, this had been the case before, since 1987
9 The relevant pieces of legislation are: law No. 93-936 of 22 July 1993; and the decrees No. 93-
1022 and No. 93-1023 of 27 August 1993. The law sets up the new 'Fonds de solidarite
vieillesse' (see main text) and makes provision for allowing decision concerning uprating of
pension to be made by decree. The two decrees change the pension formula and the uprating
mechanism.
10 The FSV is financed through a tax called 'Contribution sociale getzeralisee' (CSG). The CSG is
a new form of tax that was introduced in 1990 at a rate 1.1% and is earmarked for non-
contributory benefits. It is levied on all sorts of income (not only wages) and is proportional.
Despite the use of the term 'contribution', the CSG is considered to be a tax rather than a social
insurance contribution (the French equivalent of contribution is `cotisation').
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pensions had been uprated according to prices, with ad hoc legislation being
passed by parliament every year (RueIlan 1993: 919).
In the long term, the impact of the reform on pension expenditure could be quite
substantial. According to projections by the administration of old age insurance
scheme (CNAV), without the 1993 reform contribution rates in 2010 would have
had to be increased by around 10 percentage points. With the reform, if uprating
according to prices is maintained, this figure could be between 2.73 and 7.26
percentage points (see table 6.3)
Table 6.3. The impact of the 1993 reform on pension expenditure (increase in
contribution rates needed to cover current expenditure)
Scenario 1: expansion Scenario 2: contraction















2000 3.49 5.19 3.64 4.70
2005 5.39 2.00 4.30 7.89 4.87 6.67
2010 8.23 2.73 6.25 12.45 7.26 10.13
Note: scenario 1, expansion assumes that the number of salaried employees will grow by 1% until
2010 and that average yearly real wage growth will be of 1.5%. Scenario 2 assumes no growth in
the size of the workforce and a 1% real increase of wages.
Source: RueIlan 1993: 921
The 1993 reform will have an impact on the amount of pensions as well and on
actual age of retirement. Because of the extension to 40 years of the qualifying
period, it is expected that some employees will delay their retirement in order to
receive a full pensions despite the reform. The extension of the period over which
the reference salary is calculated will have an impact on the level of pensions. The
impact of this measure is a reduction in benefits by 7-8% for high salaries, but
does not affect those on the minimum wage, as they receive the minimum
pension, which has not been modified by the reform (Ruellan 1993: 922).
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6.5. THE REFORM OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS: THE JUPPE PLAN
The measures adopted in the 1993 pension reform affected only the regime
general, which covers employees in industry and commerce. Given the
differences in entitlement rules, and the particular socio-demoaraphic profile and
working conditions of some categories within the public sector (miners, rail
workers) it was decided to deal with the two issues separately as early as 1991
(Mission Cottave 1992). Perhaps, the real reason, which was nevertheless absent
from the official discourse, was that politicians were afraid of the possible
consequences of such a move. At 26%, the rate of unionisation is considerably
higher in the public than in the private sector (Quid 1996: 1553). In addition,
public sector employees had shown on more than one occasion to be particularly
effective in generating protest movements.
Financial pressures on separate schemes, however, are quite substantial. For
instance, in the pension scheme for rail workers employment-related contributions
cover only about a third of expenditure. The rest is made up of transfers from
other schemes on and of government subsidies (Le Monde 2/12/95, p.8). Financial
problems, coupled with the more favourable conditions enjoyed by members of
this scheme, were the key reasons put forward in order to justify a reform of the
rail workers scheme, as well as of other public sector schemes. The debate on
reforming public sector pensions, however, did not come to the fore until after the
1995 presidential election, presumably for the reasons mentioned above.
In May 1995, the newly elected President Jacques Chirac appointed as Prime
Minister Alain Juppe, the former foreign affairs Minister and most senior figure in
the Chirac camp. Chirac's electoral campaign was regarded as surprisingly left-
wing. He spent considerable time emphasising notions of social cohesion, and
with regard to the financing of social protection, his position was that economic
growth would have solved that problem, and thus that cuts were not needed. He
also favoured wage increases, which would have 'painlessly' increased social
protection receipts (see, for instance, Le Monde 25/3/95, p.'7). The fact that his
main opponent, Edouard Balladur, was preaching austerity measures to restore
sound state finances, certainly played a role in Chirac's choice of a campaign
strategy.
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Initially, electoral promises were honoured. In June 1995, the statutory minimum
wage was increased by 4% and the minimum pension by 2.8%, well above the
rate of inflation, of 1.8% in 1995. (Le Monde 24/6/95, p. 6). Towards the end of
the summer, however, there were signs of a change of direction in government
policy. Prime Minister Juppe announced a major reform of the social security
system, of which the details still had to be worked out (Le Monde 31/8/95, p. 5).
Both Juppe and Chirac made clear that they intended to deal with the structural
deficit of the social security budget and not to act through minor adjustments in
order to secure a balanced budget for the current year only. This came up in the
description of the sort of questions that, according to Alain Juppe, had to guide
the debate. As he put it:
'I intend to ask a number of "strong" questions on the future of social
protection, which is expensive and unjust [...]. Are all French people
equal in front of retirement? No, they aren't. There are 600,000
French men and women who are not covered by health insurance. [...]
75% of social protection receipts come from employment-related
contributions. It is a unique situation in Europe and the result is that
our firms are truly disadvantaged' (Juppe, quoted in Le Monde
31/8/95, p. 5)
This quotation makes reference to a number of notoriously politically sensitive
issues. Inequality in front of retirement refers precisely to the more generous
conditions enjoyed by public sector employees, especially after the 1993 reform
that affected only those working in the private sector. Moreover, the quotation
shows concern with the basic structure of the French welfare state, which relies to
a large extent on contributory social insurance and is managed by the social
partners. As seen above, the shift from the present arrangement towards a state
managed and tax-financed one is a major source of disagreement between the
government and the unions. The inclusion of such controversial proposals in its
agenda had the effect of reducing the scope for a concerted solution.
This time, however, the government was not after consensus. The political
situation was certainly favourable to a major reform, if not ideal. The government
had an overwhelming majority in parliament. The next general election was
almost three years away and the presidential one is scheduled for 2002. In
addition, the adoption of austerity measures could be justified by the need to
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comply with the requirements for monetary union". This was an additional asset
in the hands of the government, since European integration remains widely
supported by the French public. Against such a favourable background, the
government might well have decided that it was strong enough to take on the
unions. This, at least, is what appears from the analysis of the policy-making
process.
The preparation of a reform plan for social security continued until November
1995. During that period there were contacts with trade union *officials and
political parties both at the national and at the regional level. The content of the
plan, however, was kept secret until the day it was presented to Parliament. The
issue of reforming public sector pensions was seen as an extremely sensitive
exercise. According to press reports, the Minister responsible for public sector
employment 12, concerned with the possible consequences of such a move, had
managed to convince the Prime Minister to drop plans for public sector pension
reform. In fact, trade unions were informed, on a non-official basis, that this
controversial item was not going not be part of the final version of the plan. The
change of direction by the government was apparently decided on the night before
the publication of the report. Alain Juppe needed the support of his predecessor
and fellow party member, Edouard Balladur, who had criticised the government
for its lack of commitment to sound state finances. In order to secure the support
of the Balladur camp, Juppe included plans to set up a commission which would
have made proposals as to how to restore the financial viability of public sector
pension schemes. (Le Monde 21/12/95, p. II).
The 'Plan for the reform of social protection', or in short the Juppe Plan, was
presented in Parliament on 15 November 1995. It was a declaration of intentions
covering all areas of social security. It did not include actual legislative proposals,
but provided an agenda for the implementation of a number of measures, some of
which were already specified in their details. These are its main points:
• Introduction of a universal health insurance scheme;
11 Among the Maastricht criteria for monetary union, it was the 3% of GDP limit on government
budget deficit that constituted a problem for France. According to the government, in order to
comply with this requirement, cuts were needed in various areas of social protection.
12Jean Puech, Ministre de la Fonction Publique
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• the reform of public sector pension schemes (regimes speciaux), through the
establishment of a commission that within four months will make proposals so
as to ensure the financial equilibrium of these schemes, such as the extension
on the qualifying period for a full pension to 40 years;
• family benefits are frozen in 1996 and will become taxable in 1997;
• partial shift of health insurance financing from contributions to taxation (CSG,
see above fn. 10)
• increase of health insurance contributions for unemployed and retired people
by 1.2% in 1996 and in 1997 (at that time at 1.4%, or 5.4 percentage points
below the standard contribution rate for those in work);
• introduction of a new tax, levied at a rate of 0.5% on all revenues earmarked
for the repayment of the debt accumulated by the social security system;
• a constitutional amendment which allows Parliament to vote on a social
security budget.
(source: French government 1995)
The plan was viewed by French and international commentators as a major
restructuring of the social security system. It did in fact contain a number of
measures that were bound to be extremely controversial. Obviously, the reform of
public sector pension was one of these. In addition, however, there were a number
of structural changes that did not directly affect the level of protection, but that
were geared towards removing, in part at least, the control of the social partners
over the system. This was the case, for instance, of the tabling of a constitutional
amendment allowing more power to Parliament; the increase in the use of taxation
in financing, as opposed to employment related contributions, and the
introduction of a universal health care scheme. What these measures have in
common, is that they contribute to the change of the original Bismarcician nature
of the French social security system. This was regarded as unacceptable by the
trade unions, who had forcefully opposed similar measures in the past.
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Unsurprisingly, the reactions to the Juppe plan were mixed. First, among the
unions, CGT and FO condemned the whole programme, and called a one day
strike in the public sector. Other trade unions took a less radical position. The
CFDT agreed with much of what was said in the plan, with the exception of
public sector_pension reform. In contrast, employers were satisfied with the
proposed measures. The Socialists, initially, were divided. Through their official
spokesperson, they condemned the plan, though it was not entirely clear on what
grounds since it included proposals that had been put forward by them only a few
years earlier. In fact, some more outspoken party members took a different
stance. A former health care minister, Bernard Kouchner commented that: 'it is
an ambitious and courageous plan, which picks up many of our proposals' (Le
Monde 17/11/95, p.12). The Socialist leader, Lionel Jospin, was able to unite the
party only a few days later. The line adopted was to attack the method of the
government's approach, imposition without concertation, rather than the content
of the plan which in fact was not too distant from what the Socialists had been
arguing for in the past.
The protest movement started a few days later, on 24 November. Initially it was
mainly employees of the national rail company SNCF and of the Parisian
underground (RATP) who went on strike. The level of participation, however,
was rather impressive. The strikers were able to literally bring the country to a
halt. The rail and underground workers strike lasted for some three weeks, and
during that period it was virtually impossible to reach central Paris from the
suburbs in less than 4 to 5 hours. Obviously, losses for the French economy were
substantial. In the following days, other groups of public sector employees joined
the transport workers in the strike. It was mainly the case of post-office employees
and teachers. In parallel, students took the streets as well, not against the Juppe
Plan, but in order to ask for more financial resources in education. The result was
a gigantic, incoherent but still growing protest movement, perfectly in line with
the French tradition of unorthodox political actions. The protest reached its climax
on 12 December, when some 2 million people were reported to have taken the
streets in various French cities (Le Monde 21/12/95, p VI).
The national leadership of the main trade union federations were obviously quick
to join and to encourage the protest movement against the Juppe plan. What they
regarded as unacceptable, however, was not only the presence of cuts in public
sector pension schemes, but the explicit intention of the government to increase its
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grip over social security, and by the same token to reduce the unions' influence on
it. This motive was particularly strong in the case of Force Ouvriere. As its
leader, Marc Blondel, put it:
'[the Juppe Plan] is the biggest theft in the history of the French
Republic. It is the end of the Securite sociale. By deciding that
Parliament is going to direct social protection, it robs the FF 2,200
billion made up of contributions paid by employers and employees.
We were told that we needed to act in order to save social security,
but they are taking it away from us' (Le Monde 17/11/95, p.12).
This interpretation of the Jupp6 Plan must be seen in the context of the ongoing
struggle for the control of social security between the government and the unions
discussed above. The inclusion in the plan of measures aimed at removing the
control of the unions over the system, certainly contributed to their determination
to oppose it. The Juppe plan attacked a number of different interests, mainly
public sector employees and trade unions, so that the formation of a strong
coalition against it was made possible. The result was, that the government was
forced to step back on some of the measures. On the 10 December, Juppe
announced the withdrawal of plans for public sector pension reform, though the
remainder of the plan was maintained. In addition, plans to restructure the SNCF
were re-negotiated with rail worker unions, so as to allow a longer period to
restore a balanced budget in the company. The protest movement gradually faded
away, leaving the national trade union leadership unsatisfied since the measures
aiming at increasing the governments' control were maintained.
6.6. INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF PENSION REFORM IN
FRANCE
The previous sections have described the process that lead to the adoption of the
1993 pension reform and to the presentation of the Juppe plan to the French
parliament. The two exercises share a number of similar elements, as they both
include potentially controversial elements of retrenchment in pension provision.
The part of the Juppe plan concerned with public sector pensions, in fact,
envisaged the implementation of some of the measures adopted in 1993 for the
private sector, namely the extension of the qualifying period for a full pension to
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40 years. Given the similarity of the two exercises, what is striking is the very
different way in which these two reforms have been met by the unions and by
public opinion at large: overall acceptance in 1993 and a massive protest
movement in 1995. Why?
There are a number of possible answers to that question. First union density
within the public sector is significantly higher than among private sector
employees. The rate of unionisation of the French workforce is somewhere
between 10% and 14% , but it reaches 26% within the state sector (Join-Lambert
1994: 110). The difference in unionisation rates might explain the success of the
protest movement, even though 26% is still a comparatively low rate by
European standards. In addition, this explanation is of little use if one needs to
account for the different reactions of interest groups, rather than for the outcome
of informal protest.
A second explanation relates the vehemence of the protest movement generated
by the Juppe plan to the fact that it came at a time when the direction of the SNCF
was engaged in difficult negotiations with the unions for restructuring the loss-
making national railways company. The conjunction of this event with the
prospect of seeing pension entitlements reduced, created a climate of general
dissatisfaction among rail workers, who were thus more determined to take on the
government (Le Monde 21/12/95, p.III). Considering the fact that the rail strike
was the centrepiece of the protest movement, this explanation does certainly bear
some relevance.
A third possible interpretation refers to the fact that the public saw the Juppe plan
as a betrayal of the electoral promises made by Jacques Chirac just a few months
earlier. During the presidential campaign, in fact, Chirac denied that retrenchment
measures were needed in the area of social security, arguing that economic growth
alone would have sufficed to restore the financial viability of the various schemes.
The Juppe plan, which envisaged substantial cuts in family benefits and public
sector pensions, was seen by many as a complete reversal of Chirac's policy in
the area of social security. According to an opinion poll commissioned by the
newspaper Le Monde on the day the Jupp6 plan was announced, 68% of those
interviewed felt that 'this reform of social security did not comply with the
promises made by Jacques Chirac during the presidential campaign' (Le Monde
17/11/96, p.8).
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These factors certainly contribute to explain the different reactions provoked by
the 1993 pension reform and by the 1995 Juppë plan. As seen above, however, the
two events were also characterised by very different patterns of policy-making. In
line with the theoretical approach adopted in this study, it can be argued that this
difference in policy-making patterns relates to the different institutional
configurations at the time when the reform was decided: cohabitation in 1993 and
the same coalition controlling both presidency and parliament in 1995. The result
was that in 1993 the government was under pressure to negotiate with the social
partners and particularly with the unions. In 1995, the substantial level of power
concentration in the hands of the executive did not create the conditions
favourable to negotiation. Arguably, the government felt strong enough and
thought it could act without the approval of the labour movement.
The 1993 reform, in fact, combined some retrenchment measures with the
creation of a new solidarity fund. This fund did not affect the overall level of
provision, but resulted in the transfer of expenditure on non-contributory pensions
from the old age insurance scheme to the general government budget. This move
was seen positively by the unions, since it meant that the insurance scheme was
going to be under less financial pressure and that the risk of seeing their
managerial role questioned was reduced. To some extent, it can be argued that the
Balladur government in 1993 traded a reduction in pension entitlements with a
concession on the management side of social insurance. The creation of the FSV
also constituted a guarantee that the government accepted the managerial role
played by the social partners, shown by the fact that it took action to reduce the
financial pressure on the pension scheme.
According to an official of the CNAV (old age insurance scheme):
The introduction of the Fonds de Solidarite Vie illesse was a skilful
move, because it reduced the deficit of the old age insurance budget in
a way that was acceptable to the trade unions. It showed that the State
was making an effort. In fact the FSV had been carefully designed in
order to be able to attract the approval of the social partners
(interview, CNAV, 19/12/1996).
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The 1993 pension reform cannot be seen as a case of concertation between the
government and the unions. The latter, with the exception of the Catholic CFTC,
maintained their rejection to the cuts introduced by the new legislation. A fully
concerted solution, in fact, would have been extremely unusual in the French
context. Nevertheless, the government did, as mentioned in the above quotation,
make an effort in the direction of what was demanded by the unions. That effort
arguably played a role in securing, if not their approval, at least the unions'
acquiescence.
In contrast, the Juppe plan included nothing that could be seen as a move towards
the unions' requests. In addition, it represented a clear attack against the FO
union, who had been among the keenest supporters of an health insurance system
managed by the social partners and with little state intervention, not least because
it had traditionally presided over the national health insurance fund. As a civil
servant put it 'the Juppe plan was a slap in the face for FO, who had been
claiming a strict separation between insurance and non-contributory provision'
(interview, Ministry of Social Affairs, 19/12/1996). The Juppe plan, by
envisaging the creation of a universal health insurance scheme; the parliamentary
vote on the social security budget; and the introduction of taxation as a means to
finance health insurance, took a series of measures that contributed to undermine
the traditional role of the social partners in social insurance management. All
theses measures which are currently being implemented, tend to increase the
state's control over the health insurance system.
The Juppe plan, thus, not only did not include provision that was at least
acceptable to the unions, but it suggested a number of other measures that were
against what large sections of the labour movement had been arguing throughout
the previous decade. However, to receive the unions' approval was not a priority
for the government. The Jupp6 plan, in fact, was drafted under total secrecy.
There was not consultation with the relevant interests and trade unionists learned
about the contents of the plan together with the rest of the nation, when Juppe
presented it in parliament (interview, Force Ouvriere, 20/12/96). Arguably, the
government did not want to engage in lengthy negotiations, which carried the risk
of failure as had happened to many of their predecessors. The balance of power in
parliament, the unity of the executive (President and Prime Minister belonging to
the same party) and the fact that the next election was some 3 years away,
probably persuaded the government that it could afford not to negotiate.
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The comparison of the two French reforms is instructive in so far as it sheds light
on the impact of institutions on policy. This can be observed on two different
levels: the first concerns the institutional design of pension arrangements while
the second relates to the structure of formal institutions 13 . With regard to the first —
level, a crucial feature of the French basic pension scheme, and more in general
the whole social security system, is the fact that it is managed jointly by
representatives of employers and employees. As seen above, this has been the
source of a long standing conflict over the control of social insurance between the
trade unions, who largely benefit from their managerial role, and governments of
different political persuasions. In the 1993 reform, this particular institutional
setting created an opportunity for compromise. The unions accepted a reduction in
pension entitlements also because they received a guarantee that their managerial
role in the area of pensions would not be questioned. In a state run system, such
as it exists in Britain, such an opportunity would not have been available.
The second level refers to the impact of constitutional structures on policy. As
seen above, the existence of two distinct and non-coordinated electoral cycles
(presidential and general elections do not occur at the same time and have a
different frequency), reduces the length of the periods in which unpopular policies
can be adopted relatively safely. In addition, the division of executive power
between a President and a Prime Minister makes possible the occurrence of
cohabitation, i.e. a situation in which the two figures belong to different parties. In
such conditions, the level of power concentration in the hands of the executive is
substantially reduced. In 1993 cohabitation put pressure on Balladur to negotiate
with the unions; in 1995 that pressure was not there.
The French case highlights the interest of looking at the interplay of institutional
factors and electoral results. Depending on the latter, the French constitutional
structure can provide strong concentration of power or fragmentation. When
assessing the impact on policy of given institutional features, thus, it seems
essential to consider a relatively extended period of time, as depending on a
number of other factors (in the French case of electoral results) the effect of
institutions can change.
13 The distinction between these two levels in the impact of institutions on policy is generally
mentioned in neo-institutionalist studies of social policy, see Pierson 1994; Myles and Quadagno





The previous chapters have highlighted the existence of strong and contrasting
pressures which are affecting the functioning of pension systems in industrial
countries. As seen in chapter 1, population ageing is expected to result in a
substantial increase of pension expenditure over the next 20 to 30 years. In
addition, this development is coupled with a profound structural transformation
of the world economy, as a result of which it is becoming increasingly difficult
for governments to raise the funds needed to finance increas ,=_.d cpending on social
programmes. Current and future changes, thus, are likely to affect both the
demand for pension provision, which is going to increase, and the ability to
finance that demand which, in contrast is likely to decrease (George and Taylor-
Gooby 1996).
Generally, however, these socio-economic pressures are coupled with strong
popular support for existing pension arrangements (Ferrera 1993b; Taylor-Gooby
1995). As pointed out by Pierson the temporal quality of pension schemes means
that virtually everybody in industrial societies is either a pensioner or will become
one in a more or less distant future (1996b). In addition, the availability of
relatively generous pension provision in most industrial countries has created
strong expectations among the general public concerning how much their pension
will or should be worth once they reach retirement age. As a result, to cut back on
a truly universal programme like old age pensions is a political gamble.
Governments are thus caught between these two strong pressures: on the one hand
socio-economic and demographic change is pushing them towards reducing social
protection standards for the aged; on the other hand, the popularity of current
pension arrangements means that every move in that direction is putting them at
risk of electoral punishment or of informal mass protest, which can prevent them
from adopting planned legislation, as happened with the 1995 French pension
reform (see chapter 6).
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In this context, it seems essential to address the issue of what are the factors that
affect a government's ability to impose cuts in the area of pensions, in spite of the
strong level of popular support enjoyed by these schemes in most countries. The
initial aim of this study was to look for these factors in the constitutional order of
each country covered. During the research work, however, it became increasingly
clear that constitutional structures, though important, were not the only factor
affecting the political feasibility of a pension reform.
In addition, it became also clear that the relationship between constitutional
structures and governments' ability to impose cuts, was not one of simple
linearity. In general, studies which had looked at this relationship tended to
address the question of whether a constitutional system concentrating power in
the hands of the government, would be an asset or an impediment for the reform
of welfare policies (Pierson 1994; Weaver and Rockmann 1993).
What emerged from the present study, is that constitutional structures have a
substantial impact on the way governments go about reforming their pension
systems, but they are not necessarily related to success or failure in this exercise.
The level of power concentration available to a government seems to be a
powerful determinant of the policy-making strategy used in order to adopt a
pension reform. This, in turn, has an impact on the shape of the reform itself.
The structure of this chapter is based on this understanding of the relationship
between constitutional structures and pension reform. In particular, the chapter
attempts to answer the two questions outlined above:
• What sort of policy-making strategies are governments developing in order to
deal with the pension problem?
• What is the impact of strategy selection on the shape of policy change in the
area of pensions?
In order to deal with these questions, policy-making strategies for adopting
pension reforms have been analysed in three countries, Switzerland, France and
Britain, which are known for having developed very different patterns of policy-
making: more consensual in Switzerland; more confrontational and majoritarian
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in Britain; and somewhere between the two in France. The comparison of
pension reforms in these three countries has highlighted the mechanisms that
influence the selection of a given policy-making strategy for the successful
adoption of a pension reform, as well as the possible repercussions of strategy
selection on the shape of a given reform. This chapter begins by discussing the
different strategies observed in the three countries. It then looks at what are the
likely determinants of strategy selection and at how the latter is likely to affect the
shape of a pension reform.
7.1. POLICY-MAKING STRATEGIES IN PENSION REFORM
In the previous chapters, the analysis of the processes that have led to the
adoption of pension reforms in the three countries, has shown that generally
governments were well aware of the potential for controversy embodied in the
pension reform issue. In all three countries, the adoption of measures that, for
various reasons, were seen as needed by the respective governments has been
accompanied with other measures that in contrast were not particularly in line
with their priorities, but were nevertheless adopted with the objective of
increasing the political feasibility of the reform. These measures were more or
less targeted at groups likely to oppose reform. Among the four instances
reviewed, the attempted reform of French public sector pensions in 1995 is
possibly the only one in which cuts were not coupled with measures aimed at
'sweetening' their negative impact. This might help to account for the fact that the
French government was eventually forced to withdraw its plans as a result of a
massive protest movement.
In contrast, on the three other occasions reviewed here, governments did adopt a
policy-making strategy which was clearly aimed at increasing the political
feasibility of otherwise unpopular reforms. In the case of the Swiss and of the
French 1993 reform, this was in the shape of an inclusion of the trade unions into
policy-making, mainly by meeting some of their key demands. Instead, the British
1986 reform did not rely on inclusion as a means to reduce the political cost of
reform. As seen in chapter 4, the policy-making process was dominated by the
government, and more particularly by the Secretary of State for Social Services,
and very few concessions were made to external interests. The only exception was
the decision to drop plans for the abolition of the state scheme SERPS. On this
issue, however, there was a division within the cabinet, the Treasury being
fiercely opposed to the scrapping of the programme. As a result, one cannot say
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for certain whether the government's change of direction constituted a
concession to external interests or was simply the result of internal divisions. In
Britain, thus, the policy-making strategy for making its pension reform feasible
was not based on concessions to external interests likely to oppose change.
Perhaps one of the crucial features of the 1986 British pension reform, is the fact
that it did not affect the whole population, as it is generally the case in pension
reforms. A division in the British pension system between those who are covered
by the state scheme and those who are members of occupational pension plans,
allowed the government to target its saving measures on a given section of the
population only. Many British employees, mainly middle class, who have access
to occupational provision were de facto unaffected by the changes adopted in
1986. The saving measures and the transfer from the state to the market
concerned only the part of the population covered by SERPS.
As a result, the government was able to achieve substantial long term savings; to
make some progress towards its vision of popular capitalism; and at the same
time to reduce the risk of electoral punishment, since a large section of the
population was not directly affected by the change. Moreover, the decision to
introduce an additional fiscal encouragement, the so called '2% bribe' l , reduced
the potential for dissatisfaction among those who, in contrast, were directly
affected by the changes. The result was that the new personal pensions proved
extremely popular, and despite the opposition generated by the 1986 reform, the
Conservatives were able to win the general election the next year. The strategy
adopted by the Thatcher government, which exploited a division in provision for
retirement, proved successful in avoiding the possible negative electoral impact of
cutbacks in pensions.
In the Swiss case the cuts affected a universal scheme, the basic pension, which
made it impossible to use a policy-making strategy based on divisions in the
pension system. In contrast, the Swiss right-wing parliamentary majority, decided
to combine within a single piece of legislation, an increase in retirement age for
women together with other measures likely to improve the position of women in
the basic pension. The latter, which included the introduction of contribution
credits for years spent taking care of a child or a relative and the sharing of
i This was an additional rebate in social security contributions for employees who took out a
personal pension between 1988 and 1993 (see chapter 4).
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contributions between spouses, had long been a key demand of the left and of the
trade unions.
By combining these two types of measures within a single piece of legislation, the
right-wing majority was able to generate support for the 1995 pension reform
from various sections of the political spectrum, including the left, who would
otherwise have opposed plans to increase retirement age. As seen in chapter 5, the
inclusion of expansion and retrenchment measures within a single piece of
legislation, proved instrumental in making the changes acceptable to the
electorate. The reform, in fact, was supported by the main political parties
including the Socialists, which facilitated its acceptance in the referendum of June
1995.
In France, the attachment of the general public to existing pension arrangements
and the absence of a tradition of cooperation between the state and the labour
movement made pension reform a particularly thorny issue. Former Socialist
Prime Minister Michel Rocard was quoted saying that pension reform was an
issue capable to bring down more than one government. In this respect, a
consensual reform, possibly negotiated with the trade unions, would have been
extremely difficult. As seen in chapter 6, such a solution was in fact well beyond
the ambition of the Ministry of Social Affairs negotiators who had to prepare the
1993 reform. Instead, their priority was to avoid the sort of informal protest that
the French trade unions have repeatedly shown to be capable of. In sum, the
Balladur government in 1993 was not after the approval of the labour movement.
The acquiescence of its more radical sections was what it could hope for.
As a result, the 1993 pension reform, which included cuts to the main basic
pension scheme (the regime general, covering private sector employees) was
adopted together with a new 'Old age solidarity fund', which in fact constituted a
significant step towards meeting the unions' demands in the areas of financing
and management of the basic pension scheme. The new fund, which is tax-
financed, is intended to pay for the non-contributory elements (such as means-
tested pensions) provided by the insurance based scheme. By taking responsibility
for this sort of provision, the government de facto recognised the social partners
as the legitimate actors for the management of the contributory elements of the
insurance scheme. This had been one of the key demands of the most radical
sections of the labour movement (see chapter 6).
207
In contrast, the 1995 attempt at reforming public sector pensions did not include
elements aimed at generating support for it or at appeasing opposition. In fact,
cuts in pension provision for public sector employees were combined with other
measures which constituted an attack on the trade unions' position within the
social security system. These consisted mainly in an increased role for the state in
the management of social security. In addition, plans for public sector pension
reform were published at a time when a restructuring package for the national
railway company (SNCF) was being negotiated. The outcome was concentration
of dissatisfaction among rail workers and trade unionists in general, which
resulted in one of the most impressive protest movements France has seen after
1968. The government was thus forced to drop its plans for the reform of public
sector pensions. The lack of a policy-making strategy such as that used in France
two years earlier or in the Swiss and British pension reforms, certainly helps to
account for the government's failure on this occasion.
With one exception, thus, the pension reforms analysed in this study have been
accompanied by a policy-making strategy clearly aimed at making them more
acceptable to the public or to key political actors, such as the French trade unions.
In general, the aim of these strategies was to increase the political feasibility of
reforms which, because of their nature were bound to generate controversy. To
some extent, it seems that the choice of a given strategy (or the choice not to have
a strategy) is influenced by various national institutional features, such as the
structure of the pension system or the constitutional order and the pattern of the
relationship between the state and organised interests. The relative weight of the
different factors is discussed in the next section.
7.2. DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY SELECTION
The research hypotheses spelt out in chapter 2, argued for a relationship between
power concentration and the sort of policy-making strategy a government is likely
to follow in the adoption of a pension reform. In particular, it was expected to see
confrontational policy-making when power concentration with the executive is
strong and a more substantial inclination to quid pro quos when power
concentration is weak. In addition, it was also argued that contingent political
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factors, such as the proximity of an important election, could play a role in the
choice of a given policy-making strategy.
These two general hypotheses are broadly confirmed by the analysis of pension
reforms in the three countries covered. However, in the light of the findings
presented in chapters 4 to 6, it is possible to reformulate these hypotheses in a
more precise manner, and to shed some light on what are the mechanisms that
link a given feature of the institutional and political context with a given strategy.
In particular, it seems that there are five key factors likely to influence the choice
of a given strategy: the constitutional structure; the existence of a corporatist
tradition; the electoral cycle; electoral results; and power configuration. Not all
of these factors are in fact equally relevant in all of the three countries. As stated
in chapter 2, the high level of institutional variation encountered in this study,
makes it virtually impossible to formulate general hypotheses unless they are at a
relatively high level of abstraction (such as power concentration favours a
confrontational approach to pension reform). In order to capture the details of the
mechanisms that link institutional and political contexts to pension policy-
making, the discussion of these factors is sometimes limited to one or two
countries.
Constitutional structures
The three-country sample which includes the UK, France and Switzerland was
selected in order to assess the impact of their very different constitutional
structures on the policy response to a similar problem: pension financing. As seen
in chapter 2, political scientists regard Switzerland and the UK as the two ideal
types of fragmentation and concentration of power respectively, France being
somewhere inbetween. As seen in chapter 2, the impact of constitutional
structures on the expansion of social policies has been analysed by Inunergut
(1992) and by Huber et. al. (1993), who have found that systems which
concentrate power with the executive are more likely to develop comprehensive
and generous welfare states.
While the role of constitutional structures on the expansion of the welfare state
has been explored, their impact on the current phase of retrenchment remains
unclear. According to Pierson, theoretically at least, there is no strong case for
believing that a constitutional structure which concentrates power with the
executive is more successful in adopting retrenchment policies. In his view, such
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a structure concentrates both power and accountability and thus makes electoral
punishment more likely (Pierson 1994:34). This view is confirmed by the present
study. On the basis of the three-country sample analysed here, it seems that
constitutional structures do not directly affect the political feasibility of reform.
Reform have succeeded in Switzerland and in the UK, two opposite models as far
as constitutional structures are concerned. In France, the extent to which its
formal institutions allows minorities access to policy-making, depends to a
substantial extent on power configuration. When the same party or coalition
controls both Parliament and the Presidency, power concentration is strong. When
in contrast the two institutions are dominated by different camps, power is
fragmented. As seen in chapter 6, power concentration did not favour the
adoption of reform, presumably because government officials felt that the
inclusion of concessions to the trade unions were not needed given their position
of strength.
In sum, in line with Pierson's findings, there is no evidence of a relationship
between constitutional structures and political feasibility of pension reforms.
Constitutional structures, however, are not irrelevant to welfare reform. Their
main impact is on the type of policy-making process that governments decide to
adopt in order to reach their goals in pension policy. In countries where formal
institutions provide for minority-access to policy-making and encourage power-
sharing, new pension legislation was drafted after negotiations with external
interest-groups, particularly the trade unions. Both the Swiss reform and the
French 1993 reform, adopted when President and Prime Minister belonged to
different camps, included elements which were clearly geared towards meeting
some of the unions' demands, and as a result at gaining their approval or
acquiescence. In contrast, the British 1986 reform and the French 1995 pension
reform did not take into account the preferences expressed by the representatives
of labour.
Constitutional structures help to account for policy-making patterns. When these
favour power concentration, policy-making is likely to exclude the demands
formulated by external interests. In contrast, when formal institutions allow
minorities access to policy-making, pension reforms are designed so as to take
into account at least some of their demands. Most likely different patterns of
policy-making will have an impact on the shape of reform. This second element
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of the causal chain that links constitutional structures to pension reforms,
however, is discussed below (7.3).
Corporatist traditions
Within the three country-sample analysed in this study, only Switzerland has a
relatively strong tradition of corporatist policy-making. As seen in chapter 5,
trade unions, employers and other relevant interests are generally included in the
initial phases of the policy-making process. In contrast to other corporatist
countries (Sweden, Austria), corporatist practices in Switzerland did not result in
high levels of state intervention in the economy (Katzenstein 1985), and that is
arguably why Switzerland is not always included in lists of corporatist countries
(Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). Social policies, however, have traditionally always
been negotiated with the social partners in a truly corporatist manner and the left-
wing parliamentary minority has often managed to influence legislation in this
field. According to ICriesi (1995) social policy is the area in which the Socialist
party has the biggest impact on policy outcomes. France and the UK, in contrast,
are usually viewed as typical cases of non-corporatist policy-making. The former
being characterised by a strong asymmetry of power between the state and
organised-interests and the latter being seen more as a pluralist country.
Because it includes only one corporatist country, the sample selected is not
particularly suitable to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between a
corporatist tradition and current policy-making in the area of pensions. However,
what appears from this analysis is that, as hypothesised in chapter 2, the existence
of well-established corporatist practices is associated with a more inclusive
approach to policy making, as is the case in Switzerland. In contrast, in France
and in the UK, two non-corporatist countries, organised-interests were not
included into policy-making. Even the 1993 French reform cannot qualify as a
case of corporatist policy-making. Some sections of the labour movement did not
formally accept the measures adopted, though they refrained from taking
industrial action. Policy-making .then was not characterised by the inclusion of
organised-interests in the definition of policy, it only included some concessions
aimed at buying their acquiescence.
With the proviso that it should be tested in a larger number of corporatist
countries, the hypothesis put forward in chapter 2 still holds, although a more
systematic test is needed in order to ascertain its accuracy.
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The electoral cycle
The electoral cycle seems to have played an important role in the French case. On
various occasions the proximity of an important election delayed the adoption of a
pension reform. The fact that France has two parallel electoral cycles, for
presidential and parliamentary elections, has reduced the amount of time available
to policy-makers to 'safely' implement unpopular policies. In 1993, the proximity
of the 1995 presidential election acted as a deterrent on the government in the
adoption of a confrontational stance vis-a-vis the unions. The requirement not to
upset public opinion or influential actors prior to a crucial election provided an
incentive for the government not to seek confrontation with the unions.
Interestingly, in 1997 many commentators (Le Monde 14/5/97) explained the
decision of President Chirac to call an early general election with reference to
electoral cycles. Since he was committed to joining the EMU and as a result to
reduce public spending, Chirac intended to adopt a series of unpopular measures,
possibly including cuts in social programmes. By calling an early election, Chirac
hoped to avoid the political risk involved in the adoption of unpopular measures
in the year preceding a general election. For this strategy to work, however, the
right-wing coalition had to win the 1997 election, which it failed to do.
Electoral cycles, thus, seem to be playing an important role in the reform of the
French welfare state. To some extent, this is related to the existence of the double,
electoral cycle in that country, though more in general increases in politicians'
sensitivity to the public mood when an important election approaches is a basic
rule of representative democracy.
With regard to Switzerland and Britain, however, the electoral cycle explanation
does not seem to be particularly relevant. In the Swiss case, the impressive level
of stability in electoral outcomes (the government has had the same party
composition since 1959) might have contributed to reduce politicians' anxiety for
re-election. In the case of Britain, the asymmetric character of the pension reform




The impact of constitutional structure depends to a large extent on electoral
results2. A set of formal institutions which concentrates power with the executive,
might have a different impact on policy-making patterns if no party obtains a
majority. Between 1998 and 1993 the Socialist minority government of France,
committed to adopt a pension reform, was unable to find allies to get its
legislation approved by parliament. Of course, electoral results are to some extent
related to electoral laws, and thus to constitutional structures. The British first-
past-the-post electoral system favours the party with a relative majority and by the
same token makes coalition or minority government a relatively infrequent event.
In contrast, in countries with proportional representation like Switzerland, or with
a two-round plurality system (France) coalition governments are virtually the
rule.
Electoral results, however, are not determined by electoral laws only, and deserve
thus to be treated as an independent variable in their own right. The fact that a
government can count on a substantial majority in parliament, certainly
strengthens its position vis-a-vis external interests, and thereby reduces pressure
to negotiate with them. This was in fact the case in the four pension reforms
reviewed in this study. In all cases the party or the coalition supporting
retrenchment in the area of pensions could count on a substantial majority in
parliament. As a result, it is difficult on the basis of the sample selected here to
assess the importance of this factor. As in the case of the hypothesis which links
corporatist traditions to inclusive pension policy-making, the one concerned with
electoral results cannot be conveniently tested with the present sample.
Power configuration
Like electoral results, power configuration is also likely to affect the impact that
the constitutional structure has on policy-making. This is particularly true in the
case of France. In 1993, the presidency was still controlled by the Socialists,
while it was the right-wing that dominated parliament. In contrast, in 1995 both
institutions were controlled by the right-wing coalition. As seen in chapter 6,
2 This view reflects the findings of Immergut: to understand how these institutions work in
practice, we must add the de facto rules that arise from electoral results and party systems. [...]
The effective power of a political executive and the dynamics of executive-legislative relations
depend on the partisan composition of the various houses of parliament, on whether the executive
enjoys a stable parliamentary majority, and on whether party discipline is in force' (Immergut
1992: 27).
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these two different patterns of power configuration were associated with different
approaches to policy-making: more inclusive in 1993 and more exclusive in 1995.
• While formally, the person responsible for deciding the course of policy is the
Prime Minister, the President enjoys an important degree efiegitimacy in the eyes
of public opinion. If he or she disagrees with actions taken by the government,
the President can sack the Prime Minister or call an early election. With these
constraints, Prime Ministers are likely to be reluctant to embark on a politically
risky action such as enforcing a pension reform against the unions' will, unless
they are sure of the President's approval. In 1995, Prime Minister Juppe was
publicly supported by President Chirac, and managed to resist to unions' demands
for some three weeks. If all this had occurred when Mitterrand was President, it is
difficult to imagine that the latter would not have intervened in one way or
another against his political opponents in government.
As seen in chapter 6, the sharing of executive power between two different camps
arguably constituted a pressure for the Balladur government to seek trade unions'
acquiescence to its pension reform. It seems thus that when different parties, or
coalitions of parties, control the various key democratic institutions, governments
are more inclined to adopt concerted solutions. The impact of power
configuration, however, depends itself on the constitutional structure of a
country. Only if this provides for power sharing among different institutions does
power configuration become a relevant factor. In the British case, since the two
relevant institutions for policy-making, Parliament and the Government are
almost by definition controlled by the same camp, there is virtually no
opportunity for power-sharing to take place. In Switzerland, because of its
symmetric bicameral parliament, power configuration can play a role, for instance
if the two branches of parliament were to be controlled by different majorities.
However, since the establishment of democracy both chambers have always been
controlled by the same right-wing majority.
The determinants of exclusive-inclusive policy making: a summary
The above discussion suggests that there are a number of different factors
affecting policy-making strategies adopted by governments to enact a pension
reform. To some extent, the constitutional structure and the existence of a
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corporatist tradition, with the proviso that the latter would need additional testing,
seem to be the key factors determining patterns of policy-making. The three other
factors, electoral cycles, electoral results and power configuration, can alter the
relationship between formal institutions and policy-making patterns. As
mentioned above, if in a country with a constitutional structure that concentrates
power with the executive (such as the UK), no party manages to achieve an
absolute majority in parliament, power concentration will be substantially reduced
and the government more inclined to include external interests into policy-
making.
The discussion presented here has been summed up in table 7.1. The 5 factors are
treated separately and in relation to the four reforms analysed. For each reform,
the table indicates whether a given factor contributed to increase power
concentration or to reduce it (fragmentation).
Table 7.1. Summary of key determinants of policy-making strategies in the area
of pensions and their effect in four instances.
UK 1986 Switz. 1995 France 1993 France 1995
Constitutional structure Concentration Fragmentation Concentration Concentration
Corporatist tradition Concentration Fragmentation Concentration Concentration
Electoral cycle Fragmentation Fragmentation Fragmentation Concentration
Electoral results Concentration Concentration Concentration Concentration
Power configuration Concentration Concentration Fragmentation Concentration
Policy-making strategy Exclusive Inclusive Inclusive Exclusive
It appears from table 7.1. that when a relatively large number of factors favour
power concentration, external interests (particularly the labour movement) tend
to be excluded from pension policy-making. Conversely, when a relatively large
number of factors reduce power concentration, external interests are included in
the definition of pension policy to a larger extent. To be sure, this does not mean
that policy-making patterns are predetermined. As the table shows, all the pension
reforms analysed, with the exception of the French attempt of 1995, were adopted
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in contexts characterised by a mix of power concentration and fragmentation.
Nevertheless, it seems that exclusive policy-making occurs only when a large
number of the factors identified favour power concentration and vice versa. There
seems thus to be an association between the five factors identified and the pattern
of policy-making adopted.
7.3. THE IMPACT OF POLICY-MAKING PATTERNS ON PENSION
REFORM
The second hypothesis that guided this study, was that different patterns of
exclusion/ inclusion in policy-making will result in pension reforms which differ
on one or more dimensions. When a government can afford not to include the
demands made by external interests, then the policy outcomes are likely to better
reflect its priorities. Conversely, when majorities need the support of minorities
and external interests, reforms will be less radical and/or will include some form
of quid pro quo.
The analysis of pension reforms in three countries carried out in this study points
in some given directions with regard to the dimensions which are likely to be
most significantly affected by policy-making patterns. First, it appears that the
reforms studied did not occur at the same stage in the evolution of the 'pension
problem'. In some instances reform tended to anticipate predicted demographic
change, on other occasions, instead, it was a response to recurrent budget deficits.
Second, the scale of the various reforms appears to vary as well. Although, as will
be seen below, to measure the extent of welfare retrenchment is not a
straightforward task, it seems appropriate to distinguish reforms according to their
significance. Third, sometimes reforms have included demands formulated by the
left or the unions, and in such instances the overall direction of reform has been
affected. These three dimension seem to be related to the policy-making patterns
which have characterised the adoption of given pension reforms. The following
discussion will attempt to show how for each of them
Timing
The notion of 'timing' of a pension reform refers to when, in the development of
the pension problem, a reform is adopted. British and Swiss reforms have
introduced cuts in view of anticipating an expected financial problem. In contrast
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France intervened after various years of deficits in the basic pension scheme
budget. To some extent, this difference is related to the different patterns of
pensions financing in the three countries. In France, the basic scheme is financed
almost exclusively through employment related contributions; in Switzerland it
receives also a substantial subsidy from the fed-rA government; in the UK, in
contrast, the borderline between the pension scheme and the general government
budgets is not well defined, so that it is not possible to identify a 'pension scheme
budget deficit' as is the case in France.
Theoretically, one can expect countries which can afford to exclude external
interests to be better able to anticipate predicted financial imbalances. Conversely,
governments which tend to include minorities are more likely to react to financial
imbalances rather than to anticipate them. The rationale of this hypothesis lies
with the different credibility status granted to predicted and to actual budget
deficits. If the socio-economic pressure for reform is an expenditure projection, it
will be more difficult to convince actors which support current pension
arrangements that cuts are needed. In contrast, when a pension reform is put
forward by the government after a few years of recurring deficits, it will be easier
for it to persuade external interests that such a reform is inevitable.
In relation to this hypothesis the evidence presented in chapters 4 to 6 is
inconclusive. Swiss and British reforms, both of which anticipated predicted
budget imbalances, were adopted with different policy-making patterns. In the
case of Switzerland, however, the inclusion of the trade unions and of the
Socialists in pension policy-making did not concern the increase in retirement age
(the only element of retrenchment in the Swiss reform). On that point, as seen in
chapter 5, the left was in disagreement with the right-wing majority, which
suggest a link between anticipation and exclusion of external interests.
In the case of France, in contrast, the fact that the 1993 reform came after various
years of recurrent budget deficits, did not manage to convince the most radical
sections of the labour movement (CGT and FO) that a pension reform such as the
one put forward by the government was needed. As seen in chapter 6, although
these two federations of trade unions did not take on the government through
informal protest, they did not support cuts either. The Italian case is perhaps more
interesting in this respect. There, the 1995 pension reform was adopted with the
support of the trade unions who agreed on a series of saving measures, which they
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regarded as inevitable because of the current (as opposed to predicted) financial
difficulties of the pension scheme budget.
While the relationship between reform timing and policy-making patterns might_ .
need to be explored more systematically, it seems that when governments intend
to act in anticipation of a predicted worsening of pension schemes finances, they
are likely to have difficulties in convincing external interests of the inevitability of
pension reform, and as a result to include them in policy-making. This is more
likely to occur when reforms are adopted not in anticipation but as a reaction to
actual budget deficits.
Scale
Patterns of policy-making can have an impact on the scale Of pension reform. If
external interests are included, retrenchment-minded governments are more likely
to show moderation in their approach. In contrast, if they can afford to act without
the support or acquiescence of external interests, their reforming ambitions can be
fulfilled to a larger extent. To measure the scale of welfare retrenchment,
however, is probably just as difficult as it has been to measure the size of welfare
states. After a few decades of comparative studies of welfare state development,
there is a relatively widespread agreement on the fact that a purely quantitative
approach is simply inadequate to account for the diversity found among welfare
states (see, for example, Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1993a). Similarly, in
order to assess the size of welfare retrenchment in a country or in a scheme, one
cannot rely on a purely quantitative approach, such as looking at changes in
expenditure (Pierson 1994: 15).
In order to test the 'scale' hypothesis, however, it is essential to identify one or
more criteria which allow us to discriminate between reforms according to their
significance. As argued elsewhere (Bonoli and Palier 1997b) it seems appropriate
to distinguish between welfare reforms that reduce expenditure through localised
cuts and those which, by creating new constituencies or destabilising existing
ones, affect the politics surrounding a given scheme. This distinction is of crucial
importance for the medium- and long-term implications of welfare reforms. In the
first case, localised cuts such as changes in the benefit formula or in the indexation
method, though they can generate substantial savings, can be reversed and do not
necessarily have an impact on the long term developments of a given
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scheme. In contrast, structural change that modifies the politics of a scheme is
more difficult to reverse and can open up the way to further retrenchment.
The British 1986 Social Security Act certainly constitutes a powerful example of
reform which affects the politics of pension policy. First, it has created a new and
fairly large constituency, i.e. private pensions holders which have a set of given
stakes in the new pension system. For example, since their pensions will depend
on the return of their invested capital they are likely to oppose legislation which
might have a negative impact on capital gains (such as increased taxation, or,
more in general, policies which are not appreciated by investors). Second, the
changes have removed a relatively important number of contributors, many of
whom were relatively young, from a pay-as-you-go system. This, in the future, is
likely to exacerbate possible financial difficulties in that scheme and thus make
further retrenchment more likely. Third, the devolution from the state to the
private sector of responsibility for the retirement pensions of some 5 million
people has substantially reinforced the stakes that insurance companies and
financial institutions have in the pension system. As a result, these actors are
likely to oppose any measure which might reduce their ability to achieve
substantial profits in the area of pensions.
Swiss and French reforms, in contrast, did not have a substantial impact on the
politics of pensions. Changes in retirement age (Switzerland ) and in the
indexation and benefit formula (France) created some disappointment, but did
not affect the power relationship between the various actors and constituencies
that structure the politics of pensions. The failed 1995 French public sector
pension reform would not have modified political equilibria either, since the
measures planned were the same as those adopted in 1993 for private sector
employees. However, as seen in chapter 6, on that occasion, together with cuts in
pensions, the government adopted a series of measures aimed at reducing the
extent of control of the social partners on the health insurance scheme. This
second series of measures, in contrast, did modify political equilibria, by
strengthening the influence of the state and reducing that of the trade unions on
future decisions concerning health insurance. As seen in chapter 6, this was one
of the key factors that prompted the unions hostile reaction.
Interestingly, of the four reforms reviewed here, the two which included elements
likely to affect the politics of the relevent schemes were decided without
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concertation with external interests (UK and France 1995). In contrast Swiss and
French 1993 reforms, which were adopted after negotiations with the unions and
included elements geared towards meeting some of their demands, did not
significantly influence political equilibria. It seems thus that reforms which alter
the fundamental structure of a scheme, and thereby modify the politics
surrounding it, are more likely to be implemented by governments which can
afford to exclude external interests from policy-making.
This result could have some important implications for the future of the welfare
state. First, since structural change is more likely in countries with a strong
concentration of power with the executive, it seems plausible to assume that even
if current socio-economic conditions persist, we are unlikely to see convergence
among welfare states. Instead, what this hypothesis would suggest is the
persistence of the basic features of current welfare arrangements in countries
where power is fragmented (such as Switzerland, possibly Germany) and their
possible abandonment in countries where power is concentrated with the
government (UK). The accuracy of this hypothesis, however, depends on the
political orientation of the relevant governments, and particularly on the
interpretation they make of the pension problem. Possibly the new left-wing
governments of Britain and France will have different views from their right-wing
predecessors on the sustainability of current welfare arrangements.
Quid pro quos
Besides timing and scale of policy change, the analysis of four pension reforms in
three countries has pointed out that when policy-making is inclusive, policy
outcomes tend to combine saving measures with either elements of expansion
(Switzerland) or elements which meet the demands of key actors (the trade unions
in the 1993 French reform ). To some extent this observation is rather obvious. In
fact, the inclusion of external interests in policy-making is often made by making
concessions to those actors who favour existing arrangements. Nevertheless, quid
pro quos are not the only possible way to include external interests. An alternative
strategy could be that of reducing the amount of cuts planned after negotiations
with the trade unions. However, this second approach was not used in either of
the two relevant instances covered by this study.
While moderation in cuts might be an effective strategy for governments wishing
to reform their pension systems without upsetting public opinion or key political
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actors, there are a number of reasons to believe that the inclusion of quid pro quos
is a more effective tool to reach the same goal. Both in the case of Switzerland
and France 1993, the concessions made to the left and to the unions concerned a
long lasting request of the latter.
In the Swiss case, the unions and the Socialist Party had been arguing for an
improvement in the situation of women in the basic pension scheme for more than
a decade. In such a context, to oppose reform, and thus to reduce the chances of
the new pension legislation to be adopted, would have put the left in a difficult
situation with public opinion, with the risk of being held responsible for the
possible failure to improve women's situation in retirement. Through its strategy
of combining elements of retrenchment and expansion within a single piece of
legislation, the right-wing majority managed to secure sufficient support for its
reform plans and to win the referendum.
In the French case, the 1993 reform also included an element which was known
as being palatable to the trade unions. The creation of a new 'Old age solidarity
fund' intended to finance non-contributory pensions, was de facto a recognition
of the division of tasks between the social partners and the state, the former being
responsible for social insurance and the latter for non-contributory provision.
Such a distinction had been one of the key demands of the labour movement in
the previous years, since it provided a guarantee that they would continue to
fullfil their managing role in old age branch of social insurance. To oppose this
legislation, would have been against the very self-interest of the unions'
leadership.
In this respect, the inclusion in pension reforms of carefully selected elements
able to attract the approval of key actors (France 1993), or the combination of
elements of expansion and of retrenchment within a single piece of legislation
(Switzerland), has certainly contributed to strengthen the potential support of
otherwise politically difficult reforms. Possibly, given the impressive level of
controversy generated by the pension reform issue, the combination of
retrenchment with quid pro quos might be a pattern for the future of pension
policy in countries which lack the level of power concentration needed to impose
new legislation without the support or acquiescence of external groups.
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The sort of quid pro quos that are likely to be adopted in different countries seems
to be related, among other things, to the institutional design of the scheme that is
being reformed. Different institutional structures are likely to provide different
opportunities for quid pro quos. For example, the trading of cuts with guarantees
on the management side the pension scheme which occurred in the 1993 French
reform, would not be an available option in countries where the labour movement
is not involved in social insurance management. The next stage of the present
discussion, thus, is to identify what sort of institutional opportunities for quid pro
quos exist in different pension systems.
7.4. PENSION SCHEME DESIGN AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR QUID
PRO QUOS
There are at least two reasons which suggest that the institutional design of a
pension scheme has an impact on the sort of quid pro quos that are available to
policy-makers to gain trade unions' support or acquiescence for their pension
reform plans. First, the interests and the stakes that the various relevant actors
have in a scheme, depend to a large extent on the role they play within that
scheme. As seen in chapter 6, the French trade unions, who are involved in the
management of the whole social security system, have consistently shown a
strong attachment to their role. Second, depending on the structure of the scheme,
some groups are likely to fare better than others. As a result those who are
disadvantaged can be convinced to support retrenchment if they see their position
improved.
In this respect, it seems that the distinction between pension schemes of
Bismarcician and Beveridgean inspiration (see chapters 1 and 2) might bear some
relevance with regard to what are the sort of quid pro quos that are likely to be
demanded by the trade unions, or by other relevant pressure groups, and conceded
by governments. The sample selected for this study includes countries which
reflect the principles either mode1 3 . However, because in the British case the
government did not include elements aimed at meeting the demands of the unions
(nor of other external interests), it is difficult on the basis of this study to identify
3 France reflects many features of the Bismarckian model. Switzerland, because it has a ceiling
on benefits, does not exactly respect the Bismarckian principle of equivalence between
contributions and benefits, but comes nevertheless nearer to the Bismarcician end of the spectrum
in so far as entitlement and financing are concerned. Britain, comes closer to the Beveridgean
model.
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opportunities for quid pro quos in Beveridgean countries. In contrast, the
presence of two Bismarckian-leaning countries in the sample makes possible the
identification of likely patterns of quid pro quos in such countries.
Quid pro quos in Bismarckian countries
As pointed out elsewhere (Bonoli et al. 1996), trade unions in Bismarckian
countries tend to view insurance based pension schemes as some sort of collective
insurance plan covering all salaried employees (and the self-employed if
included). As a result they generally disagree with governments when they use
insurance-based schemes for general social policy purposes, such as poverty
alleviation in old age. This is not only the case in France (see chapter 6) but also
in countries like Germany and Italy. For instance, the German trade unions
oppose their government's decision to apply a non-contributory eligibility
criterion to social insurance benefits in the former GDR after the unification (ibid.
8). Similarly, in Italy, in the negotiations which led to the 1995 pension reform, a
key demand of the labour movement was that the state take financial
responsibility for the non-contributory elements of the insurance-based pension
scheme (La Repubblica 14/3/95).
There are two possible reasons behind this common position of trade unions in
Bismarckian countries. First, the exclusion of non-contributory elements from the
main scheme, means a stricter correspondence between the contribution-payer
community and the beneficiaries. This reduces the size of the transfer of resources
from workers to other categories and increases the financial capacity of insurance-
based schemes. Second, since in Bismarckian countries the trade unions are
generally involved in the management of social insurance, a strict separation
between non-contributory and insurance-based provision constitutes a de facto
acceptance of their role. This second factor is especially strong in France.
In this respect, the institutional design of pension schemes of Bismarckian
inspiration offers governments the opportunity to trade concessions on the
separation between insurance-based and non-contributory provision with a
reduction in the generosity of pension provision. This combination of measures
aiming in different directions is likely to attract the support or the acquiescence of
the labour movement. This strategy was adopted successfully by the French
government in 1993 and could be adopted in Germany as well. The compromise
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is likely to satisfy both governments and unions. The former, without additional
spending (expenditure is simply transferred from the social insurance to general
government budget) is able to secure at least the acquiescence of the labour
movement; the latter see financial pressure on insurance-based schemes reduced
and as a result further retrenchment less likely. This sort of quid pro quos,
however, has the disadvantage of being available only once. When the separation
between insurance-based and non-contributory provision has been fully achieved,
scope for such compromises is exhausted.
The Swiss case points in another possible direction for quid pro quos in
Bismarcician countries. Since in these systems, entitlement to benefits is based on
the payment of work-related contributions, groups with discontinuous
employment patterns fare generally less well than those with 'standard' careers.
This is particularly the case of women. As seen in chapter 5, this was the case in
Switzerland. The situation of women in retirement, however, can be improved
through the introduction of contribution credits and/or contribution sharing
between spouses/partners. Both measures take into account the peculiarity of
women's career patterns, by compensating for periods of inactivity. Bismarckian
pension schemes, although they were designed with the male breadwinner model
in mind, can be corrected and made more responsive to women's needs.
Progress towards gender equality in retirement can be also be used by
governments to obtain support or acquiescence of progressive groups to their plan
for pension reform. Generally, left-wing parties and trade unions are particularly
sensitive to the issue of gender equality. If given the opportunity to achieve this
objective in provision for retirement, these groups might accept cuts in the overall
generosity of a pension schemes which they would otherwise oppose. This is
precisely what happened in Switzerland in the 1995 pension reform.
The Swiss case, however, is rather peculiar because the level of gender inequality
before the reform was rather significant (see chapter 5) and seen as unacceptable
by large sections of the population. Possibly, the sort of quid pro quo seen in the
Swiss case is more likely to occur when discrimination against women is strong.
Countries which have already taken steps towards gender equality are obviously
less likely to reach a compromise on pension reform in this way.
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7.5. INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF PENSION REFORM
Recent studies of the politics of welfare retrenchment have shown that there are
two ways in which institutions have an impact on policy-outcomes (Pierson 1994;
Myles and Quadagno 1996). First, the institutional structure of the relevant
schemes affects the position of the various actors in relation to reform and points
in some given directions if savings are to be achieved. Depending on pension
scheme institutional design some reforms are likely to be less painful than others,
and as a result more politically feasible. Second, formal institutions provide the
rule of the game of policy-making, in pensions as well as any other area of public
policy. Political actors have access to decision-making to a variety of degrees
depending primarily on the constitutional structure of their country.
This study intended to deal with the second link, hence the selection of three
countries with very different constitutional structures and policy-making patterns.
Nevertheless, as the above discussion shows, the two elements of the institutional
link cannot be treated separately, for they constantly interact in influencing the
course of pension policy. Constitutional structures might put pressures on
governments to seek a compromise acceptable to the unions, but pension scheme
design affects the actual shape of such a compromise. If the objective of research
is to shed light on the relationship between constitutional structures and policy
outcomes, the institutional structure of the scheme reformed is an essential
additional variable.
Constitutional structures, however, remain a crucial determinant of the course of
pension policy. Pension reforms, because of their universal character (a change in
pension policy affects virtually the whole population of a country), affect
distributional mechanisms in which virtually every individual has a stake, and is
likely to fight in order to preserve it. In this respect, the extent to which
individuals, groups and political actors have access to policy making is a key
element in the determination of given policy outcomes, as is the government's
capacity to resist to external pressures. Access to policy-making and resistance to
external pressures, of course, depend to a substantial extent on constitutional
structures.
This relationship is perhaps most obvious in the Swiss case, where through the
referendum system Swiss voters can challenge legislation which they regard as
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unsatisfactory. Almost any group can threaten to challenge new pension
legislation at the polls. If the measures proposed are unpopular, then there is a
substantial risk of defeat. The result is that the ruling majority is not particularly
capable to resist external pressures. That is why the right-wing majority has been
inclined to negotiate the content of reform with external groups and to include
measures likely to reduce the potential unpopularity of pension cuts. When
agreement became impossible, then the strategy was to combine retrenchment and
expansion elements within a single piece of legislation, so as to strengthen the
pension reform's chances to survive the referendum challenge
The British government has a much stron ger capacity to resist external pressures
during policy-making, but is more vulnerable to electoral punishment. In the
British electoral system a relatively minor swing from the governing party to the
opposition can make the difference from being in power or not. For this reason,
the key preoccupation of British policy-makers was probably not so much the
political feasibility of reform, but its likely electoral repercussion. By choosing a
retrenchment option which affected only a section of the population, and by
reducing its short term negative impact through tax concessions (the '2 % bribe),
the Thatcher government managed to neutralise the electoral threat.
In France, the capacity of the government to resist external pressures varies
according to power configuration: it is much stronger when President and Prime
Minister belong to the same camp. When this was not the case, in 1993, the
government accepted to include some of the trade unions' demands in its new
pension legislation. These concessions were related to the management of the
basic pension scheme and were relevant for the trade union leadership but not for
the general public. Unlike in the British and Swiss cases, the French government
was not trying to appease public opinion (possibly also because it had just
achieved a landslide victory) but was after union acquiescence. The popularity of
pensions with the public, however, arguably played a role in France as well, since
it constitutes an asset for the trade unions when they decide to set up informal
protests.
Constitutional structures, however, are not the only factor affecting governments'
capacity to resist external pressures. As seen above, at least four other elements4
4These are: the existence of a corporatist tradition; electoral cycles; electoral results, and power
configuration.
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have affected power concentration and policy-making patterns in the three
countries studied. Some of them, have little to do with constitutional structures
and institutions. The existence of a corporatist tradition depends primarily on the
strength of the labour movement, and thus on socio-structural factors. Electoral
results, though related to institutions (through electoral laws) depend on a wide
range of other factors. The impact of institutions, thus, should not be exaggerated,
and in particular, should not be considered as a fixed and constant feature. As the
French example has shown, a combination of electoral concerns and power
configuration prompted the government to adopt a less uncompromising stance
than what is usually allowed by French formal institutions.
Formal institutions, and particularly constitutional structures, are an important
factor in determining the course of policy. This is particularly true in the case of
pensions, because of their universal character. However, the impact of formal
institutions cannot be appreciated if these are looked at out of their social and
political context. It is the analysis of the interaction between formal institutions,
social structures, political contingencies and pension scheme design that best
accounts for the observed patterns of retrenchment in the area of pensions.
227
Conclusion
Like most doctoral dissertations, the present one has gone through a number of
phases during which its goals, its ambitions and its central arguments have
somewhat evolved. The initial objective of this study was to explore the link
between constitutional structures and the political feasibility of welfare
retrenchment. The idea behind this was to show that retrenchment was easier in
countries where constitutional structures concentrate power. That is why I decided
to cover countries like France, Switzerland and Britain, known for having very
different constitutional structures.
However, as I started gathei-ing information on pension reforms in the three
countries, I realised that the relationship between constitutional structures and
welfare reform was much more complex that I had assumed initially. In addition,
I had the chance to read Paul Pierson's book 'Dismantling the Welfare State',
which argued that the relationship between formal institutions and retrenchment
was not a linear one. Formal institutions which concentrate power, by the same
token, concentrate accountability. As a result, their overall effect on welfare
reform remains uncertain. This view has been confirmed by the present study, as
reforms have succeeded in both Switzerland and Britain, two opposites as far as
constitutional structures are concerned, and have failed in France, which is
somewhere between the two.
As I continued in my research work, I realised that the initial question could be
fruitfully expanded. Instead of simply asking whether constitutional structures
had an impact on the feasibility of retrenchment policies, I began to look at the
shape of given welfare reforms, and at other non-constitutional variables which
were likely to affect them. In particular, I realised that constitutional structures
alone explained rather little: their relevance depended on a number of other
factors such as electoral results, the relationship between the state and organised
interests, and so forth. The subject-matter soon became more complex that I
initially thought it would be.
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These problems emerged at various stages of the research work, so that while on
the one hand I was becoming aware of the complexity involved in this study, on
the other I was having access to increasing amounts of information concerning
policy-making processes and on pension reform politics. This made my job
easier, as after the completion of the empirical work, the theoretical links between
independent and dependent variables emerged very clearly from a simple
comparison of the three case studies. To have highlighted some theoretical links,
can be regarded as the key contribution of the present study to the ongoing debate
on the current transformation of welfare states.
Key findings
This study has explored the question of whether formal institutions and in
particular constitutional arrangements have an impact on social policy reform in
the area of pensions. On the basis of a new-institutionalist understanding of public
policy-making, these institutional structures are seen as imposing limits on the
content of pension reform. Radical and unilateral reforms have been put forward
only in contexts of strong power concentration. In contrast, institutions which
provoke fragmentation of power have tended to be associated with reforms that
have included some of the demands formulated by external interests, in general
by the trade unions.
This was very clear in the case of Switzerland. There, a constitutional structure
that encourages power-sharing and provides veto points to unsatisfied minorities
has produced a pension reform which combines element of retrenchment and of
expansion. In the Swiss 1995 reform, the key saving measure was to increase the
retirement age for women from 62 to 64. This was fiercely opposed by the
Socialist Party and by the labour movement, who had been arguing in favour of a
reduction in the age of retirement in order to reduce labour supply and
unemployment. However, the parliamentary right-wing majority decided to
include, within the same piece of legislation, provision for contribution credits
for informal carers and a contribution-sharing system for married couples. These
two measures are going to affect mainly women and are meant to compensate the
loss due to a higher retirement age for this group. More crucially, however,
contribution credits and contribution-sharing had been among the key demands of
the left and of the labour movement in pension policy for a few years. The result
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was that the left did not oppose the pension reform which managed to survive the
referendum obstacle and is now law. Without the inclusion of such quid pro quos,
the government would certainly have had more problems in getting its legislation
accepted at the polls.
In France this study has looked at two pension reforms, adopted under different
political circumstances. As seen in chapter 6, the French constitution can provide
the opportunity for executive power-sharing, which occurs when the presidency
and parliament are controlled by different parties. The 1993 reform was adopted
in this situation of fragmented executive power, and the result was that it included
provision for the creation of an 'Old age solidarity fund', which met some of the
trade unions' demands. In 1995, with the election of Jacques Chirac to the
presidency, power fragmentation gave way to a unified executive. In this context
of strong power concentration, the French government put forward plans for a
second pension reform, which did not include any significant concession to the
labour movement. In response, the latter managed to set up an impressive mass
protest movement which eventually forced the government to drop its plans.
Finally, the British case displayed both a strong level of power concentration and
a reform which did not include any significant quid pro quo for external interests.
Moreover, the savings brought about by the 1986 pension reform were de facto
targeted on a section of the population only: those who did not have access to
occupational pensions. Many voters, mainly middle class and thus more inclined
to support the Conservative party, did not experience any loss because of the
changes in legislation. As a result of this strategy, the government managed to
minimise the risk of being electorally punished.
The comparison of these three case studies points in a number of directions with
regard to the identification of theoretical links.
First, what best accounts for patterns of inclusion and exclusion in policy-making
is not the constitutional order of a country alone, but its interaction with a
number of other features such as electoral results, political cycles and government
- unions relationships, or, on an abstract level, the factors likely to affect the level
of power concentration with the executive. On this basis, this study has shown
that strong power concentration tends to be associated with exclusive policy-
making and with unilateral pension reforms. In contrast, pension reforms adopted
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in contexts of power fragmentation, tend to include quid pro quos for groups who
oppose cuts in pension legislation, and to be more balanced in their distributional
outcomes.
Second, the timing of reform seems to be related to the level of power
concentration. When the latter was strong, retrenchment-minded governments
have been able to adopt reforms designed to anticipate predicted (as opposed to
current) financial problems (UK 1986). In contrast, in contexts of power
fragmentation it has proved more difficult for governments to anticipate expected
financial difficulties. Generally, reforms have been adopted after a few years of
recurring deficits in pension scheme budgets (France 1993).
Third, power distribution has had an impact on the scale of change brought about
by the relevant pension reforms. Profound changes in pension legislation,
particularly those likely to affect distributional and political equilibria
surrounding a given scheme, have succeeded only in contexts of strong power
concentration. Particularly, the UK 1986 reform has altered the politics of
pensions in a substantial way. First it has weakened the constituency supporting
SERPS; second, it has created a new, fairly large constituency, personal pension
holders, with their own set of interests in pension policy, and finally, it has
reinforced the stakes that the financial sector has in the pension system. In
contrast, power fragmentation tends to be associated with incremental change and
with strict path dependency. Cuts included in the Swiss and in the 1993 French
reforms, did not affect in a significant way political equilibria. The relationships
between the various actors with a stake in pension policy remains unchanged.
These findings suggest that particularly radical and unilateral reforms may not be
'politically feasible' in countries where constitutional arrangements encourage
power fragmentation. This could simply mean that in these countries the
adaptation process of welfare states will take longer, but will eventually produce
the same results obtained in countries with strong power concentration. However,
the fact that power fragmented system tend to combine retrenchment with
expansion, could result in an alternative path to adaptation, which combines the
requirements of economic competitiveness with responses to emerging needs.
Trading cuts in provision with an improvement of women's treatment (as it
happened in the Swiss reform) could be an example.
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If consensus does produce qualitatively different results from confrontation,
perhaps the expected convergence in social policies due to common socio-
economic pressures will not materialise. While in the past the main obstacle to
convergence has been politics, there are strong reasons to believe that in the
current and future phase of welfare restructuring this key role will be played by
formal institutions. As socio-economic pressures due to ageing and globalisation
intensify, the room for manoeuvre allowed to left-wing parties in government
diminishes. As a result, although recently the left has been very successful in a
large number of European countries, the sort of policies adopted when in
government are not significantly different from those enacted by their right-wing
predecessors. The result is a change in the configuration of welfare politics: the
classical opposition left-right is being replaced by a confrontation between
governments (regardless of political persuasion) and the labour movement. This
is increasingly clear in countries like Italy and France (currently ruled by left-of-
centre governments), and will possibly emerge in Britain, although the
traditionally strong relationship between the Labour Party and the unions might
mitigate this shift. As the political orientation of governments looses relevance as
a determinant of the direction of policy, the role played by formal institutions is
likely to become more visible.
The limits of the present study - Directions for future research
With regard to independent variables, this study has concentrated mainly on
institutions. These, however, are not likely to be the only factor behind current
and future change. As acknowledged throughout this study, socio-structural
factors, like the strength and the mobilising capacity of trade unions, seem to be
playing a substantial role in the current process of welfare state restructuring. Like
constitution-based power fragmentation, a strong and well integrated labour
movement can provide a formidable obstacle for governments committed to cut
back on welfare provision. The trade unions' ability to set up and sustain mass
protest, however, depends also on the popularity of welfare arrangements and on
people's perceptions of the state's obligation towards them. These factors refer to
the cultural level, and arguably would need to be analysed as well.
A second limitation lies with the small number of countries covered. Possibly, in
order to ascertain with more accuracy the relationship between constitutional
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structures, patterns of power distribution and social policy reform, one would
need to investigate it in a larger number of instances, and in a wider number of
countries. In addition, given the fact that this analysis has covered only pensions,
additional research should try to establish whether these findings are sector-
specific or can be generalised to other areas of welfare.
Finally, this study, together with an increasingly large number of other ones, has
tried to contribute to a wider research effort, which consists in the exploration of
the relationship between institutions and policy-outcomes. This is certainly
relevant to current debates on the future of the welfare state. However, it seems
that if analysis were to be limited to institutions, our understanding of current
change would be at best partial. After having looked at socio-economic, at
political and now at institutional explanations of social policy change, I believe
that a possibly fruitful next step is to look at the impact of cultural factors on
welfare policy.
Intuitively, there seems to be substantial cross-national differences in the
perceptions of the relationship between the individual on the one hand; and the
state, the market and the family on the other. Particularly, variations concerning
what is regarded to be the reasonable obligations an individual attributes to each
of these three agencies. A recent study has shown the existence of substantial
cross-national differences in what is regarded to be an appropriate level of family
obligations in various European countries (Millar 1996). This sort of research
could be applied to the relationship between the individual and the two other
agencies: state and market. Perhaps this might help to account for why
Continental Europeans seem to be prepared to resist welfare retrenchment to a
larger extent than Britons or Americans
This study has tried to contribute to the debate on the current transformation of
welfare states, by highlighting some mechanisms that relate constitutional
structures to policy outcomes in the area of pensions. However, I hope that it will
also be understood as a invitation to pay more attention to the politics of pensions
when reform is being considered. The pension problem is at least as much a
political problem as an economic one, and it is pointless to look for solutions on
an abstract level without taking into account country-specific degrees of political
feasibility. Any discussion on the future of pensions should be informed by what
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we know with regard to the acceptability of different measures by various actors
and in different institutional contexts.
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